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1 General Introduction
In classical economics the baseline assumption when analyzing the strategic behavior
and performance of firms and individuals is that decision-makers are completely ra-
tional and selfish (focused on maximizing their own payoff). While this assumption is
a useful theoretical benchmark, it do not always apply to peoples behavior in reality.
Human beings are often only partially rational, which may lead to unsophisticated and
inefficient decisions.
In the three self-contained chapters of this dissertation, I analyze strategic decision-
making and the dynamics of markets and teams using laboratory experiments. Chapter
2, which is based on joint work with Stefan Penczynski, investigates how much infor-
mation sellers are willing to disclose under competition and whether consumers make
sophisticated buying decisions in the sense that they can draw the right conclusions
from the information that is and is not provided to them. Chapter 3, which is based on
joint work with Henrik Orzen, considers only the firm side and analyzes the assumption
that due to competition and market dynamics only rational firms that decide optimally
in terms of profit maximization survive in the long-run. Chapter 3 tackles the question
of the validity of laboratory experiments in our market setting. In Chapter 4 I exam-
ine dynamic investment behavior in a teamwork setting where investments have to be
accumulated over time to complete a certain project. I seek to analyze whether there
is cooperative behavior even if collective interests conflict with individual interests as
costs are private and benefits are public.
2Chapter 2
In B-to-C markets consumers are often overwhelmed by the number of brands and
product variations offered and, when trying to make informed decisions, rely on third-
party product information. Often they are unable to draw the proper conclusions from
the information provided or fail to consider the possibility that information may have
been deliberately withheld. Firms can exploit this rather naive behavior by selectively
providing information that is advantageous to them. One thing that might help even
unsophisticated consumers is competition. Competitive forces and the need to attract
more consumers can act as a lever forcing firms to disclose more information.
To analyze the disclosure of verifiable information in settings with and without seller
competition we established an experimental framework with varying market and infor-
mation structures. This enabled us to see how competition on the one hand and sellers
ability to purchase further verifiable information on the other affected firms disclosure
decisions and consumers conclusions.
We found that increased competition had a significant positive effect on the disclosure
of information. Sellers often chose to disclose selected information and buyers on
average accounted for this by bidding less than the reported average. However, buyers
on average did not fully compensate for sellers’ selective disclosures and, surprisingly,
did particularly poorly in the competitive setting. When sellers had the option to
purchase additional information, unobserved by the buyers, the stronger selection upon
purchase was counterbalanced by stronger overall compensation on the buyer side, on
average lowering buyers’ overbidding compared to the benchmark cases.
Chapter 3
Experiments in industrial organization in which students assume the role of firms are
often criticized due to concerns about external validity. There are several facets to
this problem. In this paper we discuss one common line of reasoning that uses an
evolutionary argument. The idea is that in “real” markets competition favors firms
3that decide optimally and market forces eliminate firms that do not maximize profits.
Therefore, it is safe to assume that firms that are still present in a market conform to
the ideals of the rational choice model.
To investigate the relevance of this claim to the validity of laboratory experiments
we set up a deliberately complex market setting and compared behavior and market
outcomes in two treatments. In the Baseline treatment subjects were allocated at
random to markets of different sizes and then interacted strategically by investing in
production capacity and by competing on prices over several periods. Losses or poor
performance were distinct possibilities but did not lead to any selection. The Market
Force treatment was identical except that subjects could self-select into the market as
long as they had sufficient liquidity and were expelled from the market if they did not.
We examine sorting effects and market performance.
We did not find strong evidence in favor of the market selection argument. Although
we observed a clear sorting effect when market entry was endogenous, the self-selection
did not affect outcomes significantly. In both treatments, firms oftentimes did not fully
exploit their market power in market with lower competitive pressure, while in mar-
kets with more competitors capacities and prices tend to be too high affecting profits
negatively. Overall, we found that experience had a significantly positive effect on
profitability and although the setting was deliberately complex, participants’ decisions
converged on average to the equilibrium solution.
Chapter 4
The term “procrastination” is often associated with individual behavior. In fact, pro-
crastination is not just an individual issue and can be a major roadblock to teamwork
which can lead to the failure of a project. One common remedy to counteract procras-
tination is setting deadlines.
To investigate dynamic investment behavior in individual and team projects as well
as the effects of team size and deadlines, I employ a setting where participants make
4effort decisions over several periods in order to complete a project. Treatments varied
in two different dimensions: team size and type of deadline. Deadlines were set in one
of two ways: (i) Team members were allowed to suggest a maximum number of periods
for project completion and a deadline was then defined through a mechanism based on
the suggestions made (self-imposed deadline). (ii) Teams were told how many periods
they had to complete the project (exogenous deadline).
I found that, in the absence of deadlines, there was little procrastination when par-
ticipants worked alone, and all of them managed to complete their projects. However,
teams systematically failed to coordinate on the most efficient outcome. In contrast
to working alone, teamwork seemed to foster procrastination, and team size even en-
hanced that negative effect. Large teams needed almost twice as long as small ones to
complete a project. Overall, introducing a deadline helped to mitigate the problem of
procrastination. However, it negatively affected project completion rates, particularly
when the deadline was exogenous rather than self-imposed. In addition, team size also
showed a strong negative effect on the completion rate, independently of the amount
of time teams had to finish a project.
2 Disclosure of Verifiable Informa-
tion under Competition1
2.1 Introduction
Many times per day, consumers are confronted in media advertisements and on product
packages with verifiable product information that producers choose to convey. This
might be a microwave oven’s “very good” result in an independent test, the certified
absence of a chemical in a plastic container, or the scientifically proven tolerance of
humans to cholesterol from egg. How useful the presence and in particular the absence
of such information is to the consumer often depends on her skill to judge the selection
of disclosed information.
In order to investigate both the seller’s selection and the appropriateness of con-
sumer’s inference, this study establishes a rich experimental framework with varying
market and information structure. In particular, the framework enables us to see how
seller competition as well as the seller’s ability to purchase further verifiable information
change the disclosure behavior of sellers and the inference of buyers.
In contrast to cheap talk games, the verifiability of the information provides a clear
link to the underlying state of the world, so that such disclosure games often feature full
information revelation. However, for this to work, the seminal theoretical treatments
1This chapter is based on joint work with Stefan P. Penczynski.
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emphasize the important role of the buyer’s sophistication in the form of “skepticism”
in the inference process (Grossman, 1981; Milgrom and Roberts, 1986). Recent exper-
imental studies suggest that the level of sophistication is often low enough to cause
harmful inferences on the receiver end of the information (Jin, Luca and Martin, 2016;
Benndorf, Ku¨bler and Normann, 2015).
Looking at the examples above, a likely aid in favor of the consumer is the com-
petition between sellers. Indeed, for the case of incomplete sophistication, Milgrom
and Roberts (1986) show that competition among parties with strongly-opposed in-
terests reestablishes full information revelation as sellers increase disclosure. Although
not studied theoretically, competition and choice of seller might also change buyers’
sensitivity to a given level of non-disclosure.
On the other hand, a complicating factor for consumers is usually the uncertainty
about the size of the set of verifiable information available to the seller. For example, a
favorable subset of verifiable information from nutrition science might shape consumers’
view of food items such as eggs more than it should if they think that no other evidence
exists.2 Theoretical studies show that uncertainty about the set of evidence makes
information transmission more difficult and can inhibit the unraveling of information
(Dziuda, 2011; Felgenhauer and Schulte, 2014).
Our experimental framework is designed to investigate in detail seller disclosure and
buyer inference in a versatile setting with varying market and information structure.
The setup naturally reflects the rich informational setting of product markets as well as
the conflict of interest that arises from sellers’ incentives to increase buyers’ willingness
to pay and buyers’ incentives to evaluate the product correctly. Sellers have ten pieces
of noisy evidence about the product quality, whose true value only they know precisely.
For each one, they can decide whether or not to reveal it. The bidding mechanism gives
buyers incentives to bid their true valuation of the product.
2For example, in a recent influential meta-study of randomized-controlled trials on the effect of
dietary cholesterol on blood cholesterol, 11 out of 12 studies chosen to be analyzed were funded by
the egg or fish industry (Griffin and Lichtenstein, 2013). The study disregarded a number of studies
with different results (McDougall, 2016).
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One dimension of our 2× 2 experimental design relates to the number of sellers in a
market, which is one in the monopolistic setting M and four in the competitive setting
C. In the latter setting, buyers chooseone seller and bid for her product. In the other
dimension, the benchmark of ten pieces of evidence is extended by the sellers’ option
to purchase for a small fee an additional set offive evidences about the product quality.
Buyers are aware of the option, but cannot observe whether it was exercised.
Across settings, we find that sellers frequently report only a selected set of evidences
which predominantly contains the most favorable evidences. Buyers compensate for
that selection, but – in accordance with previous findings of limited sophistication
– often to an insufficient degree. Although buyers’ correct inferences could impose
equality of payoffs, sellers gain more than buyers across all four games. Competition
increases transparency throughout, albeit not to the level of full disclosure. Despite the
increased transparency, buyers compensate surprisingly little for the selection in the
competitive settings. Indeed, they almost undo the potential benefit of competition
as they earn on average only slightly more when choosing one seller out of four than
when not. The influence of the competitive setting on the buyer’s inference is thus as
important as the sellers’ increased disclosure.
The option to purchase additional information on average leads to more evidences
being published. However, it does not change the bias in the published evidence because
this increase is mostly due to the larger set of evidences to select from. Further, the
buyer’s skepticism is increased in the monopoly setup, leading to an average bid that
almost coincides with the product value. In the competitive setup, the skepticism
increases but does not reduce the gap between the bid and the true product value. In
both cases, the investment in the additional evidences is worthwhile for sellers.
Overall, we deliver a detailed account of sellers’ selection of favorable evidences and
buyers’ insufficient compensation for it. Full disclosure is rare since the compensatory
buyer behavior favors opacity. We see that competition decreases buyers’ skepticism
2.2 Related Literature 8
surprisingly strongly, while the uncertainty about the available set of evidences in-
creases it moderately.
Thanks to the nature of our games, we not only observe that skepticism is insuf-
ficient in the baseline setting, we further observe that it changes in response to the
institutional setting. Our results imply that skepticism is a very useful feature of con-
sumers postures, if applied in the given context correctly. Johnson, Meier and Toubia
(2015), for example, study a context in which skepticism is too strong and turns out
costly for consumers. Conversely, the persistence of objectively misguided consumer
myths arising from business-related information provision, such as the perceived con-
sumption necessity of dairy products for bone strength and for coverage of calcium
and protein needs, suggests the existence of areas of insufficient skepticism. Overall,
the recent investigations in the topic suggest that consumers have potential to improve
the calibration of their skepticism and increase their welfare by dealing better with
information that is provided by interested parties.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 shows how our study relates and
contributes to different strands of literature. Section 2.3 presents our experimental
games and discusses theoretical considerations and the related literature. Section 2.4
reports the results before section 2.6 discusses them and concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
In economics, the understanding of the negative consequences of information asym-
metries motivates the investigation of information disclosure (Akerlof, 1970; Viscusi,
1978). In particular, the potential of voluntary disclosure of information is investigated
in order to evaluate the need for mandatory disclosure policies (Grossman and Hart,
1980; Grossman, 1981). The prediction of full voluntary disclosure of verifiable infor-
mation due to unraveling is important, but also dependent on assumptions such as
negligible disclosure costs, sufficient competition, or rationality of the consumer (Mil-
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grom, 1981; Milgrom and Roberts, 1986).3 The endogenous provision of evidence is
a characteristic feature of the large class of persuasion games that have been studied
extensively (Glazer and Rubinstein, 2001, 2004, 2006; Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011)
Apart from reasons for incomplete disclosure such as the large amounts of information
available to the consumer and strategic considerations not to disclose information (Dra-
nove and Jin, 2010), recent studies have investigated the sophistication of consumers
in more detail. Brown, Camerer and Lovallo (2012, 2013) show that the preventing of
movie previews by critics is associated with lower movie quality, a relationship which
is possibly underestimated by customers.
Experimental studies such as ours allow to cleanly study simplified situations in order
to understand the underlying mechanism more deeply. Forsythe, Isaac and Palfrey
(1989) study information disclosure in blind-bid auctions and see that – as theory
predicts – all sellers eventually disclose the true value of their product. The auction
format and the consequent strategic considerations make it difficult to clearly identify
the role and extent of bidders’ sophistication.
In a recent study, Jin, Luca and Martin (2016) experimentally implement a simple
stylized disclosure game similar to the original setup in Milgrom and Roberts (1986)
which is suitable to cleanly investigate buyers’ sophistication. They find that unraveling
is incomplete due to a lack of skepticism in buyers, which persists over a large number
of rounds and under the provision of detailed feedback. This study is the most detailed
investigation of buyer behavior in this standard setting. In slightly different settings,
two recent studies support the finding of limited sophistication on the buyer’s side.
Hagenbach and Perez-Richet (2015) experimentally investigate disclosure when types
are not monotonically ordered, a case considered theoretically in Hagenbach, Koessler
and Perez-Richet (2014). Benndorf, Ku¨bler and Normann (2015) consider disclosure
of information in labor markets with the focus on privacy concerns.
3The large theoretical and experimental literature on cheap talk considers situations in which
statements are not bound to relate to the true seller type (Crawford and Sobel, 1982; Cai and Wang,
2006; Wang, Spezio and Camerer, 2010).
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In our study, we extend this literature by proposing a simple and flexible market
framework of information disclosure which is directly informative about seller and
buyer behavior. Thanks to its flexibility, we can investigate behavior across market
and information structures and therefore uncover whether the sophistication of buyers’
and its anticipation by sellers changes between them.
Milgrom and Roberts (1986) show that the skepticism of buyers leads to unraveling
even in monopolistic markets. Further, competition among sellers with strongly op-
posed interests is able to compensate for lacking skepticism on the buyer side by the
existence of incentives to reveal the truth about products. Empirical studies support
the view that competition matters, although it is not clear in which direction. Jin
(2005) studies health organizations and shows that competition gives stronger incen-
tives to differentiate in disclosure decisions. Burks, Cuny, Gerakos and Granja (2015)
find an increase in competition between banks to raise the level of voluntary disclosure
and in particular of negative information.
Our experiment allows us to cleanly observe how competition changes transparency.
So far, there is little understanding of whether and how the subjective perception of
competition influences beliefs and sophistication of the consumer (Huck and Zhou,
2011).
The possibility of extending the set of evidences relates our study to the literature
on strategic experimentation and the trade-off between benefits from exploration and
exploitation in bandit problems (Rothschild, 1974; Aghion, Bolton, Harris and Jullien,
1991). Here, the trade-off is simpler since the seller only has to weigh the fixed costs of
additional evidence against the transparency and selection benefits of more evidences.
In the persuasion context, the buyer’s uncertainty with respect to the seller’s pool of
evidences increases the burden on the evidences and makes partial communication less
informative. In a model with an exogenously given set of evidences, Dziuda (2011)
shows that persuasion is feasible if the persuader has a high number of favorable evi-
dences. Felgenhauer and Schulte (2014) find the same with private acquisition of new
2.3 Experimental Games 11
evidences and show that a limit on the number of evidences acquired makes persuasion
impossible if the seller’s stakes are too high.
Our experiment illuminates sellers’ propensity to extend the evidence set and whether
this results in increased transparency and/or stronger selection of evidences. Further-
more, we show whether and to which extent the uncertainty increases the skepticism
with which evidences are received.
Finally, the determinants and the right level of skepticism is an increasingly covered
topic in economics (Johnson et al., 2015). Burdea, Montero and Sefton (2016) show in
an experimental study of disclosure of partially verifiable information that receivers’
skepticism decreases when they have more control about verification, holding constant
the amount of and selection of information revealed. Due to the importance of unbiased
information for consumer welfare, we believe that the empirical study of skepticism and
its determinants is a topic of high importance.
2.3 Experimental Games
We investigate the effects of competition and of additional disclosable information in a
2×2 experimental design as shown in Table 2.1. In the first dimension, we implement
two market structures, monopoly and competition. In the second dimension, on top of
the standard number of ten evidences, the option to purchase five additional evidences
exists.
Monopoly Competition
M C
10 Evidences (X10) M10 C10
10+5 Evidences (X10+5) M10+5 C10+5
Table 2.1: 2×2 experimental design.
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Monopoly (M10) The most basic game features one seller and one buyer. The seller
offers a good of value v, which is uniform-randomly drawn from [200, 1000]. While this
distribution is common knowledge, the realization is private information to the seller.
The seller cannot communicate the true value of the good to the buyer, but he receives a
disclosable set E of ten informative but noisy evidences ei. The evidences are normally
distributed with a standard deviation of σ = 100 and a mean of µ = v. The number
and distribution of evidences is common knowledge. The seller decides which of those
evidences, if any, to report to the buyer and thus determines a message M ⊆ E. Due to
the verifiability of information, the seller cannot change or manipulate the evidences’
values. Evidences outside of M remain his private information.
The buyer observes M and bids b ∈ [0, 1200] to buy one unit of the seller’s good.
The design of the price mechanism is equivalent to a Becker, DeGroot and Marschak
(1964) mechanism: The price for one unit of the good, p > 0, is uniform-randomly
drawn from the interval [v−200, v+ 200]. p is disclosed only after the buyer places her
bid. If b < p, the transaction does not take place, leaving both parties with a payoff
of 0. If b ≥ p, the transaction takes place and the buyer gets the value v for the price
p. The seller obtains the bid b and incurs costs of c = v − 50 upon production of one
unit.4
In summary, the seller’s payoff is
ΠS(b, p, c) =

(b− c) if b ≥ p,
0 otherwise.
and the buyer’s payoff is
ΠB(b, p, v) =

(v − p) if b ≥ p,
0 otherwise.
4For examples of possible outcomes see Appendix A.1.
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It can be shown that – similar to a second price auction – it is a dominant strategy
for the buyer to bid what she believes to be the true value of the good. Therefore, this
rich setup cleanly implements the natural conflict of interest between the seller that
wants the buyer’s bid to be as high as possible and the buyer that wants her evaluation
of the good to be as accurate as possible.
Competition (C10) The competition game features four sellers and four buyers in
each market. Sellers are denoted by j ∈ {A,B,C,D}. Each seller offers a good with
a value vj that is independently drawn and private information as before. All aspects
of E remain the same. The decisions of each seller to determine M ⊆ E are made
simultaneously. Subsequently, the buyers as well as the sellers observe the published
evidences of all four sellers.
In contrast to before, buyers choose from which seller to buy before they place their
bid b for the chosen seller’s product. Prices pj∗ and payoffs are determined in the same
fashion as before for the transaction between the buyer and her chosen seller j∗. There
is no competition among the buyers because a seller can sell up to four units of his
good.
Note that the absolute magnitude of vj is not important to the buyer due to the
price mediation. In that sense, the setting is symmetric across sellers. A rational
buyer should always decide to purchase from the seller whose good’s true value she can
estimate most accurately. All sellers have thus the same incentives to reveal evidences.
10+5 Evidences (M10+5 and C10+5) In the X10+5 games, the possibility of
purchasing additional evidences is introduced as sellers can – in addition to the initial
set of ten evidences – purchase five more evidences for a price of Pe = 15 points.
The additional evidences are independently distributed in the same way as the initial
evidences. Sellers make the purchasing decision after they observe their initial set of ten
evidences. Buyers know that sellers have the possibility to purchase these additional
2.3 Experimental Games 14
five evidences but cannot observe a seller’s purchase. Apart from the price Pe which
sellers pay upon purchase independently of any transaction, the payoff structure is not
different from before.
In the X10+5 games, sellers are given the opportunity to disclose more information
to the benefit of the accuracy of the buyers’ inference. Depending on the competitive
pressure and the price Pe, sellers potentially purchase and disclose additional infor-
mation. Alternatively, the additional information might lead to stronger selection of
disclosed information with buyers not being able to infer whether a purchase was made.
2.3.1 Theoretical considerations
Theoretical background
In order to create a multifaceted and versatile framework of information disclosure,
we implement a rich setting with multiple normal signals and the usual conflict of
interest between the two market sides. Many of the usual intuitions about voluntary
information disclosure as discussed in the literature hold to be true here. Some aspects
of the context are more unusual and will deserve particular mentioning.
Using a price mechanism with an exogenous price avoids the introduction of any
strategic consideration via an endogenous price determination mechanism. Still, the
price levels the field between different seller types, putting emphasis on the amount
of information available. For example, a low-v product can be more interesting to the
buyer than a high-v product if its value can be more accurately assessed. Therefore,
in competition, firms compete on a level playing field despite their different v’s.
Traditionally, the Becker-deGroot-Marschak mechanism is an incentive-compatible
mechanism mostly used to elicit willingness-to-pay (WTP). If a buyer holds and knows
his WTP, the mechanism gives incentives to truthfully reveal it. In our case, the true
value v is subject to uncertainty from the point of view of the buyer, so that risk-averse
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buyers are expected to underbid relative to their expected value (Kaas and Ruprecht,
2006).
Compared to other market settings, the price mechanism in form of the Becker-
deGroot-Marschak mechanism provides the buyer with incentives to reveal her will-
ingness to pay and thus her precise inferred expected value of the product. Since the
reaction to this mechanism is not subject of our investigation, we explain participants
that the bidding of their expected value is optimal.5
The buyers’ way of inferring the true value of the item is important for our study as
it determines in large parts the equilibrium outcome. The early literature of Milgrom
(1981) and Milgrom and Roberts (1986) emphasizes the importance of buyer sophisti-
cation or, in other words, skepticism for the information revelation in the monopolistic
setting. In our setting, skepticism in the face of partial disclosure implies the belief
that the disclosed information is the most favorable from the seller’s perspective. The
nature of the evidences further implies that any disclosed information is always use-
ful and allows to form a posterior belief about the true value. The more information
is disclosed, the more accurate the belief will be. The possibility that the seller has
preferred to reveal k rather than fewer pieces of information because of k particularly
favorable realizations might induce the buyer to further reduce the inferred value. In
the face of the skeptical buyer’s markdown applied to the nominal value of partially
disclosed information, the seller maximizes the buyer’s bid by revealing all pieces of
information if they are not too extreme.
By the nature of the normal draws, extremely low or high realizations of E occur
with very small probability. Very low realizations might reduce the chance of a prof-
itable transaction so much that the seller prefers to not disclose or to only disclose
low realizations, practically refraining from the initiation of a transaction. Conversely,
very high realizations might lead to partial disclosure if the corresponding markdown
is believed to be small compared to the position of the outliers.
5The instructions state: “Note that in terms of expected payoff, the Buyer benefits most from
bidding what he believes the Value of the item is.”
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As in other settings, the partially disclosing seller always benefits from a less skeptical
buyer who might have a different belief about the ranking of the disclosed information
in E or who does not measure well the extent to which the disclosure depends on the
realizations. In this case, full revelation of information will not be achieved and the
seller is expected to make an extra profit at the expense of the buyer.
We implement a setting which does not exhibit “strongly opposed interests” as mod-
elled in Milgrom and Roberts (1986) via an additional pricing stage. All disclosure
incentives are derived from the relative amount of disclosure. Intuitively, this setting
is closer to the more commonly observed nature of competition since companies do
not frequently reveal information about competitors’ products. More importantly, it
is interesting to quantify the effect of moderate competition. If it leads to full trans-
parency this is an interesting insight. If it does not, the observation of whether and how
buyer sophistication changes in the face of competition with incomplete transparency
is equally interesting.
Theoretical predictions
In order to fix ideas about behavior in the experiment, we sketch some theoretical
considerations. For simplicity, we first consider a setup in which the seller decides
about the message M prior to observing the realization of E. Later, we evaluate what
the treatment effects are when the choice is made under private information of E.
Let the belief β specify which evidencesM are disclosed from E. The messageM ⊆ E
induces a posterior belief distribution f(v|M,β) and an expected value E(v|M,β).
A skeptical buyer holds a belief β = s that the seller discloses the highest #M evi-
dences in E, inducing f(v|M, s) and E(v|M, s). Analogous to Milgrom and Roberts’s
(1986) skeptical posture, in the face of a seller that benefits from a higher bid, this
belief minimizes the buyer’s bid for a given message M . In relation to the average
observed evidence in M , e¯M =
∑
i:ei∈M ei, the bid features a skepticism-induced mark-
down S#E(M) = e¯
M − E(v|M, s). As #M increases, the inclusion of evidences closer
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to v leads to a markdown reduction of ∆S#E(#M) ≡ S#E(#M + 1)−S#E(#M) < 0.
This markdown is zero when all evidences are disclosed and hence no selection is im-
plemented, S#E(M = E) = 0. Given #M , the markdown and its derivative increase
in the cardinality of the set of evidences #E to select from.
A na¨ıve buyer holds the belief β = n that M is the complete evidence available to
the seller and not selected from E. Such a buyer takes M at face-value and forms
an expected value E(v|M,n) = e¯M . The resulting bid therefore does not include a
skepticism-induced markdown.
Irrespective of the belief β, due to the remaining uncertainty about the true value v, a
risk-averse buyer maximizes expected utility with a bid b∗ that is below E(v|M,β) and
that generates a risk-induced markdown R(M) = E(v|M,β)− b∗ (Kaas and Ruprecht,
2006).
Because more pieces of evidence reduce uncertainty about E(v|M,β), b∗ increases
with higher #M and the markdown reduces ∆R(#M) ≡ R(#M + 1)− R(#M) < 0.
The absolute level of expected utility increases in #M due to the decrease in risk.
Proposition 2.1 (M10 – Sophisticated buyer) If the risk-averse buyer is skeptical, the
seller will disclose all evidences, M = E.
Proof. Since a skeptical buyer is accounting for the selection of evidences, the seller
can only influence his risk-induced markdown and minimize it by giving as much in-
formation as possible, M = E.
In this setup, the assumption of risk-aversion leads to incentives of full revelation. A
risk-neutral, skeptical buyer would be indifferent between various strengths of selection
and many seller strategies could be sustained in equilibrium.
Proposition 2.2 (M10 – Sophisticated and naive buyers) If the risk-averse buyer is ve
with probability ν and skeptical with probability 1− ν, the seller will disclose a number
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of evidences #M∗ such that the incremental reduction of the markdown ∆R(#M∗) is
just not smaller than the expected gain from the naive’s overbidding, ν ·∆S10(#M).
Proof. We restrict attention to seller strategies that disclose the top #M evidences
because these are the most beneficial strategies in the face of na¨ıve buyers. The seller
chooses #M such that his profit is maximized.
max
#M≤10
pi(#M) = E(b)− c = (1− ν) · (E(v|M, s)−R(#M)) (2.1)
+ ν · (E(v|M, s)−R(#M) + S10(#M))− c (2.2)
= (E(v|M, s)−R(#M)) + ν · S10(#M)− c (2.3)
Intuitively, the seller will publish a number of evidences #M∗ up to the point were
the marginal or incremental cost from reducing the naive’s overbidding is equal to
the incremental benefit of reducing uncertainty. An optimal number #M∗ > 1 is
obtained when the risk-aversion is such that the risk-induced markdown that applies
to both types, ∆R(1) outweighs the seller’s benefits from na¨ıve bidding ν∆S10(1).
Similarly, since for large messages the reduction in uncertainty ∆R(9) is relatively
small, a substantial share of ν will induce #M∗ < 10. Of course, extreme choices
of #M = 1 or #M = 10 could still occur for extreme enough risk preferences that
determine R.
Proposition 2.3 (M15 – Sophisticated buyer) When the seller can purchase five fur-
ther pieces of evidence, he does so only if the resulting change in R is greater than the
price of 15 points. After a purchase, all 15 pieces of evidences are disclosed.
Proof. Due to the sophistication of the buyer, the disclosed information only impacts
the risk-induced markdown. If the buyer is sufficiently risk-averse that the increase to
15 evidences more than compensates the cost of the additional five pieces of evidence,
the seller benefits from the purchase.
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Proposition 2.4 (M15 – Sophisticated and naive buyers) If the risk-averse buyer is
naive with probability ν and skeptical with probability 1 − ν and R′
S′15
< R
′′
S′′15
, the seller
will disclose a number of evidences #M∗ such that ν = R
′
S′15
.
Proof. In M15, the seller can choose between purchasing and not purchasing additional
evidence. Not purchasing additional information would re-establish the case of M10
considered in proposition 2.2.
If the seller purchases additional evidences, then sophisticates know in equilibrium
that the disclosed evidence is featuring a stronger publication bias than without the
additional evidences. The naive buyer, however, still acts as if #M = #E.
Conceptually, the seller’s choice of #M∗ is isomorph to proposition 2. Generally,
#E = 15 opens the possibility to reduce uncertainty further than under #E = 10. For
the first ten evidences, the marginal risk-induced markdown is as before and decreases
to lower levels as #M > 10.The publication bias for a given #M is much higher now
as is the marginal skepticism-induced markdown.
max
#M≤15
pi(#M) = ν · S15(#M) + (E(v|M)−R(#M))− c (2.4)
FOC: ν · S ′15(#M∗) = R′(#M∗) (2.5)
SOC: ν · S ′′15(#M∗) < R′′(#M∗) (2.6)
It follows that the resulting optimal message size is therefore higher than in M10.
Whether or not the resulting higher profit for the seller justifies the payment for the
additional pieces of evidence determines then whether or not the seller chooses to
purchase or not. In any case, an equilibrium in which the seller purchases features a
higher gross profit (before fee) than in M10.
In our experiment, sellers observe their evidences before deciding about M , making
an exhaustive analysis very complex. Sellers might select into disclosing #M on the
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basis of the realized evidences. For example, S#E(M = E) could be non-zero and
positive when full disclosure only occurs with “good” realizations of E. Indeed, the
result of full disclosure from proposition 1 does not necessarily hold here. For example,
Shin (1994) shows that full revelation fails in a simpler context when there is uncertainty
regarding the informed party’s information. For example, E might realize in a fashion
that the seller prefers not to put out the whole E.
Importantly for our experimental treatments, as before, the incentives for disclosure
decrease when naives enter the population of buyers. Compared to the equilibrium
with only sophisticated buyers, we should expect less disclosure in an equilibrium when
naives are present. The lack of full disclosure in the monopoly setting can then only
be probabilistically attributed to the presence of naive buyers.
Due to the assumed risk-aversion, we can show that under competition, full disclosure
is reestablished as equilibrium.
Proposition 2.5 (C10) Irrespective of the buyer types, under competition, #M = 10
and sellers derive the expected profit (E(v|E)− c).
Proof. Due to the preference of all risk-averse buyers for products with a lot of infor-
mation and a resulting low level of risk they choose among the four products in the
market the product with the highest #M . Rather than not being chosen by any buyer
for a transaction, the sellers discloses #M = 10 and – in the face of four buyers – will
be chosen in expectation by 1 consumer for a transaction.
2.3.2 Experimental Procedures
We conducted the experiments in the Experimental Economics Laboratory at the Uni-
versity of Mannheim (mLab).6 Across ten sessions, a total of 160 students partici-
6The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree Fischbacher (2007) and
subjects were recruited with ORSEE (Greiner, 2004).
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pated. We recruited all students from the general student population of the University
of Mannheim.
At the beginning of each session, the instructions are read out aloud and explained
to all participants. Subsequently, subjects have three attempts to complete an under-
standing test of four comprehension questions about the payoff structure. Those who
fail get an individual short briefing on the points they did not understand. Finally,
subjects have three minutes to generate draws from normal distributions with stan-
dard deviation of 100 in order to get familiar with the kind of draws occurring in the
experiment.7
Participants play two of the four different games sequentially in each session as shown
in Table 2.2. To control for order effects, we vary the order of the games between
sessions. Apart from the pilot sessions one and two, each game is played twice as game
one and game two of the session, respectively, following a latin square design.
Each game is played for ten rounds with two unpaid practice rounds before the
start. Participants are randomly matched into markets and randomly assigned the role
of seller or buyer. While their market counterparts change randomly in each round,
participants keep their role of seller or buyer for five rounds. For the last five rounds,
roles are switched and maintained until the end, while counterparts keep changing.
Session Game 1 Game 2 Session Game 1 Game 2
1 M10 C10 6 C10 C10+5
2 C10 M10 7 M10 M10+5
3 C10 M10 8 C10+5 C10
4 M10+5 C10+5 9 M10 C10
5 C10+5 M10+5 10 M10+5 M10
Table 2.2: Games in 10 sessions
At the end of each round, the feedback in M games consists of the true item value, the
price, the bid, the realization of a transaction and own payoffs. In C games, sellers are
7Appendix A.3 provides screenshots of the games and of this tool.
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further informed about the published messages of all other sellers, their own number
of realized transactions and the total amount bid for their good.8
Participants are compensated on the basis of the outcomes in the 20 paid rounds.
Individual payoffs are in points and are converted to cash at an exchange rate of 1
EUR for 60 points.9 The average payoff per subject was 10 EUR. Since payoffs can
be zero and even negative in a given round, we established a minimum payoff for the
session of 2 EUR which was not binding for any participant.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 The effect of competition
A basic indicator of the effect of competition is the number of evidences that sellers
disclose, #M . Figure 2.1a shows that this number is fairly symmetrically distributed
around four and five and shifts slightly right in competition, with a pronounced spike at
full disclosure of ten evidences. Figure 2.1b shows a slightly stronger difference in later
rounds 5+10, suggesting that the competitive pressure leads to even more disclosure
over time.10
Throughout games and rounds, panel (a) of Table 2.3 shows significant differences in
the average number of disclosed evidences between M and C. In M10, over all rounds,
1.47 pieces of evidences less are disclosed compared to C10. The difference is 1.60 in
the last rounds of being a seller.
The selection of evidences leads to a positive “publication bias” of e¯M − v if the
mean of the disclosed evidences exceeds the true value of the good. Panel (b) of Table
2.3 shows that the reduced disclosure in M leads to a higher publication bias than in
8In the two pilot sessions, sellers were not able to see what the other sellers decided to report.
9All values are restricted to integers and given in experimental points.
10By considering the 5th and the 10th round we can check for possible learning effects over time
and we make sure that each participant is only accounted for once in each role.
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(a) All rounds. (b) Rounds 5+10.
Figure 2.1: Number of disclosed evidences, #M .
All rounds Rounds 5+10
M C M C
(a) 10 4.71 *** 6.18 4.65 *** 6.25
Nr Published evidences *** *** [0.24] **
#M 10+5 5.31 *** 6.91 5.16 *** 7.38
(b) 10 75.05 *** 45.61 82.83 *** 42.21
Publication bias [0.94] [0.49] [0.59] [0.49]
e¯M − v 10+5 75.40 *** 43.15 77.35 *** 47.24
N
10 480 480 96 96
10+5 320 320 64 64
Notes: t-tests for equal means, significance level indicated by: *** p <0.01, **
p <0.05, * p ≤0.1, [p > 0.1].
Table 2.3: Means of number of disclosed evidences and publication bias
C, as expected when sellers publish the highest evidences. This difference is significant
across games and even more pronounced in the last rounds between M10 and C10.
Overall, the data show that sellers’ disclosure in monopoly is quite low but improves
significantly due to competition.
The publication bias and sellers’ decisions of which evidences to disclose can be
analyzed in further detail when reporting it by the number of published evidences #M
as in Table 2.4. Panel (a) gives benchmark magnitudes from simulations of 10000 draws
of ten evidences. The first line indicates the mean difference to the true value for the
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kth ranked draw, ek − v, and the second indicates the mean publication bias for the k
highest draws, 1
k
∑
i∈{1,...,k} ei − v.11
Panel (b) reports the observed publication bias overall (X10) as well as split up
between M10 and C10. Across games, for k ≤ 6, the magnitudes of the publication
bias are below the levels theoretically expected under a “top k evidences” disclosure
strategy, and above for k > 6. This suggests that for k ≤ 6, sometimes evidences other
than the top k are disclosed, possibly to avoid a transaction after a low realization of
evidences. The numbers for k > 6 witness a selection into disclosing many evidences
as a result of favorable evidence realizations. Otherwise, for example, a publication
bias of 12.5 for k = 10 in X10 is statistically very unlikely. Furthermore, with one
exception, the bias is slightly smaller in C10 than in M10, suggesting that evidences
other than the top k are disclosed more often in C10. Similar patterns can be observed
for X10+5 in Table 2.11 on page 33.
To better understand the sellers’ strategies, we can take a closer, exemplary look
behind these averages. For k = 1, consider the publication bias of 141.3 in M10 and
the significantly lower value of only 40.6 in C10. Figure 2.2a shows that almost all
sellers in M10 disclose their highest evidence while less than 40% of sellers do so in
C10 (2.2b). The latter figure shows that further strategies used may be to disclose
the single evidence that is closest to the true product value or to disclose the lowest
evidence to avoid a loss-making transaction. The smaller publication bias in C suggests
that competition increases the incidence of such strategies.
The buyer now observes the disclosed evidences with a mean of e¯M and – in order
to bid approximately the true value v – should account for the selection by bidding
this mean minus a “markdown”, e¯M − b. For correct inferences of v, the buyer’s
markdown and the seller’s publication bias should be the same in absolute value. In
C, we always refer in the following to the evidences of the seller j∗ chosen by the buyer
11These calculations give a good indication of the expected publication bias, but do not take into
account the interval boundaries of v, which influence the rational inference in the experiment. Sim-
ulations in Appendix A.2 show that the boundary only matters in a limited range above the lower
interval boundary.
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#M / Rank k
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
(a)
Mean
k -154.2 -100.4 -65.8 -37.8 -12.5 12.0 37.5 65.5 100.1 153.7
Top k -0.2 16.9 31.6 45.5 59.4 73.8 89.2 106.4 126.9 153.7
(b)
Pub.
bias
X10 312.5 325.8 343.7 350.6 46.83 59.93 70.83 81.43 113.03 117.63
N 129 41 60 79 116 142 151 106 79 51 6
M10 310.4 331.6 353.2 357.1 52.43 65.03 72.73 90.23 117.81 141.3
N 34 17 24 38 51 70 75 65 61 39 6
C10 313.2 21.7 237.3 44.6 42.53 54.93 69.03 67.33 96.53 40.63
N 95 24 36 41 65 72 76 41 18 12 0
(c)
Mark-
down
X10 12.3 13.3 21.9 31.6 35.2 30.7 40.7 58.9 96.0 162.2
N 208 38 59 85 104 130 133 87 69 41 6
M10 39.8 16.8 29.5 35.1 45.3 40.2 59.8 75.1 116.2 170.4
N 34 17 24 38 51 70 75 65 61 39 6
C10 7.0 10.5 16.7 28.8 25.4 19.6 16.1 11.0 -57.8 1.8
N 174 21 35 47 53 60 58 22 8 2 0
(d)
Pub. bias
C10 Chosen
sellers
9.8 26.4 40.4 44.2 51.2 56.1 73.5 64.0 140.1 45.3
174 21 35 47 53 60 58 22 8 2 0
Notes: Average publication bias being 3above (below3) the simulated confidence interval of N Top k
draws is denoted with Maya numerals 3 (99%), 2 (95%), and 1 (90%) to the left (right) of the average.
Table 2.4: Summary by number #M and rank k of disclosed evidences (X10 games)
for a transaction. The publication bias of those chosen sellers can be calculated as
markdown + precision and differs little from the publication bias across all sellers in
Table 2.3.
As expected, panel (a) of Table 2.5 shows that the markdown is lower in competition
than in monopoly. Surprisingly, the magnitude of the markdown in competition is very
small: in C10 it is only 21% of the publication bias, suggesting that buyers are much
less skeptical than in monopoly. We can judge the appropriateness of the markdown by
calculating the precision of the bid, b−v. Panel (b) of Table 2.5 shows some overbidding
in M10 but five times the overbidding in C10, the absolute difference remaining stable
over time.12
This difference is maintained when conditioning on the observed number of evidences.
Panel (c) of Table 2.4 shows the markdown by the number of disclosed evidences and
12In the M treaments, the markdown and the precision do not precisely add up to the publication
bias due to six (M10) and two (M10+5) sellers that do not disclose any evidence and for which
publication bias and markdown cannot – in contract to precision – be calculated.
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(a) M10 (N = 39). (b) C10 (N = 12).
Figure 2.2: Fraction of disclosure for k-ranked evidences.
All rounds Rounds 5+10
M C M C
(a) 10 67.30 *** 13.78 67.68 *** 9.60
Markdown [0.46] [0.42] [0.77] [0.63]
e¯M − b 10+5 73.23 *** 19.28 72.67 *** 16.44
6= 0 10 *** *** *** [0.33]
10+5 *** *** *** *
(b) 10 5.63 *** 25.22 8.13 [0.22] 26.43
Precision [0.63] [0.41] [0.71] [0.90]
b− v 10+5 1.63 ** 19.14 1.30 [0.15] 28.31
6= 0 10 [0.32] *** [0.45] ***
10+5 [0.79] *** [0.93] **
Notes: t-tests for equal means, significance level indicated by: *** p <0.01, **
p <0.05, * p ≤0.1, [p > 0.1].
Table 2.5: Buyers’ markdown and bidding precision
by M10 and C10. Panel (d) reports the publication bias of sellers j∗ chosen by the
buyers. The markdown is generally smaller in magnitude than the publication bias.
In particular, the minor markdowns even for small #M are surprising and contribute
to the low precision in C10. A very similar picture emerges for the 10+5 settings in
panels (e) and (f) of Table 2.11 on page 33.
The buyers’ overbidding is reflected in an elevated transaction probability and in
relatively low payoffs. Panel (a) of Table 2.7 shows that transaction probabilities are
mostly above 0.5, significantly so in M10 and C10. Throughout all games, the sellers’
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Rounds 1-5 Rounds 6-10
M C M C
(a) 10 56.59 *** 4.23 78.18 *** 23.33
Markdown [0.75] [0.18] [0.19] [0.83]
e¯M − b 10+5 53.11 *** 17.34 93.61 *** 21.23
6= 0 10 *** [0.54] *** ***
10+5 *** *** *** ***
(b) 10 17.45 [0.08] 35.62 -6.20 [0.06] 14.83
Precision [0.35] [0.30] [0.14] [0.90]
b− v 10+5 28.01 [0.76] 24.73 -24.74 *** 13.55
6= 0 10 ** *** [0.47] ***
10+5 *** *** ** [0.08]
Notes: t-tests for equal means, significance level indicated by: *** p <0.01, **
p <0.05, * p ≤0.1, [p > 0.1].
Table 2.6: Buyers’ markdown and bidding precision
payoffs are higher than the buyers’ payoffs as seen in panel (b). Importantly, buyers
do not benefit from competition as their payoff in C10 is almost the same as in M10.
M10 M10+5 C10 C10+5
(a) Trans-
action
probability
All rounds 0.54 0.53 0.54 0.52
6= 0.5 * [0.32] *** [0.21]
N 480 320 480 320
Rounds 5+10 0.60 0.55 0.59 0.53
6= 0.5 ** [0.46] *** [0.38]
N 96 64 96 64
(b)
Payoff
All rounds
Seller 58.73 46.53 59.26 50.08
∆ 18.24 4.45 16.56 8.33
∆ 6= 0 *** [0.47] ** [0.23]
Buyer 40.49 42.08 42.70 41.75
Seller, gross 51.31 55.23
∆ 9.23 13.48
∆ 6= 0 [0.14] *
Notes: t-tests for equal means, significance level indicated by: *** p <0.01, **
p <0.05, * p ≤0.1, [p > 0.1]. “Gross” refers to the payoffs before cost of purchasing
additional evidences is subtracted.
Table 2.7: Transaction probability and payoffs
In addition to the bidding behavior, in competition, the buyers’ choice of seller can
discipline the seller. Table 2.8 reports the difference in disclosure characteristics xj∗
between the chosen seller and the other three sellers 1
3
∑
j 6=j∗ xj. The chosen seller
on average reports 1.51 pieces of evidence more than the average competing seller.
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A higher number of disclosed evidence thus increases the seller’s probability of being
selected. The mean and median of the disclosed evidence of the chosen seller are
relatively higher in C10, reflecting that their nominal magnitude has a positive and
significant effect on the buyer’s choice of the seller. That this effect is not significant
in C10+5 might be due to the stronger reliance on differences in #Mj. The standard
deviation of disclosed evidence is slightly higher for the chosen sellers, an effect that is
fully attributable to their higher number of evidences.
Characteristic x C C10 C10+5
#Mj 1.51*** 1.40*** 1.67***
e¯M 32.24*** 49.17*** 6.83
SD Mj 7.31*** 7.15*** 7.55***
N 800 480 320
Table 2.8: Numbers for chosen seller relative to other three sellers
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2.4.2 The effect of purchasing additional information
When sellers have the option to purchase additional evidences, panel (a) of Table
2.9 indicates that roughly one-third of the time they do so. Competitive pressure in
C10+5 increases this fraction slightly, but not significantly. In the last rounds, this
fraction increases throughout, an effect that can be attributed to the payoff benefits
that purchasing brings. Panel (b) shows that – across settings – purchasing (+5) leads
to a higher payoff than not purchasing further evidences (+0), a difference that even
increases over time.
10+5 M10+5 C10+5
(a)
All rounds
33.13 31.88 34.38
[0.56]
Purchase +5 N 640 320 320
(%)
Rounds 5+10
39.84 35.94 43.75
[0.47]
N 128 64 64
(b)
All rounds
+5 62.16 53.99 69.74
∆ 6= 0 *** [0.28] **
Payoff
+0 41.44 43.04 39.78
Rounds 5+10
+5 72.04 47.00 90.79
∆ 6= 0 * [0.96] **
+0 38.19 45.76 29.58
Table 2.9: Sellers’ purchasing decisions and average payoffs
Distributions of disclosed evidences are very similar to the ones before with the
difference of a more pronounced fraction of disclosure of ten evidences across games and
rounds, see Figure 2.3. Throughout, very few sellers reveal that they made a purchase
by disclosing more than ten evidences. Panel (a) of Table 2.3 shows average numbers
of disclosed evidences in X10+5 games that are throughout roughly 0.5 higher than
in the ten benchmark. Interestingly, this happens at a maintained level of publication
bias. The previously observed differences between monopoly and competition in X10
are approximately replicated.
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(a) All rounds. (b) Rounds 5+10.
Figure 2.3: Number of disclosed evidences, #M , in C10+5 and M10+5.
The results so far suggest that purchases were mostly made to enable even more
selection. Figure 2.4 supports this view graphically and illustrates disclosure as a
function of the purchasing decision. Among purchasers, disclosing ten evidences is
most common, by far so in competition. This way they leave the buyer in the unknown
about their purchasing decision while still selecting and appearing transparent.
(a) M10+5. (b) C10+5.
Figure 2.4: Number of disclosed evidence #M by purchasing decision
The uncertainty about the seller’s pool of evidences makes buyers more skeptical,
they increase the size of their markdown compared to the benchmark X10 settings, as
Table 2.5 shows. While this leads to an almost perfect precision in the M10+5 game,
the markdown change in C10+5 is not sufficient to improve the precision by much.
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In the last rounds, the precision deteriorates as the markdown – in contrast to the
publication bias – is even smaller in absolute terms.
Table 2.7 shows that the overall payoffs of sellers is reduced in 10+5, in terms of both
net payoff including the fee and gross payoff. Since the payoffs of purchasing sellers
are much higher, this loss comes from non-purchasing sellers. The payoffs of buyers
are not changed much and differences between buyers’ and sellers’ net payoff are not
significant anymore.
Fixed-effects panel regressions in Table 2.10 summarize how the behavior of sellers
(#M , Pub. bias) and of buyers depend on game characteristics. Importantly, the effect
of competition on the number of disclosed evidences and the publication bias is clearly
and significantly emerging. Further, the increase in markdown due to competition is
larger in absolute terms than the decrease of the publication bias.
Regressions (1) to (4) show that the effect of X10+5 is strongly influenced by the pos-
sibility to purchase additional evidences. While X10+5 has a positive, non-significant
effect on the number of disclosed evidences, controlling for the purchasing decision in
regression (2) reverses this sign. The effect of subjects’ role-switching is minor as the
buyers’ markdown improves only slightly and marginally significantly in rounds 6-10
(p-value=0.12, regression 5). Regressions (1)-(4) further show that a higher value v
increases the number of disclosed evidences significantly and reduces the publication
bias. At the same time, a higher absolute value of observed evidences e¯M decreases
the markdown (regression 5).13 Further, the characteristics of the set of ten evidences
E are relevant. A higher mean of the evidences relative to the value increases signifi-
cantly the number of reported evidences. Still, this higher mean and a higher standard
deviation lead to an increased publication bias. This reflects the selection into more
disclosure when E consists of high evidences in the high ranks.14
13This relationship exists close to the lower bound of v as well as over the whole interval. See
Appendix A.2 for a discussion of the optimal increase in the markdown close to v’s lower bound.
14Neither gender nor an economics-related field of study have a significant effect on any of these
dependent variables.
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#M #M Pub. bias Pub. bias Markdown
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Competition 0.87∗∗∗ 0.87∗∗∗ -22.58∗∗∗ -22.53∗∗∗ -40.32∗∗∗
(0.21) (0.21) (3.82) (3.82) (7.80)
X10+5 0.31 -0.30 7.23 2.05 -3.43
(0.27) (0.26) (5.81) (6.66) (11.68)
Competition -0.16 -0.20 6.69 6.39 9.82
× X10+5 (0.29) (0.28) (5.56) (5.55) (10.25)
Rounds 6-10 -0.13 -0.03 -0.46 0.37 9.52
(0.20) (0.19) (3.37) (3.37) (6.13)
Value v 0.0007∗∗∗ 0.0007∗∗∗ -0.01∗ -0.01∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Mean E − v 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.04)
SD E -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.05)
Purchase +5 1.79∗∗∗ 15.21∗∗∗
(0.27) (4.93)
e¯M 0.09∗∗∗
(0.01)
Constant 5.43∗∗∗ 5.42∗∗∗ 12.20∗ 12.04∗ -2.08
(0.31) (0.30) (6.93) (6.91) (9.60)
N 1600 1600 1592 1592 1592
Subjects 160 160 160 160 160
R2 overall 0.10 0.19 0.26 0.26 0.11
Notes: Panel fixed-effects regressions. Cluster-robust standard errors (subject level)
are provided in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% level. In 7 instances, sellers choose #M = 0 and do not feature in (3)-(5).
Table 2.10: Determinants of #M
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2.5 What explains lack of skepticism in competi-
tion?
The results so far raise the question why we observe the lack of skepticism in com-
petition. In the following we investigate three possible explanations. First, fairness
concerns might motivate buyers to reciprocate the generous information provision of
the chosen seller by not reducing their bid too strongly. Second, the very choice of
a seller might give buyers an illusion of control and make them optimistic about the
selection of evidence that they face. Third, the knowledge of the competitive pressure
might lead to the belief that the selection of published evidence is less biased than
under monopoly.
We investigate these explanations with the help of three further games that only fea-
ture buyers. All three games change details of the C10 game and confront new buyers
with data that had been generated by sellers in the previous sessions. First, in “C10B”,
buyers face markets and published evidences as generated in C10 but their bids only
have financial consequences for themselves, not for any seller. Avoiding consequences
on other participants removes any relevance of social preferences and reciprocity and
should thus re-establish levels of skepticism as observed in monopoly. Otherwise iden-
tical to C10B, “C10B-NC” (No Choice) imposes on buyers the choices of buyers in the
original C10 markets, thus removing any own choice and any resulting feeling of con-
trol that could lead to different behavior between competition and monopoly. Lastly,
“C10B-4M” (four Monopolists) confronts buyers with markets that are made up of four
monopolists’ products and published evidences as previously observed in M10. Since
the behavior of those monopolists is not shaped by competitive pressure the observed
level of skepticism towards the chosen seller should be as in monopoly.
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2.5.1 Experimental procedures
The additional six sessions were conducted in Mannheim (MA, three sessions) and in
the AWI-Laboratory of the University of Heidelberg (HD, three sessions). Each session
features a sequence of the three games with each game occurring once in each sequence
position (Latin Square design), see Table 2.12. Each session features five rounds of each
treatment, using data from the first five rounds of the respective games in sessions one
to ten.
Session Sequence position
MA, HD 1 2 3
11, 14 C10B C10B-4M C10B-NC
12, 15 C10B-NC C10B C10B-4M
13, 16 C10B-4M C10B-NC C10B
Table 2.12: Games in extension sessions 11-16.
As opposed to the eight seller and eight buyers in previous sessions, each session
now includes 16 buyer. Thus, each set of three sessions (MA, HD) uses the data from
the six C10 games in sessions one to ten. In the C10B-4M games, data from the six
M10 games are fed in. Due to non-shows of three participants, a total of 93 subjects
provided 279 observations per game.
2.5.2 Results
Table 2.14 presents the results by games. By design, panels a and b coincide with
averages of periods one to five in C10 and M10, respectively. The non-shows introduce
small differences, also between C10B and C10B-NC. With respect to our hypotheses
regarding the buyers’ behavior, the markdowns are the most interesting evidence here.
Recall from Table 2.6 that the round one to five markdown in C10 was -4.23 and in
M10 -56.59. Strikingly, we can see that the markdown in all games is less pronounced
than in C10.
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C10B C10B-NC C10B-4M
(a) Nr Published 5.77 5.80 4.9
evidences
(b) Publication 47.13 46.55 74.45
bias
(c) Markdown 0.91 [0.86] 1.83 [0.79] 0.57 [0.94]
6= 0 [0.79] [0.63] [0.86]
(d) Precision 38.61 [0.86] 37.56 *** 55.76 ***
6= 0 *** *** ***
N 465 465 465
Notes: t-tests for equal means and non-zero means, significance level indicated by: ***
p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p ≤0.1, [p > 0.1].
Table 2.13: Buyers’ markdown and bidding precision
With respect to the explanations for the low skepticism in competition, this allows
us to conclude as follows. The similar behavior in C10 and C10B suggests that generos-
ity is not behind the non-skeptical attitudes under competition. Further, the similar
behavior in C10B and C10B-NC suggests that the own choice of a seller has relatively
little influence on skepticism either and does not explain the large skepticism in M10.
Finally, the similar behavior in C10B and C10B-4M suggests that the competition does
not influence much the beliefs about the selected evidence either.
So overall, the results of these additional games allow us to rule out some simple
explanations for the difference in skepticism, but we cannot single out what would be
required to establish skepticism. So it is possible that a different reason is behind the
observed effect. Further, we cannot rule out an interaction of NC or 4M with the
removal of social preferences B, although we are lacking any intuition why that should
exist.
2.5.3 Some checks
None of the markdowns is significantly different from zero.
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C10B C10B-NC C10B-4M
(a) Markdown 2.33 1.25 -0.75
Seq. position 1 N 155 160 150
(b) Markdown 2.91 2.05 0.24
Seq. position 2 N 160 150 155
(c) Markdown 3.53 2.22 2.12
Seq. position 3 N 150 155 160
Table 2.14: Buyers’ markdown and bidding precision over rounds
One hypothesis that we have not checked is about the complexity of competition
versus monopoly. So just the fact that you are confronted with four sellers and only
after your choice are back in the situation as in monopoly.
2.6 Conclusion
In this study, we establish a rich experimental market framework to study disclosure
of verifiable information by interested parties as well as the inference behavior on the
consumer side. The setup cleanly implements the natural conflict of interest inherent
in any seller-buyer interaction without adding further confounding strategic elements.
In particular, changes in the market and in the informational structure allow us to
investigate behavioral responses to those institutional variations. In the monopolistic
baseline setting, we replicate previous findings of insufficient skepticism on the buyer’s
side and resulting incomplete disclosure on the seller side.
Competition raises the amount of information disclosed and should help consumers’
inference. However, the skepticism of buyers turns out so low that it nearly compensates
the potential payoff improvements and leaves buyers as well off as under monopoly.
This suggests that buyers feel protected by competition to an extent that they act less
cautiously.
Introducing the possibility for sellers to purchase additional evidences creates un-
certainty about the amount of information available to the sellers. Buyers account for
this uncertainty and bid more skeptically, particularly in monopoly.
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The suggested framework can be extended in order to understand further influences
on behavior that have been discussed theoretically. For example, it would be inter-
esting to investigate disclosure about outside options that sellers know more about
than consumers. Milgrom and Roberts (1986) predict that cigarette companies would
not reveal information about the benefits of not consuming any cigarettes. Further
interesting aspects could be partial verifiability and costly influence on the realization
of evidence. For example, Lesser et al. (2007) show in the context of nutrition-related
research that funding sources are predictable of the study outcome.
The recent investigations of skepticism in the literature show that it is an important
feature of consumer behavior which can be very useful when it is calibrated well to the
disclosure behavior and driving interests. We believe that it will be a very relevant
and important field of study which can increase consumer welfare significantly. This
is especially true for products whose full effects on welfare are understood only via
complex investigations, such as cigarettes and food items.
3 Selection in Markets:
An Experimental Approach1
3.1 Introduction
Over the last several decades laboratory experiments have become an extremely pop-
ular tool for studying economic behavior in depth. Perhaps unsurprisingly, one of the
earliest traditions in this literature was the investigation of competition in markets,
starting with Chamberlin (1948), Smith’s early contributions (Smith, 1962, 1964) and
the works of Sauermann and Selten (1959), E. Fouraker and Siegel (1960, 1963), and
Friedman (1963, 1967). Utilizing the controlled conditions of the laboratory as a basic
testing ground for theories of competition has the key advantage that the experimenter
can recreate the specific conditions (in terms of costs, demand, information, timing,
number of competitors etc.) that theories assume in order to derive predictions. On
the other hand, there are worries about the external validity of experiments that recruit
from the typical subject pool - mostly undergraduates, sometimes graduate students
- for tasks relating to the decision-making of oligopolistic firms, and such worries ap-
pear to be more pronounced than in experiments in which students essentially act as
consumers, as workers, or as nondescript individual decision makers who are asked to
make basic choices under risk or uncertainty. Thus, a fundamental question is: Can
1This chapter is based on joint work with Henrik Orzen.
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we draw any useful conclusions from laboratory research that examines the behavior
of firms without letting actual firms participate in the experiments?
While this is a reasonable question to ask, it cannot be answered by armchair eco-
nomics. Specifically, a general a priori “sense of uneasiness” about employing student
volunteers to represent firms in the laboratory is too nebulous to be convincing. In-
stead, it must be spelled out what exactly may prevent the parallelism between what
is observed in experimental markets and what is going on in naturally-occurring ones.
On such a basis empirical or experimental tests can be carried out to examine specific
points of criticism (see Siakantaris, 2000; Guala, 2002).
Indeed, the issue of whether firm behavior can be legitimately studied in the labora-
tory has multiple facets. Clearly, decisions in firms are made by people, and experimen-
tal subjects are people. However, some may suspect that managers and entrepreneurs
are a particular breed of people who are perhaps more risk loving or more creative than
the average student and who will also be more experienced. Secondly, the process that
leads to important decisions in large companies typically involves groups, for example
a management board or an advisory committee of experts and such decisions may have
to be justified to other stakeholders. Yet, in most market experiments firms are rep-
resented by individuals who act completely on their own. Furthermore, the decisions
of real firms often involve high stakes, whereas student volunteers are paid on average
little more than the minimum wage for their time spent in the laboratory. Some skep-
tics also voice concerns that the small-group settings in the lab may cause participants
to be more inclined towards cooperative behavior amongst each other than are real
competitors at the market place.
There are counterarguments to some of these claims. For instance, regulators rec-
ognize tacit collusion as a relevant phenomenon in many naturally-occurring markets,
and entrepreneurs, CEOs or other top-level managers often take individual responsi-
bility for vital business decisions. However, while clarifying whether or not there are
close field analogs of situations or outcomes we typically find in the laboratory would
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be an intriguing undertaking, we are more interested here in learning whether specific
concerns about external validity can be shown to matter for appropriate experimental
designs or procedures in order to establish a higher degree of parallelism between the
lab and the field. One example is the suspicion that replacing students by professionals
in the relevant field leads to systematically different results. If this can be established
we would know that professionals differ from students to such an extent - in terms of
their knowledge, experience or preferences - that we ought to pay close attention to
these factors. This question has already received some attention in the literature (see
Frchette, 2015, for an overview). For better or worse, the current evidence does not
send strong signals that the student subject pool leads to very biased results. How-
ever, to date the volume of this research is limited and thus it is difficult to draw clear
conclusions.
In this paper, we contribute to the debate by examining whether and in how far
a popular line of reasoning to support the assumption of rational firms in models of
competition is relevant to how experimental oligopoly research ought to be conducted.
The argument dates back to at least Friedman (1953) and goes something like this:
Even though there is no guarantee that any individual business enterprise will always
comply with the principles of rational firm behavior, market forces favor businesses that
maximize profits and reject businesses that do not. Thus, since those who make good
decisions will thrive and those who make bad decisions will sooner or later be forced
to exit, we should expect most firms - at least in established markets - to conform to
the model of the sophisticated rational firm. This is a powerful argument and while its
main role is to defend the use of the rationality assumption in theoretical work it also
provides a line of attack against experiments: Confronted with an unfamiliar situation
student subjects may resort to simple, improvised heuristics when deciding what to do
and may be unable to discover optimal strategies in complex market settings. Although
bad performance is punished to some extent by low payoffs, conventional experimental
protocols do not stipulate the removal of unsuccessful entrepreneurs or provide non-
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entrepreneurial activities as alternatives. Hence, experimental results obtained in any
other than the very simplest settings will be biased towards naive behavior.
We employ the following strategy to investigate the importance of such market force
effects to the validity of experimental results. Our subjects interact as competing
“firms” and we confront them with a multi-layered strategic market setting, which is
intentionally more complex than most experiments on oligopolistic competition without
venturing into the absurd and without deviating too much from the kinds of settings
that are typically implemented.2 The Baseline treatment is procedurally conventional
in that student subjects are allocated at random to markets of different sizes even
though in most experiments such allocations are done between-subjects whereas we
employ a within-subject protocol. This treatment also resembles many other experi-
mental studies in that poor performance is a distinct possibility but does not lead to
any selection. Thus, there is not much evolutionary pressure for bad decisions to be
weeded out over time, which may have repercussions also on the behavior of other play-
ers who have a better understanding of how to maximize profits as they will take their
competitors’ suboptimal choices into account. The Market Force treatment addresses
this potential shortcoming by introducing endogenous market entry. That is, subjects
now self-select into the market but they can do so only as long as they have sufficient
liquidity and are expelled from the market if they do not. We expect there to be sort-
ing effects and we ask whether this leads to adjustments over time such that market
outcomes change in meaningful ways. We also investigate whether and how individual
decisions in our markets vary systematically with other measurements we take from
our participants. For this we run a battery of post-tests that examine risk aversion,
loss aversion, cognitive skills and social value orientation at the level of individuals.
In our market experiments we consider duopolies, triopolies and quadropolies. Once
the market size is known in a given round, subjects first choose capacity levels and then
compete by setting prices in three consecutive periods. Thus, our setting resembles the
2For comparisons see the review of the more recent literature by Potters and Suetens (2013) and
the review of the earlier literature by Holt (1995).
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Kreps and Scheinkman (1983). However, we use a demand function that avoids a sit-
uation in which only mixed-strategy solutions exist on certain game paths. Instead,
unique pure-strategy predictions are obtained in all subgames. This has the advan-
tage that there are always clear theoretical benchmarks against which we can compare
actual behavior. We do not claim that our setting provides an accurate description
of any specific real world market. Our goal is a different one, namely to investigate
whether outcomes will be driven by naive play and whether market selection forces
can discipline our student subjects in this respect. There are several details in the pre-
dicted equilibrium path that naive players could “get wrong”. For example, choosing a
suitable capacity level is an important aspect of individually optimal behavior: Capac-
ities that are too high lead to losses; the equilibrium solution is characterized by firms
artificially withholding capacity; and too small capacities impede sizable profits in the
pricing stage. We have a somewhat counterintuitive comparative prediction here: More
firms lead to lower total outputs. This is because in equilibrium firms contract their ca-
pacities extremely much when more entry occurs. Profits are also predicted to decrease
with the number of competitors, and so are prices despite the reduction in total output.
We observed strong self-selection into markets when entry was endogenous. However,
self-selection did not seem to affect capacity and pricing decisions substantially. The
outcomes in both treatments – Baseline and Market Force – did not differ significantly.
In both treatments participants performed best in three-firm markets in the sense
that, on average, their choices were very close to the equilibrium predictions. In
duopolies firms did not fully exploit their market power, especially in the first rounds of
the experiment. There, mean capacities and prices tend to be lower than ex-ante pre-
dicted. By contrast, mean capacities and prices were higher than predicted in four-firm
markets.
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Although we constructed a deliberately complex market setting, participants very
quickly adjusted to the market situation in both treatments and average capacities and
prices converged towards the equilibrium values.
We found that the market entry decision did not vary significantly with any of the
characteristics we measured in the post-tests. Experience and cognitive skills affected
decisions and profits significantly in the sense that with increasing experience and
cognitive skills capacity and price choices were closer to the equilibrium predictions
and profits increased. This applied to both treatments.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 gives a more detailed description
of the experiments and the post-tests. Section 3.3 discusses theoretical considerations
and predictions before the results are presented in section 3.4. The last section 3.5
concludes.
3.2 Experimental Design
3.2.1 Baseline treatment
Main market
Participants are matched into groups of five. Each participant represents a firm. For
each group there is a single main market. Each round consists of three stages:
Stage one: Market allocation
Stage two: Capacity choice
Stage three: Price choice in three consecutive periods
In the Baseline treatment participants are randomly allocated to either the main market
or the side market at the beginning of each round (stage one). Those who are on the
main market will compete with those in their group who have also been selected to the
main market. Participants on the side market do not compete with other firms since
there is a separate side market for each firm.
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Everyone is informed about the number of firms on the main market. Participants
who are on the side market receives this information as well. The demand on the main
market for firm i’s good in period t is given by
qit(pit, p¯−it, n) = max
{
0,
120
n
− 2pit + p¯−it
}
(3.1)
.
where n is the number of firms present in the main market, pit is firm is price in
period t and p¯−it is the competitors’ average price (p¯−it = 0 if n = 1) in that period.
In stage two each firm i decides on its production capacity q¯i ∈ [0, 50] with q¯i ∈ Z
for the current round. A firm’s production capacity determines how many units it
can maximally produce in each period of stage three. Once the decision about the
production capacity is made, it cannot be changed in stage three. Each capacity unit
costs 50 ECUs and has to be paid upfront, prior to the start of the pricing stage.
At the beginning of stage three the production capacities of all firms on the main
market are announced. Then firms in the main market compete in three consecutive
periods by choosing prices pit ∈ [0, 50] with pit ∈ Z for their goods. In period two and
three firms are informed about all firms’ price choices of the previous period. After the
third period, the round ends.
At the end of each round, participants are informed about their round profit. In ad-
dition to that, they also receive a market summary including all firms’ capacity levels
and the average prices in each period.
Side market
All firms that are not in the main market operate on a firm-specific side market. Similar
to the main market firms first determine their production capacity q¯ ∈ [0, 20] in stage
ne and then choose prices p ∈ [0, 50] in three consecutive periods in stage two. The
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maximum possible capacity is only 20 units because demand levels are generally lower
than on the main market. The demand level on the side market fluctuates randomly
from round to round and is characterized by
qt(pt) = A− 2pt (3.2)
where A is drawn at the beginning of each round from the set {53, 54, , 59} with any
number being equally likely. Subjects are informed about the value of A only after
having made the decision to enter the side market but before making any choices.
Stage two and stage three correspond to the stages on the main market.
At the end of each round, participants receive feedback on their expenditures for
capacity and their revenue from the three periods. Moreover, they also get a summary
of what has happened on the main market in the particular round (number of firms,
chosen capacity levels, average prices).
Using an outside option task in which participants had to make the same decisions
as on the main market with the only difference that there is no competition, has several
advantages for our experiment. Firstly, when both tasks – main and outside option –
are the same, we avoid that participants select the main market or side market based
on how much they like or dislike a particular task. This would lead to a selection
bias that we do not desire. Secondly, the side market is a version of the main market
without strategic risk as participants do not complete against others there. Hence, it
might attract those players who are seeking to avoid this type of strategic interactions
with others. And lastly, being on the side market gives participants the opportunity
to further familiarize themselves with the setting and the decisions they are supposed
to make.
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3.2.2 Market Force treatment
In the Market Force treatment the way firms operate and make their decisions is the
same as in the Baseline treatment. The only difference is that in the Market Force
treatment firms are allowed to choose whether they want to be on the main market
or rather operate on the side market for each round. Participants make this decision
simultaneously and individually at the beginning of each round.
At the end of each round, firms that are present on the main market individually
decide for themselves whether they wish to remain on the main market for the subse-
quent round or wish to exit the main market. Firms that decide to exit will operate
on the side market during the subsequent round. All firms whose account balance
falls below 300 ECUs are not allowed to operate on the main market. This minimum
capital requirement forces firms that were previously on the main market and made
unprofitable decisions to exit the main market. It is worth noting that this is not a
pure bankruptcy rule but stricter. Market forces will eliminate those firms who did not
make profitable decisions or do not have enough capital to operate on the market.
In the side market the only difference to the Baseline treatment is that in the Market
Force treatment, firms decide at the end of each round whether they want to enter the
main market or remain on the side market. Due to the minimum capital requirement,
entering the main market requires an account balance of at least 300 ECUs.
For firms who were previously forced to exit the main market as their account bal-
ance dropped below 300 ECUs, being on the side market can also be seen as a “recovery
phase” to rebuild their resources. As the average expected payoff on the side market
is between 160 ECUs and 330 ECUs, firms can reach the necessary balance threshold
for entering the main market within one to two rounds.
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We allowed the main market to only grow by one firm from round to round. Hence,
not every firm who wants to enter the main market is admitted. If more firms want to
enter than allowed, the selection of the firms who may enter is done at random. This
way, we could avoid high uncontrolled variations of the market size. Once market entry
decisions are made simultaneously there is a high probability of coordination failure,
which can lead to high fluctuations in terms of market size. Although this volatility
due to coordination failure an interesting phenomenon on its own, it is not the focus
of our work here.
3.2.3 Post-test
In order to see whether and how certain individual traits affect entry decisions and mar-
ket behavior, we constructed an additional test consisting of four independent smaller
tasks. We picked four different measurements to test for, as we believe that these might
affect individual choices in the following ways:
(i) Loss aversion: Subjects who are more loss avers may not want to enter the main
market and rather operate in the side market where their outcome does not depend
on the interaction with other players. Furthermore, highly loss avers subjects may
choose to produce less or charge lower prices to ensure that they do not have unsold
overcapacity.
(ii) Cognitive skills: The hypotheses here is that higher cognitive skills lead to “better”
capacity and pricing decisions and hence higher profits.
(iii) Risk aversion: Participants who are more risk avers may prefer to stay on the side
market, as there is no strategic risk there. As for capacity and price choices, risk avers
subjects might be more careful to not overproduce or overprice.
(iv) Social preferences: Participants with a higher pro-social preference might be less
competitive on the market, for example in term of price setting.
3.2 Experimental Design 49
Task 1: Loss aversion
We use a loss aversion design as in Rau (2014) for this part with ten lotteries each with
a 50-50 chance of a good outcome and a bad outcome (see Table 3.1). Each subject
receives an initial endowment of 25 points and has to decide for every of these ten
lotteries whether or not s/he would be willing to play it. Once all choices have been
made, the computer randomly selects one of the ten lotteries. If the subject’s previous
choice was to play this lottery, his/her payoff is the initial endowment plus or minus
the amount indicated depending on whether the good or bad outcome was drawn. If
the individual chose not to play this lottery s/he receives the initial endowment of 25
points.
Lottery Bad outcome Good outcome
1 -4 points 20 points
2 -6 points 20 points
3 -7 points 20 points
4 -8 points 20 points
5 -10 points 20 points
6 -12 points 20 points
7 -14 points 20 points
8 -17 points 20 points
9 -20 points 20 points
10 -25 points 20 points
Table 3.1: Lotteries of the loss aversion test
Task 2: Raven’s standard progressive matrices
In order to test participants’ cognitive skills we used the Raven’s standard progressive
matrices (referred to as Raven’s SPM). These matrices were originally developed by
John C. Raven (Raven, 1936, 1981), designed to test the reasoning and problem solving
abilities of the test-takers. In each question of this test participants are shown a panel
containing a pattern of geometric shapes with one element missing. Each pattern is in
the form of a 3x3 matrix. In each case there are eight proposed solutions. An example
of such a task is given in Figure 3.1. Participants are asked to identify the solution that
is best suited to complete the pattern. In our experiments participants were shown 12
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panels in total with increasing difficulty. They had 12 minutes to find the 12 missing
elements.
Figure 3.1: Example of one panel from the Ravens test
Task 3: Risk aversion
We used the Eckel-Grossmann test (see Eckel and Grossman, 2002; Eckel et al., 2007)
to analyze the risk aversion of participants. Participants were confronted with six
lotteries as depicted in Table 3.2, each with a 50% probability of receiving the higher
outcome. From these six lotteries subjects were asked to choose one. The lotteries are
increasing in variance and expected value allowing us to categorize the participants into
five risk categories. A completely risk avers subject would chose lottery one, which has
the lowest expected payoff but guarantees a safe outcome of 28 points. A risk neutral
player who only maximizes expected payoffs would be indifferent between choosing
lottery five and six. However, considering the variance of the lotteries, lottery six is
a mean-preserving spread of lottery five and hence could be seen as even more risky
than lottery five by the participants.
In addition, participants are ask to state whether they would consider themselves
as a person who is willing to take risks in general. They are asked to indicate their
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Lottery Payoff: Heads Payoff: Tails
1 28 points 28 points
2 36 points 24 points
3 44 points 20 points
4 52 points 16 points
5 60 points 12 points
6 70 points 2 points
Table 3.2: Lotteries of the Eckel-Grossmann test
own assessment on a scale from 1 to 10 with 1 = not at all willing to take risks; 10 =
completely willing to take risks.
Task 4: Liebrand’s ring measure of social values
As the name already says this ring measure is used to assess a subject’s social value
orientation (SVO) and was first devised by W. B. G. Liebrand in 1984 (Liebrand, 1984).
The SVO assesses how much weight a person attaches to others’ outcome in relation
to their own.
For this task participants are randomly matched into groups of two. The identity of
the partner remains anonymous. Participants face a set of 24 scenarios each containing
a pair of options (option A and option B), which consists of a combination of the
subject’s own payoff and the payoff of the other participant.
Example scenario:
Option A Option B
Your payoff 13.00 14.50
Other’s payoff 7.50 3.90
Each scenario corresponds to a point on the SVO ring which is a circle centered at
the origin of the Cartesian plane. The vertical axis represents the payoff of the other
subject and the horizontal axis represents a subject’s own payoff.
Adding up all 24 allocations choices of a participant yields an own-other-payoff allo-
cation vector. The angle of this vector indicates the subject’s social value orientation.
There are four common orientations: altruistic, individualistic, cooperative and com-
petitive. The altruistic subject maximizes the other’s payoffs, while the individualistic
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subject maximizes his/her own payoffs. The cooperative subject prefers win-win sit-
uations and maximizes joint payoffs and the competitive subject maximizes his/her
relative advantage (difference between own payoff and the other’s payoff). The length
of this own-other-payoff allocation vector indicates how consistent and efficient the sub-
ject’s choices were. If the length of the own-other-payoff allocation vector is equal to
the radius of the SVO ring all choices were completely consistent and pareto efficient.
3.2.4 Experimental Procedure
We conducted the experimental sessions in the Experimental Laboratory of the Uni-
versity of Mannheim (mLab).3 Across eight sessions, a total of 120 undergraduate and
postgraduate students participated. All students were recruited from the general stu-
dent population of the University of Mannheim. Compensation of all participants was
calculated based on their ECU balance at the end of the experiment. The exchange
rate was 175 ECUs = 1 Euro.
Throughout the entire experiment participants are provided with a calculator. The
purpose of this calculator was firstly to help participants familiarize themselves with
the possible scenarios and how they affect their ECU earnings for different market
sizes. And secondly, to assist participants with finding their optimal capacity choice
and prices based on their believes about the other firms’ choices.
At the beginning of each round, the calculator for the main market has four sliders
that allow participants to set (a) the number of firms on the main market, (b) their
production capacity, (c) their price and (d) what they believe the average price of the
other firms on the main market is (see Figure 3.2). Given the chosen values for (a),
(b), (c) and (d), the calculator showed how many units would be sold, the capacity
costs and the expected revenues.
3The experiment was programmed in zTree (Fischbacher, 2007) and subjects were recruited through
ORSEE (Greiner, 2004).
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Once the actual number of firms on the main market is determined and announced to
everyone, the first slider disappears and the calculator uses only the actual number of
firms.4 After stage two in which all participants chose their production capacities the
second slider also disappears and the calculator uses only the actual chosen capacity.
Hence, in stage three (pricing stage) the calculator only has two sliders ((c) and (d)).
For those who were on the side market a calculator with two sliders, one for the
production capacity and one for own prices, was provided.
Figure 3.2: Calculator
At the beginning of each session, the instructions were read out and explained to
all participants. Participants were randomly allocated to groups of five. Throughout
the entire experiment participants stayed in these groups and only interacted with the
other four members in their own group but not with the members of other groups.
The entire experiment consisted of ten rounds. Each round constituted of one two
stage game in which firms chose their capacities and prices as described before.
At the beginning of the first round participants had up to four minutes to work with
the calculator. After these four minutes participants were randomly allocated to either
the main market or the side market in the Baseline treatment. In the Market Force
treatment, participants had to decide whether they want to enter the main market
or operate in the side market within these four minutes. By clicking either the “yes”
4In the Baseline treatment this happens after the random draw has allocated subjects to the main
market and in the Market Force treatment it is after subjects have made their entry decisions.
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or the “no” button on the screen they were able to submit their decision. If partic-
ipants did not press a button within the four minutes, they will automatically enter
the side market. Once participants were allocated to the corresponding markets, they
were asked to chose capacities and prices.5 Participants had certain time limits to sub-
mit their capacity choice and price choice decisions. The time limits for price choices
were shorter in the later five rounds of the experiment. If a participant did not sub-
mit a decision within the time limits, the value that they had selected for the relevant
variable in their calculator (production capacity or price) was automatically submitted.
In order to achieve a better comparability, we programmed the sequence of market
sizes in the Baseline treatment based on our observations in the Market Force treat-
ment. We constructed the Baseline treatment in a way that each session exactly mirrors
one Market Force treatment session in terms of the size and the order of the main mar-
kets. As we wanted to focus our analysis on duopolies, tripolies and quadropolies, we
replaced n = 1 by n = 2 and n = 5 by n = 4 in the Baseline treatment.6
The post-tests were conducted separately from the main experiment. Additional
invitations for the post-tests were send out to all participants of the main experiment
after all sessions of the main experiment were completed. 79% of subjects who took
part in the main experiment participated in the post-tests. In those post-test sessions
all participants worked on their own and completed the four tasks as described above
in section 3.2.3 individually. At the end of a session they received feedback on their
choices, the lottery outcomes and their payoffs. They were also informed about how
much they were given by their counterparts in the Liebrand’s ring measure of social
values task. All earnings were given in points and the exchange rate was 12 points =
5Appendix B.1 provides screenshots of the games.
6A monopoly situation only occurred in two markets for one round each and n = 5 only occurred
in one market for one round in the Market Force treatment.
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1 Euro. In addition to what they earned each participant also received a show-up fee
of 4 Euros.
3.3 Theoretical Considerations
The market setting we investigate is characterized by differentiated goods with capacity-
constrained firms and with or without endogenous entry. As described before, the se-
quence of events in a given round in the endogenous-entry variant is as follows:
Stage one: Firms independently and simultaneously decide whether or not to enter the
main market.
Stage two: Entrants observe the number of entrants and then independently and si-
multaneously choose their production capacities. Each unit of capacity comes at a cost
of c.
Stage three: Firms observe the vector of chosen capacities and then independently and
simultaneously choose prices in T consecutive periods.
Recall that the demand for firm i’s good in period t is
qit(pit, p¯−it, n) = max
{
0,
120
n
− 2pit + p¯−it
}
.
where n is the number of firms present in the main market, pit is firm i’s price in
period t and p¯−it is the competitors’ average price (p¯−it = 0 if n = 1) in that period.
Thus, the demand for firm i’s product decreases hyperbolically in the number of firms,
decreases linearly in firm i’s own price and increases linearly in the other firms’ mean
price.7 Marginal costs of production in stage three are constant and normalized to zero.
7This demand system has the intuitive property that a firm’s price induces a positive externality
on its rivals. It has the unintuitive property that this externality holds even when the demand for the
firm’s own product drops down to zero. While there are various ways in which this could be fixed,
we chose to disregard this issue because (i) doing so avoids unnecessary additional complications in
the demand function, (ii) it is irrelevant for the equilibrium solution, and (iii) the price range in our
experiment is limited and potential effects would be small.
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In the following we first derive the subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the game
for n market entrants and subsequently determine n by considering the alternative to
entering the main market. To find equilibrium prices in the stage three pricing subgame
we must take into account the capacity choices made in the previous stage two. If firm
i’s capacity, q¯i, is sufficiently large at given prices, such that q¯i ≥ qit(pit, p¯−it, n), it is
not capacity-constrained and will sell qit(pit, p¯−it, n) units.8 Conversely, if the demand
exceeds firm i’s capacity, it will sell q¯i units.
As long as firm i’s rivals charge sufficiently high prices, its best response is to operate
at maximum capacity and to select a price pit such that the demand qit(pit, p¯−it, n) is
precisely equal to q¯i:
pBR1it (p¯−it, n) =
60
n
− 1
2
q¯i +
1
2
p¯−it. (3.3)
Should the competitors choose very low prices, demand for firm i’s product will be
limited and it is not optimal to lower pit so much that it sells out. In this case firm i’s
best response is
pBR2it (p¯−it, n) =
30
n
+
1
4
p¯−it. (3.4)
Firm i finds it optimal to withhold excess capacity in this way if p¯−it < 2q¯i − 120n .
Consider now the possibility of an equilibrium in which m firms are at their capacity
limit and best respond according to (3.3) and n − m firms have excess capacity and
best respond according to (3.4). In the following we will use the letter i to index
full-capacity firms and the letter j to index excess-capacity firms. Both types of best
response functions can be reformulated to express own price as a function of the sum
of all prices, Pt:
pBR1it =
n− 1
2n− 1
120
n
− n− 1
2n− 1 q¯i +
Pt
2n− 1 (3.5)
pBR2jt =
n− 1
4n− 3
120
n
+
Pt
4n− 3 (3.6)
8In our setting a firm’s capacity level indicates how much it is able to produce in each of the T
periods.
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Summing up equation (3.5) over the m full-capacity firms and equation (3.6) over
the n−m excess-capacity firms, and denoting Q¯m =
∑m
i=1 q¯i as the sum of capacities
of all full-capacity firms, we obtain
Pt =
n− 1
2n− 1
120m
n
− n− 1
2n− 1Q¯m +
mPt
2n− 1 + (n−m)
(
n− 1
4n− 3
120
n
+
Pt
4n− 3
)
(3.7)
and solving for Pt yields the equilibrium sum of prices:
P ∗t =
2m(n− 1) + n(2n− 1)
(6n− 3− 2m)
120
n
− 4n− 3
6n− 3− 2mQ¯m.
Using P ∗t in equations 3.5 and 3.6 we obtain
p∗it =
4n− 3
6n− 3− 2m
120
n
− n− 1
2n− 1 q¯i −
1
2n− 1
4n− 3
6n− 3− 2mQ¯m (3.8)
and
p∗jt =
2n− 1
6n− 3− 2m
120
n
− 1
6n− 3− 2mQ¯m (3.9)
.
In equilibrium the demand for a full-capacity firm is, by construction,
q∗it(p
∗
it, p¯
∗
−it, n) =
120
n
− 2p∗it + p¯∗−it = q¯i
and the demand for an excess-capacity firm is
q∗jt(p
∗
jt, p¯
∗
−jt, n) =
120
n
− 2p∗jt + p¯∗−jt =
2(2n− 1)
6n− 3− 2m
120
n
− 2
6n− 3− 2mQ¯m
.
This solution can be used to find equilibrium prices and revenues for any stage three
subgame, i.e. for any vector of capacity levels that was chosen in stage two. A simple
numerical algorithm is required to establish m in each case. We use this approach to
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determine theoretical benchmarks at given capacities for the price-setting stage in our
experiment.
In the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, however, no firm will hold unnecessary
excess capacity since capacity is costly. The consequence of this is that on the equilib-
rium path equation (3.5) is a representation of any firms’ best response. This allows us
to rewrite equation (3.8) as P ∗t = 120− Q¯ where Q is the total capacity on the supply
side. From this we obtain
p∗kt =
120
n
n− 1
2n− 1 q¯k −
1
2n− 1Q¯
. Thus, in effect firm k chooses qk in stage two to maximize
pi∗k(q¯k) = T
(
120
n
− n− 1
2n− 1 q¯k −
1
2n− 1Q¯
)
q¯k − cq¯k
where T is the number of stage three periods (T = 3 in our experiment) and c is the
marginal cost of capacity (c = 50 in our experiment).
This yields
q¯∗k(n) =
2n− 1
3n− 1
(
120
n
− c
T
)
as the equilibrium capacity level and therefore
p∗kt(n) =
120
3n− 1 +
2n− 1
3n− 1
c
T
as the SPE price conditional on n. Per-round profits are given by
pi∗k(n) =
(120T − nc)2
nT
2n− 1
(3n− 1)2
Table 3.3 lists the equilibrium predictions for different values of n.9 As the table
shows, profit is severely affected by market entry as there is increased competitive
9For a monopolist the optimal stage three price is p(q¯) = 60− q¯2 for any q¯ in the feasible range.
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pressure on prices. Notice the curious prediction that total market capacity falls with
the number of firms. We shall see whether this is borne out by the data.
Market Capacity Market Price Per-period Per-round
size per firm capacity revenue profit
n = 1 43.3 43.4 38.3 1661.1 2816.7
n = 2 26 52 34 884 1352
n = 3 14.6 43.8 25.4 370.7 382.8
n = 4 8.5 33.9 21.5 182.6 123.4
n = 5 4.7 23.6 19.3 90.9 37
Table 3.3: Equilibrium predictions
Subjects that do not enter the main market operate on firm-specific side markets in
which they assume the role of monopolists. The demand in period t is given by
qt(pt) = A− 2pt (3.10)
where A is drawn at the beginning of each round from the set {53, 54, ..., 59} with
any number being equally likely. Subjects are informed about the value of A only
after having made the decision to enter the side market but before making any choices.
Stage two and stage three correspond to the stages on the main market. The firm’s
optimal price in stage three is given by
p∗(A) = max
{
A− q¯
2
,
A
4
}
.
That is, the firm will choose a price that ensures that all units are sold unless the
capacity is so high that it is more profitable to withhold capacity. Obviously, it would
not be reasonable to purchase such excess capacity in the first place. In stage two the
firm’s maximization problem boils down to maximizing
pi(q¯) = T
(
A− q¯
2
)
q¯ − cq¯
which yields
q¯∗(A) =
A
2
− c
T
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and hence
pi∗(A) =
(TA− 2c)2
8T
as the optimal profit. Given T = 3 and c = 50 and given the uniform distribution of
A, the expected profit on the side market is E(pi∗) = 194.2.
Thus, if three firms operate on the main market they fare better in equilibrium than
they would have done on the side market. However, four firms on the main market
will individually conclude that the side market would have been the better option.
Therefore, standard theory predicts n = 3.10
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Summary
Table 3.4 gives a brief overview of the average capacities and prices chosen as well as the
average realized profits for both treatments – Baseline and Market Force – depending
on the market size. The equilibrium values (ex-ante predictions) were also included as
a reference point.
At first glance, there seems to be no substantial difference regarding the average
capacity and price choices as well as the profits between the Baseline treatment and
the Market Force treatment given market size. Testing for the differences using the
Mann-Whitney U test verifies this first impression as all p-values were between 0.157
and 0.908.
In the following, we use the Mann-Whitney U test for between-subject comparisons
and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test for within-subject comparisons if not stated other-
wise.
10Note that while side market profits are risky (they range from pi∗ = 145.0 for A =53 to pi∗ =
247.0 for A = 59) they are guaranteed to exceed equilibrium profits on the main market for n = 4
and guaranteed to fall short of equilibrium profits for n = 3. Thus, risk aversion does not provide a
motive for excess entry into the main market.
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We observed a striking difference between the actual mean profits and the ex-ante
equilibrium profits. In three-firm markets the mean profits were 44% lower than the
equilibrium profits in the Baseline treatment and 34% lower in the Market Force treat-
ment. In duopolies firms were on average only about half as profitable as predicted by
the equilibrium. The gap between actual profits and ex-ante predicted profits is even
larger in four-firm markets. There, average profits were only 10% of the equilibrium
profits in the Market Force treatment and even negative in the Baseline treatment. All
these differences were highly significant with p-values between 0.003 and 0.004.
The considerable difference between actual and equilibrium profits suggests that
either capacities or prices were not chosen optimally or a combination of both.
In duopolies the mean capacities and prices were both lower than the ex-ante equi-
librium values for both treatments. In the Baseline treatment the difference is not
significant for capacities (p = 0.167) but highly significant for prices (p = 0.005).
In the Market Force treatment both differences were significant. For capacities the
p-values is 0.023 and for average prices it is 0.082.11
In both treatments the mean capacities were very close to the ex-ante prediction in
three-firm markets (p = 0.367 and p = 0.556). However, the average posted prices were
significantly lower than the equilibrium price (p = 0.003 for both treatments).
In quadropolies average capacities were significantly higher than the equilibrium ca-
pacities in both treatments (p = 0.003). In line with the theoretical predictions, average
prices were significantly lower than the ex-ante equilibrium prices (p = 0.021 in the
Market Force treatment and p = 0.005 in the Baseline treatment). Low average profits
in these markets may result from prices that were either too low to cover capacity costs
or still too high to sell all units produced. We find evidence for the latter explanation.
11The difference between average posted prices and equilibrium prices is significant for the first
period (p = 0.004) but for periods two and three it is not significant anymore (p = 0.142 and p =
0.625).
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Some firms set high capacities in conjunction with high prices. Especially first-period
prices were on average far too high. This led to excess capacity and high losses.
N Share Treatment Capacity Price Profit
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
Baseline 24.4 26.8 29.0 30.4 28.7 734.2
2 23% Market Force 19.5 29.4 32.4 34.0 31.9 763.4
Equilibrium 26.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0 1352.0
Baseline 15.0 22.6 22.9 23.3 23.0 221.7
3 55% Market Force 15.0 23.4 23.8 24.2 23.8 251.8
Equilibrium 14.6 25.4 25.4 25.4 25.4 382.8
Baseline 10.6 19.8 19.7 19.4 19.6 -13.9
4 22% Market Force 10.0 20.4 20.0 19.7 20.1 12.5
Equilibrium 8.5 21.5 21.5 21.5 21.5 123.4
Table 3.4: Average capacity, price and profit in the main market over all ten rounds
Column two of Table 3.4 shows the distribution of market size. As we can see,
markets with three firms occurred most frequently. Figure 3.3 gives a slightly more
detailed picture of the market size distribution showing that there is a clear convergence
towards n = 3 over time. In rounds one to five markets with three firms occurred 42%
of the time. This share increased to 68% for rounds six to ten. In equilibrium, our
parameterization implies that ex-ante expected profits in the side market were lower
than expected profits with three firms in the main market. This is reversed for expected
profits with four firms in the main market. Therefore, this convergence is in line with
the theoretical predictions.
3.4.2 Baseline treatment
Capacity choice
By construction more firms lead to lower total market outputs in our setting. Accord-
ing to the theoretical predictions the total market output in duopolies is 52 units, in
tripolies 43.8 units and in quadropolies 34 units. The data shows that in two- and
three-firm markets total capacities per market averaged over all ten rounds were not
significantly different from the equilibrium predictions. In duopolies the average to-
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(a) Rounds 1 to 5 (b) Rounds 6 to 10
Figure 3.3: Distribution of market size in the Market Force treatment
tal output was 47.3 units. This was slightly but statistically not significantly lower
than predicted (p = 0.167). In tripolies the actual total output was 43.4 units and
not significantly different from the equilibrium prediction (p = 0.367). However, for
quadropolies the average total market capacity (44.9 units) was significantly higher
than the equilibrium value (p = 0.012). Using a Wilcoxon signed rank test shows that
there was no systematic difference between the average market outputs of these three
market sizes (p > 0.23).
Considering rounds one to five separately from rounds six to ten, the average total
market outputs were slightly closer to the equilibrium predictions in the second half
of the experiment. The market outputs in the first five rounds were lower than the
equilibrium value in duopolies (45.9 units) and higher in three- and four-firm markets
(47.9 units and 44.6 units, respectively). In rounds six to ten total market output
increased in duopolies to 48.8 units and decreased in tripolies as well as quadropolies to
43.3 units and 37.3 units. These differences, however, were not significant for duopolies
and quadropolies (p > 0.45). For tripolies the difference was only marginally significant
(p = 0.099).12
12The data shows that for quadropolies those independent observations with a total market output
above 50 units in the first five rounds did not encounter a main market of size n = 4 in the later five
rounds of the experiment.
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Although the mean market outputs were closer to the ex-ante equilibrium outputs
in rounds six to ten, they were still statistically not significantly different from each
other for the different market sizes (p > 0.2).
(a) Baseline treatment
(b) Market Force treatment
Figure 3.4: Mean capacities vs. ex-ante equilibrium capacities over all ten rounds
In contrast to the total market outputs, the firms’ average capacity choices were sig-
nificantly different between duopolies, tripolies and quadropolies with p-values between
0.003 and 0.004.
3.4 Results 65
Figure 3.4a suggests that the capacity choices converged towards the ex-ante pre-
dicted equilibrium (q∗) given market size, especially in three- and four-firm markets.
Visually, mean capacities in tripolies were close to the equilibrium value already in the
first rounds. This impression is supported by testing for the difference between the
ex-ante predicted capacities and the average chosen capacities, averaged over rounds
one to five and over rounds six to ten, respectively. For tripolies, the difference is
statistically not significant (p = 0.224 for rounds one to five and p = 0.845 for rounds
six to ten). For duopolies and quadropolies the difference is significant in the first five
rounds (p = 0.041 and p = 0.009, respectively) but not significant in the later five
rounds (p = 0.271 and p = 0.115, respectively).
The cumulative distribution of the chosen capacities were slightly steeper around the
equilibrium values for the second half of the experiment (see Figure 3.5). The share of
firms choosing values close to the equilibrium capacity more than tripled in duopolies
and almost doubled in markets with four firms.13
From Figure 3.4a capacity choices seemed more volatile in duopolies than in three-
player and four-player markets. The average coefficient of variance within each inde-
pendently observed market was indeed higher in the first five rounds for duopolies (0.44)
than for tripolies (0.37) and quadropolies (0.29). However in the later five rounds, the
average coefficient of variance reduced to 0.23 in duopolies, which is lower than for
markets with three and four firms (both 0.30). When we compare the mean capacities
of the different independent observations, the coefficient of variance was approximately
0.2 for all three market sizes in the first five rounds. This coefficient reduced to 0.13 for
markets with three and four firms in the later five rounds. For duopolies, however, the
coefficient did not change. This suggests that the variance between different indepen-
dently observed duopolies did not change over time, but within a market participants’
capacity choices assimilated.
13In duopolies the share increased from 9% to 32% for choosing 25-27 units. For tripolies 18% of
all firms chose a capacity of either 14 or 15 units in the first five rounds. This share remained almost
constant over time. In quadropolies participants choosing eight or nine units increased from 13% to
22%.
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(a) n = 2
(b) n = 3
(c) n = 4
Figure 3.5: Cumulative distribution of chosen capacities – Baseline treatment
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Price choice
After choosing capacities, firms on the main market chose their prices in three consec-
utive periods.
To get an overall understanding of the price choices, first look at the development of
the average posted prices in Figure 3.6. The ex-ante predicted prices of a symmetric
equilibrium (p∗) were included for comparison.
The average posted prices differed significantly between the two-, three and four-
firm markets with p-values below 0.004. As Table 3.4 indicates, subjects chose prices
that were on average lower than the equilibrium price regardless of the market size.
Figure 3.6a offers support for this finding: Throughout all ten rounds mean posted
prices were always below the ex-ante equilibrium prices for the corresponding market
size. But for markets with three and four firms average prices seemed to converge
towards the equilibrium. Considering the first five rounds separately from rounds six
to ten, the average chosen prices were significantly lower than ex-ante predicted in
the first half of the experiment regardless of market size. Testing for the difference
between average posted prices and ex-ante equilibrium prices gives p-values of 0.005
in duopolies, 0.003 in tripolies and 0.008 in quadropolies. For the second half of the
experiment, the differences remained significant for three- and four-firm markets (p =
0.003 and p = 0.036, respectively). For duopolies the difference was statistically not
significant anymore (p = 0.109).
According to the theoretical predictions, lower average prices should correspond to
higher average capacity choices. However, recall that in duopolies the average cho-
sen capacities were significantly lower than ex-ante predicted in the first five rounds.
Hence, average posted prices were too low in the first half of the experiment. In the
second half of the experiment neither capacities nor prices differed significantly from
the ex-ante predictions. In tripolies capacity choices were not significantly different to
the ex-ante equilibrium values throughout the entire experiment. Therefore, we would
expect average posted prices to be not significantly different from the ex-ante equilib-
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(a) Baseline treatment
(b) Market Force treatment
Figure 3.6: Mean posted prices vs. ex-ante equilibrium prices over all ten rounds
rium value as well. But as we have seen above, average posted prices were significantly
lower than the ex-ante equilibrium prices. The same applies to quadropolies in the sec-
ond half of the experiment. Since capacities in quadropolies were significantly higher
than q∗ in the first five rounds, average posted prices were in line with the theoretical
predictions.
As ex-ante predicted prices were calculated based on ex-ante equilibrium capaci-
ties q∗, it is not the most accurate benchmark for analyzing whether participants set
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prices optimally in stage three after capacities were chosen. Therefore, we calculated
an individual profit maximizing price for each firm based on their capacity choices and
the total market outputs. Actual posted prices were then compared to these ex-post
predicted equilibrium prices (see Figure 3.7). Each point in Figure 3.7 represents the
price set by one firm in one of three periods of a round. The 45 degree line constitutes
of all points for which the actual chosen price is equal to the ex-post predicted price.
For all points above the 45 degree line the actual prices were larger than the predicted
ones and for all points below the 45 degree line actual prices were below the predicted
ones. Here again we differentiate between the first five rounds and the later five rounds
of the experiment in order to capture price adjustment effects.
Figure 3.7 also supports the assertion that posted prices tended to be lower then ex-
post predicted in two- and three-firm markets as most of the points fall below the 45
degree line. For quadropolies prices were more evenly distributed above and below the
45 degree line. A non-parametric test shows that for duopolies as well as tripolies actual
prices were on average significantly lower than ex-post predicted prices throughout all
ten rounds (p = 0.004 and p = 0.003, respectively). For quadropolies the difference
between the average chosen prices and the predicted prices is not significant (p =
0.262).
In Figure 3.7 the points seemed to be less scattered in the second half of the experi-
ment implying that actual prices were closer to the ex-post predictions in later rounds.
This is affirmed when considering the standard deviation of the posted prices within
markets. In duopolies the standard deviation reduced by about 50% between rounds
one to five and rounds six to ten. For tripolies and quadropolies it reduced by 35%
and 40%.14
14For n = 2 the standard deviation reduced from 4.4 to 2.2, for n = 3 from 2.4 to 1.6 and for n =
4 from 2.2 to 1.3.
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(a) n = 2, rounds 1 to 5 (b) n = 2, rounds 6 to 10
(c) n = 3, rounds 1 to 5 (d) n = 3, rounds 6 to 10
(e) n = 4, rounds 1 to 5 (f) n = 4, rounds 6 to 10
Figure 3.7: Actual prices vs. ex-post predicted prices – Baseline treatment
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To test whether actual prices were closer to the predicted prices in the second half of
the experiment, we first calculated the absolute differences between the actual average
prices of each round and the predicted prices for each firm.15 Then for each indepen-
dent observation the average is taken across all these price differences for the first five
rounds (|∆P 1|) as well as for the later five rounds (|∆P 2|). If the average prices were
closer to the predicted prices in the second half of the experiment |∆P 2| should be
systematically smaller than |∆P 1|. For duopolies average posted prices were indeed
significantly closer to the predicted prices in the later five rounds (p = 0.035). For
tripolies and quadropolies the difference, however, was statistically not significant (p =
0.126 and p = 0.201, respectively).16
Using a similar method as described above, we tested whether posted prices indeed
converged towards the ex-post predicted prices within a round. We first calculated the
absolute differences between the posted prices and the ex-post predicted prices for each
firm per period per round. Again, we used the absolute values since differences could be
positive or negative and we did not want them to negate once we aggregate over all ten
rounds. Then, for each independent observation we obtained a mean (absolute) price
difference per period. Based on these three means (one for each period) we constructed
a trendline with the average absolute difference as the dependent variable and periods
as the independent variable. If posted prices were to converge to the predicted prices,
the slopes should be systematically negative, which can be tested using a Wilcoxon
signed-rank test.
With this method we obtained that for duopolies the slopes of the trendlines were
significantly negative with a p-value of 0.009 and hence posted prices converged to-
15We used absolute values to measure the difference between actual prices and predicted prices as
differences can be positive or negative.
16For quadropolies a within-subject comparison between rounds one to five and rounds six to ten is
possible only to a limited extent as only four independent observations played a four-firm market in
both halves of the experiment. There were ten independent observations in the first five rounds and
six in the later five rounds in total.
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wards the predicted prices within a round. For tripolies this effect was only marginally
significant (p = 0.092) while for quadropolies it was not (p = 0.790).
In Figure 3.7a to Figure 3.7d, lower predicted prices appeared to materialize bet-
ter while for high predicted prices the outcome fell short. Calculating the correlation
between the average posted prices and ex-post predicted prices over all ten periods,
we see that for duopolies the correlation coefficient is only 0.22. This indicates that
participants with high predicted prices did not exploit their market power. They priced
far below their predicted values. When only considering third-period prices the corre-
lation coefficient increases to 0.45 indicating that within a round prices increased. For
markets with three firms the correlation between average posted prices and predicted
ones over all ten rounds was slightly negative (-0.19). This suggests that actual prices
even decreased when predicted prices increase. As depicted in Figures 3.7c and 3.7d
there were some outliers setting prices that were only half their predicted prices. If
only considering third-period prices the correlation becomes positive (0.35 for all ten
rounds and 0.69 for rounds six to ten only). This is in line with our finding that prices
converged towards the equilibrium prices. As expected by looking at Figures 3.7e and
3.7f the correlation between actual and predicted prices is very high for quadropolies
with a correlation coefficient of 0.9.
Profits
To evaluate a firm’s market performance, we shall have a closer look at the profits.
As expected average profits were significantly different between the three market sizes
(p < 0.004).
Figure 3.8a gives an overview of how average profits developed over time. For better
comparability, we used the ex-ante predicted profits of each market size as a bench-
mark (100%). We calculate the ex-post predicted profits, the actual profits and profits
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extrapolated based on third period prices and sales as a share of the ex-ante profits.17
Normalizing the profits like this also allows us to aggregate over different market sizes.
Average profits – actual, third period and ex-post predicted – were always lower than
ex-ante equilibrium profits (see Figure 3.8a). The ex-post predicted profits were lower
than the ex-ante equilibrium profits which indicates that capacities were not chosen
optimally. This is especially evident in the first four rounds of the experiment, which
corresponds to our finding that average total market outputs were too low for duopolies
and too high for quadropolies in the first five rounds. Figure 3.8a also suggests that
average prices were set too low as there is a clear gap between the ex-post predicted
profits and the realized profits. Although price adjustments within a round had an
positive effect on profits – “Profits based on period 3” were always above the “actual”
profits –, average prices in the third period were still too low.
As Figure 3.8a shows average profits increased rather quickly. While firms were
unprofitable in the first three rounds, the realized profits were over 60% of the ex-post
equilibrium profits from round five onwards. The gap between predicted profits and
the actual profits closed over time implying that participants prices choices approached
the ex-post equilibrium prices.
As profits were determined by the combination of capacities and prices, the question
for which capacities profits were the highest might occur. In Figure 3.9 we illustrate
the average profits given chosen capacities. For each market size we calculated the
median over all rounds across all sessions of the Baseline treatment. We then divided
the chosen capacities into three percentiles: the lowest 33%, the highest 33% and the
remaining 34% around the median. For each of the three capacity intervals Figure
3.9 depicts (i) the average ex-post predicted profits, which were calculated based on
the chosen capacity and the ex-post predicted prices mentioned above, (ii) the actual
17We calculated the “Profits based on period 3” by simply assuming that the capacities and prices
in periods one and two were the same as what was chosen by the subjects in the third period of each
round. We do this to measure the effects of the price adjustments within a round.
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(a) Baseline treatment
(b) Market Force treatment
Figure 3.8: Development of profits across all ten rounds
profits that were observed during the experiment, (iii) the profits based on the third
period outcomes.18
Predicted profits were highest for capacities around the median and thus around the
equilibrium capacities in almost all graphs of Figure 3.9. Only in Figure 3.9a predicted
profits were increasing with capacity. Having a closer look at the data, we can see
that firms with a very high capacity had market counterparts with very low capacities.
Hence, these market counterparts were capacity constrained. However, those firms with
18For the Baseline treatment the median is very close to the equilibrium capacities in markets with
two and three firms. There, the equilibrium capacities were in the interval around the median. For
n = 4 the equilibrium value was at the border between the lower 33% and the median interval.
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(a) n = 2, rounds 1 to 5 (b) n = 2, rounds 6 to 10
(c) n = 3, rounds 1 to 5 (d) n = 3, rounds 6 to 10
(e) n = 4, rounds 1 to 5 (f) n = 4, rounds 6 to 10
Figure 3.9: Average actual and predicted profits given capacities – Baseline treatment
high capacities did not exploit their market power as they set prices that were much
lower than what they could have charged. This lead to a very notable gap between the
predicted profits and actual profits.
Not only were the predicted profits highest for capacities close to the equilibrium
capacities, but the actual profits were also highest in those intervals. The difference be-
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tween the average profits for capacities around the median and the remaining capacity
levels was significant for duopolies (p = 0.041) and marginally significant for tripolies
(p = 0.092). For quadropolies average realized profits were significantly higher in the
low capacity interval than for higher capacity levels (p = 0.03).
We have addressed the very low profits in four-firm markets before. Figure 3.9f shows
that for high capacity choices average profits were highly negative. Posted prices were
too high, especially in the first period. Hence, firms were left with a lot of excess
capacity.
Independent of the market size, an increase in profits given capacities could be
observed over time when comparing the actual profits in the first five rounds to the
later five rounds of the experiment. For duopolies and tripolies this increase was
significant (p = 0.022 and 0.003), while for quadropolies it was at the boarder of
marginal significance (p = 0.1). Profits in the second half qwew much closer to the
predicted profits which corresponds to the findings regarding capacity choice and prices
stated above.
For all three market sizes profits based on third period outcomes were significantly
higher than actual profits showing that price adjustments within a round had a positive
effect on profits (p−values < 0.004).
To sum up, total market outputs did not differ significantly between the different
market sizes. However, mean capacities and prices of the three market sizes under
consideration were significantly different. In duopolies average capacities were lower
than predicted by the ex-ante equilibrium. Given capacity choices, prices were too
low on average, especially for firms with high ex-post predicted prices. Most of them
did not make use of their market power. In tripolies mean capacities were already
very close to the ex-ante equilibrium values in the first few rounds. Average posted
prices were slightly but significantly lower than ex-post predicted prices. In four-firm
markets mean capacities were significantly higher than in the ex-ante equilibrium and
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prices were on average higher than ex-post predicted. This led to very high losses for
some firms.19 Overall capacities as well as prices converged towards the equilibrium
values over time. Price adjustments were also observed within each round in the sense
that third-period prices were closer to the ex-post predicted prices. The profitability
of firms increased substantially over time. It seems that although participants did not
actively choose to be on the main market in the Baseline treatment, they very quickly
adjusted to the market situation.
3.4.3 Market Force treatment
As mentioned above the main and only difference between the Baseline treatment and
the Market Force treatment was that subjects in the Market Force treatment were
asked to choose whether they want to enter the main market or be on the side market.
In case they were already on the main market, they had to decide whether they wish
to stay on it. We will refer to this choice as their entry decision hence on.20
By comparing the decisions made in this treatment to the Baseline treatment, we
wish to find out whether (i) subjects self-selected into either main or side market and
(ii) these selection effects led to systematically “better” choices.
Entry decision
Before turning to the analysis of subjects capacity and price decisions, let us first
investigate whether there is a self-selection effect. Figure 3.10 depicts the distribution
of how many rounds subjects operated on the main market. The figure suggests that
there is self-selection once participants were given the chance to choose: The mode is
very clearly at ten rounds. 27% of all subjects were on the main market in ten out
of ten rounds of the experiment while 7% of all participants never entered the main
market but remained on the side market during the entire session.
19Losses of up to 700 ECUs were observed.
20Recall that the entry balance requirement was 300 ECUs.
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Figure 3.10: Share of total market entries for all ten rounds
The self-selection becomes more evident when considering the entry decisions in
rounds one to five and rounds six to ten separately (see Figure 3.11). The shape of
the distribution in rounds six to ten has a u-shape with the most subjects either being
on the main market for all five rounds or not at all. While in the first five rounds the
distribution forms a small u-shape between two rounds and five rounds. This suggest
that while some experimentation took place in the earlier rounds, participants “spe-
cialized” themselves over time and either operated on the main market or stayed on
the side market.
Figure 3.11: Share of total market entries for rounds 1–5 and 6–10
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We defined and calculated an index to quantify the magnitude of this specialization
for each group of five participants. The specialization index (SI) takes on values
between 0 and 1 and is defined such that 1 is equal to total specialization. As standard
theory predicts n = 3 in equilibrium for our setting, SI = 1 implies that three out of
five firms were on the main market and the remaining two firms operate on the side
market for all ten rounds of the entire experiment. For SI = 0 each of the five firms
would be on the main market in six out of ten rounds.
Calculating the index for all independent observations, we find clear evidence for
specialization in the Market Force treatment (see Table 3.5). Table 3.5 also shows that
specialization was increasing over time. In the later five rounds of the experiment 67%
of all markets had an index value of 1. This offers support for the visual impression
that there was self-selection into the main market from Figure 3.11.
This selection effect is also illustrated in Figure 3.12. There the cumulative distri-
bution of rounds participants were on the main market is very close to the cumulative
distribution of total specialization. In rounds six to ten, it almost completely overlaps
with the distribution for SI = 1 (see Figure 3.12d).
As expected, we did not find systematic specialization in the Baseline treatment
since participants were randomly allocated to either main or side market (see Table
3.5). Therefore the cumulative distribution is closer to the uniform distribution (see
Figure 3.12a and 3.12b).
Market Force Baseline
Rounds 1-5 Rounds 6-10 Rounds 1-5 Rounds 6-10
∅SI 0.81 0.95 0.38 0.26
SImin 0.42 0.77 0 0
SImax 1 1 0.78 0.58
SI = 1 25% 67% 0% 0%
Table 3.5: Summary of the specialization index
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(a) Baseline treatment, rounds 1 to 5 (b) Baseline treatment, rounds 6 to 10
(c) Market Force treatment, rounds 1 to 5 (d) Market Force treatment, rounds 6 to 10
Figure 3.12: Cumulative distribution of rounds subjects operated on the main market
Does this high degree of specialization have a systematic effect on capacity and price
choices and how does it affect the profitability of firms?
Capacity choice
First, consider the total market output. The average total market outputs were 40.2
units in duopolies, 45 units in tripolies and 40.4 units in quadropolies. Recall that the
ex-ante equilibrium market outputs are 52 units, 43.8 units and 34 units, respectively.
Hence, as before in the Baseline treatment, average total outputs were significantly
lower than predicted by the ex-ante equilibrium in duopolies (p = 0.023), and signifi-
cantly higher than predicted in quadropolies (p = 0.009). For tripolies the total outputs
were almost equivalent to the ex-ante predictions with a p-value of 0.556. Comparing
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average total outputs in both treatments, we did not find a significant difference re-
gardless of market size (p > 0.19).
Separately looking at the total market capacities in rounds one to five and rounds six
to ten, the total market output neither increased nor decreased significantly for either
market size (p > 0.4).
Considering comparative statics, the mean market outputs did not differ systemat-
ically between two- and three-firm markets (p = 0.221) as well as between two- and
four-firm markets (p = 0.965). This is equivalent to our findings in the Baseline treat-
ment. However, by contrast, the difference between mean market outputs of three- and
four-firm markets was marginally significant (p = 0.0917).
As with the findings in the Baseline treatment, the mean capacities differ significantly
between two-, three- and four-firm markets (p < 0.037).
In Figure 3.4b the development of the mean capacities over time appears to be sim-
ilar to what was observed in the Baseline treatment (see Figure 3.4b) in the first half
of the experiment: Mean capacities were significantly lower than ex-ante predicted in
duopolies (p = 0.016), not significantly different in tripolies (p = 0.969) and signifi-
cantly higher in quadropolies (p = 0.011). In the second half of the experiment, the
difference remains significant for two- and four-firm markets (p = 0.036 and p = 0.090,
respectively) and insignificant in tripolies (p = 0.367). Whereas, in the Baseline treat-
ment mean capacities were not significantly different from the equilibrium predictions
in the later half of the experiment for all three market sizes. However, there is no
significant difference in mean capacities between both treatments (p > 0.2).
In Figure 3.13 we can also see that the cumulative distribution between rounds one
to five and rounds six to ten were quite similar. For markets with three and four firms
the distribution curve for the later five rounds appears to be slightly steeper around
the ex-ante equilibrium value. In fact, the share of firms choosing either 14 or 15 units
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(a) n = 2, Market Force treatment
(b) n = 3, Market Force treatment
(c) n = 4, Market Force treatment
Figure 3.13: Cumulative distribution of chosen capacities – Market Force treatment
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in tripolies increased from 17% in the first five rounds to 27% in the later five rounds.
For quadropolies we observed a similar increase. 19% of firms chose either 8 or 9 units
in rounds one to five and 28% in rounds six to ten.
In total, capacity choices in the Market Force treatment were not significantly dif-
ferent from the Baseline treatment. For duopolies the mean capacities were even lower
when entry was endogenous. However, this difference was not significant.
Price choice
As in the Baseline treatment price choices differed significantly between the different
market sizes (p-values between 0.003 and 0.004).
In Figure 3.6, which shows the development of the average posted prices over time,
prices for all three market sizes seemed to converge towards the ex-ante equilibrium
values.
Recall that average capacities were significantly lower than ex-ante predicted in
duopolies. In tripolies there was no significant difference between predictions and av-
erage chosen capacities and in quadropolies actual capacities were significantly higher
than equilibrium values. Hence, based on the theoretical predictions, we would expect
average prices to be higher than ex-ante predicted in duopolies, not significantly differ-
ent from predictions in tripolies and significantly lower than ex-ante equilibrium prices
in quadropolies.
However, for duopolies average posted prices were lower than ex-ante predicted in
rounds one to five (p = 0.083). In rounds six to ten the difference was not significant
anymore (p = 0.8). In tripolies average actual prices were significantly lower than ex-
ante predicted throughout all ten rounds. Although average prices seemed to converge
to the equilibrium prices the differences remained significant (p = 0.013 for rounds
one to five and p = 0.021 for rounds six to ten). Thus, average prices were lower
than expected in duopolies and tripolies. For quadropolies mean posted prices were
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significantly lower in the first half of the experiment (p = 0.006) which is in line
with the theoretical predictions, as capacities there surpassed equilibrium predictions
significantly. For the second half, prices converged towards the equilibrium prices and
the difference was not significant anymore (p = 0.205). As average capacities remained
significantly lower than predicted in the second half, average chosen prices were higher
than we would expect according to theory.
When comparing the actual posted prices to the ex-post instead of the ex-ante pre-
dicted prices, we obtain the same results. Prices were significantly lower in duopolies
and tripolies and not significantly different in quadropolies.21 Given average capacities
chosen this implies that prices were set too low in markets with two and three firms
while they were too high in markets with four firms. This result is equivalent to what
we have found in the Baseline treatment.
The visual impression from Figure 3.14 is similar to the Baseline treatment before:
(i) Actual posted prices seemed closer to the ex-post predicted prices in the second
half of the experiment, and (ii) posted prices converged towards the equilibrium prices
within a round.
Using the same method as described before, we test for the significance of the ob-
served convergence. And indeed for duopolies and tripolies average posted prices were
significantly closer to the equilibrium prices in the second half of the experiment. But
for duopolies the difference between first and second half was only marginally signifi-
cant (p = 0.076). In contrast to the Baseline treatment where the posted prices were
not significantly closer to the predictions in tripolies, the difference between the first
five rounds and the later five rounds was significant in the Market Force treatment
(p = 0.025). For quadropolies the result was similar to the Baseline treatment: The
difference was not significant (p = 0.281).
21Considering the first five rounds separately form the later five rounds p = 0.004 in the first half
and p = 0.022 in the second half of the experiment in duopolies. In tripolies the p−values were 0.007
and 0.013 respectively and in quadropolies they were 0.541 and 1.
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Equivalent to what we observed in the Baseline treatment prices converged towards
the equilibrium prices in two- and three-firm markets (p = 0.007 and p = 0.092, re-
spectively) while they did not in quadropolies (p = 0.530).22
Comparing the average prices between the Baseline treatment and Market Force
treatment, no significant difference could be found for all three market sizes (p > 0.19).
Similar to the Baseline treatment, participants in the duopoly market did not ex-
ploit their market power. The correlation coefficient between posted prices and ex-post
predicted prices were even slightly negative (-0.05) which indicates that for higher pre-
dicted prices posted prices tended to be even lower. When only considering actual
prices in the third period the correlation coefficient was positive but still low (0.18).
Recall that in the Baseline treatment the coefficient was 0.45. This implies that higher
predicted prices materialized better in the Baseline treatment. As opposed to the
Baseline treatment where the correlation was negative (-0.19) in three-firm markets,
posted prices and ex-post predicted prices were strongly correlated with each other
(0.8) in the Market Force treatment. When comparing Figures 3.14c and 3.14d to
Figures 3.7c and 3.7d we can see that the points were less scattered in the Market
Force treatment. Especially for higher predicted prices some firms set very low ac-
tual prices in the Baseline treatment. For quadropolies however, the correlation (0.69)
was slightly lower in the Market Force treatment than in the Baseline treatment (0.9).
As Figure 3.14e show there were some outliers charging only half their predicted prices.
As with the capacity choices, we did not observe a significant difference between
the price choices in the Market Force treatment and the Baseline treatment. Only
for tripolies, convergence to the ex-post equilibrium prices was slightly stronger and
posted prices were more strongly correlated to the predicted prices in the Market Force
treatment .
22Here we used the same method as described before in section 3.4.2.
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(a) n = 2, rounds 1 to 5 (b) n = 2, rounds 6 to 10
(c) n = 3, rounds 1 to 5 (d) n = 3, rounds 6 to 10
(e) n = 4, rounds 1 to 5 (f) n = 4, rounds 6 to 10
Figure 3.14: Actual prices vs. ex-post predicted prices – Market Force treatment
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Profits
Figure 3.8b gives an overview of how profits developed over time. Similar to what
we have observed before in Figure 3.8a for the Baseline treatment, ex-post predicted
profits were always lower than the ex-ante predicted profits. This corresponds to the
fact, that capacities were not chosen optimally as average capacities were significantly
lower than ex-ante predicted for duopolies and higher for quadropolies. Further, profits
based on the third period outcomes only were on average higher than the actual profits,
again indicating that price adjustments within a round had a positive effect on profits.
In fact, the difference between actual profits and profits extrapolated based on third
period outcomes was significant for all three market sizes (p < 0.004).
Compared to the Baseline treatment profits were higher in the first rounds and
seemed to increase faster within the first five rounds. While firms were on average
unprofitable in the first round, realized profits increased immediately in the second
round to 50% of the ex-post predicted profits. In round five actual profits increased to
approximately 70% of the ex-post predicted profits. The development in the later five
rounds was comparable between both treatments. Overall, profits did not significantly
differ between the two treatments for all three market sizes (p > 0.2).
Disaggregating the data and looking at each market size individually, profits signifi-
cantly differed between the three market sizes (p < 0.004). Considering profits in the
first half and the second half of the experiment separately shows that average profits
in the second half are significantly higher. For duopolies and tripolies p < 0.05 and for
quadropolies p = 0.06.
Figure 3.15 depicts the average profits given capacity choices. We again calculated
the median, the lower 33% percentile as well as the upper 33% percentile of the chosen
capacities for each market size. In this treatment the ex-ante equilibrium capacity were
in the upper 33% percentile for duopolies and in the interval around the median for
tripolies and quadropolies.
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(a) n = 2, rounds 1 to 5 (b) n = 2, rounds 6 to 10
(c) n = 3, rounds 1 to 5 (d) n = 3, rounds 6 to 10
(e) n = 4, rounds 1 to 5 (f) n = 4, rounds 6 to 10
Figure 3.15: Average actual and predicted profits given capacities – Market Force
treatment
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In contrast to the Baseline treatment, the difference between realized profits and
predicted profits were not as prominent in the first five periods for all three market
sizes. As before in the Baseline treatment, Figure 3.15 conveys the impression that
average profits were highest for the interval around the ex-ante equilibrium capac-
ity. However, the difference in average profits between the interval with the ex-ante
equilibrium value and the remaining two capacity intervals was only significant for
quadropolies (p = 0.006). For duopolies the difference was not significant (p = 0.234)
and for tripolies it was only at the boarder of significance (p = 0.1).
Overall, we do not find strong evidence for a significantly better market performance
in the Market Force treatment compared to the Baseline treatment.
3.4.4 Side market
On the side markets where individuals were not competing against each other the
average capacities and prices chosen were almost equivalent to the equilibrium values
resulting in an average profit which was very close to the equilibrium profit for both
treatment types (see Table 3.6).
Treatment Capacity Price Profit
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
Baseline 12.4 22.7 22.9 23 22.9 214.2
Market Force 12.8 22.8 22.8 22.8 22.8 228.8
Equilibrium 12.5 23 23 23 23 240
Table 3.6: Average capacity, price and profit in the side market over all ten rounds
As can be seen from Figure 3.16 and 3.17 the capacities and prices chosen were fairly
constant across all rounds and not significantly different from the equilibrium values. As
the data shows no difference between the side markets in the Baseline treatment and the
Market Force treatment, we pooled the data of both treatments for the analysis. The
realized profits were almost equal to the ex-post predicted profits – the maximum profits
given capacity choices – (see Figure 3.18). Hence, once capacities were set, firms on the
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side market did choose the right profit maximizing prices. Looking into the data only
2.9% of prices chosen in period three were not equal to the predicted prices. Average
ex-post predicted profits were only 9 ECUs lower than ex-ante predicted. Hence, firms
in the side market, on average, also managed to choose the profit maximizing capacities.
Figure 3.16: Mean capacity vs. ex-ante equilibrium capacity – side market
Figure 3.17: Mean posted price vs. ex-ante equilibrium price – side market
In total, we can conclude for the side market that: (i) There was no significant
difference between side markets in both treatments. (ii) Firms set capacities which
were very close to the equilibrium capacity throughout all rounds. (iii) Almost all firms
set the profit maximizing prices and prices did not systematically change between the
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Figure 3.18: Average actual and predicted profits − side market
three periods of a round. And (iv) resulting from (ii) and (iii), average actual profits
were very close to the equilibrium profits.
3.4.5 Post-tests
To investigate whether and how certain characteristics such as loss aversion, risk aver-
sion, cognitive skills and social value orientation were related to the outcome variables
entry decision, capacity and price choices as well as profits, we ran a battery of post-
tests.
Figure 3.19 gives an overview of the results for the four different tasks. As expected,
the distribution of subjects’ choices for the loss aversion test as well as the risk aversion
test has a bell shape. The mode and median is at five for the loss aversion test and at
three for the risk aversion test (see Figure 3.19a and 3.19c).23 Hence, most subjects’
loss and risk aversion level were in the middle of our scale. The correlation between
these two tests is positive with a correlation coefficient of 0.42.
23Lottery five in the loss aversion test: 50:50 chance of either losing 10 points or gaining 20 points.
Lottery three in the risk aversion test: 50:50 change of either getting 44 points or 20 points.
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In the Raven’s SPM where we tested for cognitive skills almost half of the participants
managed to do either eight or nine tasks correctly. 20% of subjects even solved ten or
more matrices (see Figure 3.19b).
Figure 3.19d depicts the outcomes of each subject on the the self/other allocation
plane of the Liebrand’s SVO test. The curve of the SVO ring is included as a reference
point. As not all points lie on the boarder of the curve some choices were not pareto-
efficient. There were only very few altruistic subjects who attributed more payoff to
the other player than to themselves. 51% of subjects were completely “egoistic” as
they always chose the option which benefited themselves the most (allocation (30, 0)).
The angle of the own-other-payoff allocation vector (“Liebrand angle”) which gives
the social orientation was negatively correlated to the length of the vector (“Liebrand
efficiency”) with a coefficient of -0.31 indicating that subjects who were more pro-
social tend to be less efficient. Furthermore, risk aversion is positively correlated to the
“Liebrand angle” (0.38) and slightly negatively to the “Liebrand efficiency” (-0.23).
This implies that subjects who were more risk averse tend to be more pro-social and
slightly less efficient.24
For ease of interpretation of the regression results we rescaled the post-tests so that a
variable value of zero corresponded to the characteristics of (i) loss neutrality, (ii) high-
est level of cognitive skills, (iii) risk neutrality, (iv) selfishness (focused on maximizing
own payoff) and (v) efficiency maximizing.
(i) In the loss-aversion test, the lottery number nine was the loss-neutral option,
offering a 50:50 chance of either losing or gaining 20 points. Hence, if a participant
accepted lotteries one to nine, the variable “Loss aversion” was set equal to zero in our
new scale. We set up the new scale such that the degree of loss aversion increased with
increasing numbers. Accepting just lottery number one which was the option with a
24The correlation between all other variables were very low with coefficients between -0.04 and 0.13.
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(a) Loss aversion (b) Raven’s SPM test
(c) Risk aversion (d) Liebrand’s SVO ring
Figure 3.19: Summary of post-test results
safe outcome of 28 points corresponds to a loss aversion level of eight in our new scale.
For lottery number 10 “Loss aversion” was set equal to -1.
(ii) The variable “Raven’s test” is equal to zero if all 12 questions were answered
correctly in the Raven’s SPM test. The modified scale gives minus points for each
incorrectly solved puzzle. If one of the 12 tasks was answered incorrectly “Raven’s
test” takes the value of -1 and so on.
(iii) Lotteries five and six in our risk aversion test were both expected payoff max-
imizing solutions. A risk neutral individual who only cares about maximizing their
expected payoffs should be indifferent between these two lotteries. However, lottery
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six is a mean-preserving spread of lottery five as the variance is smaller in lottery five.
Hence, for lottery five “Risk aversion” = 0 and for lottery six ”Risk aversion” = -1. As
with the scale for loss aversion, the higher the value the more risk averse the individual.
(iv) The “Liebrand angle” did not need to be rescaled. An angle of 0 degree corre-
sponds to extreme egotism and an angle of 90 degrees indicates complete altruism.
(v) For the “Liebrand efficiency” metric (vector length), a length of 30 would be the
most efficient outcome. Again we set the most efficient outcome to zero. Hence as
with the Ravens test, the variable takes on negative values for outcomes that were less
efficient.
Entry decision
We used the total number of rounds each participant operated on the main market as
the dependent variable for this regression. Although we observed a strong self-selection,
none of the measured characteristics had a significant effect on how often a participant
chose to operate on the main market as the regression results in Table 3.7 shows.
Capacity choices
To analyze how characteristics elicited in the post tests relate to subjects’ capacity
choice, we used the difference between their actual capacity and the equilibrium ca-
pacity of the corresponding market size as the dependent variable. As these differences
could take on positive (+∆q) as well as negative (−∆q) values, we looked at both
separately.
Beside the measurements from the post-tests, we also included the number of rounds
(“Round”) and the aggregated number of rounds a participant operated on the main
market (“Aggregated entries”) to account for experience as an explanatory variable.
Furthermore, we controlled for the market size (“Market size”) and included the
squared market size (“Market size2”) to account for non-linear effects.
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# Entry
Loss aversion 0.376
(0.261)
Raven’s test 0.248
(0.289)
Risk aversion −0.348
(0.458)
Liebrand angle −0.019
(0.034)
Liebrand efficiency 0.057
(0.275)
Constant 6.221∗∗∗
(1.494)
Observations 48
R2 0.079
Adjusted R2 -0.031
Notes: Standard deviation are in parentheses.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 3.7: Regression - Market entry decision
The regression results are presented in Table 3.8. We obtain comparable results for
both treatments. When capacities were lower than the equilibrium capacity (−∆q),
market size (“Market size”) and experience (“Round”) had a significantly positive effect
on capacity choices in the sense that actual capacities were closer to the equilibrium
capacity. In the Baseline treatment, participants with higher cognitive skills measured
by the Raven’s SPM test chose capacities that were closer to the equilibrium capacity.
For negative deviations from the equilibrium this effect is stronger than for positive
deviations. With the average deviation being -4.16, a coefficient of 0.7 implies that
an increase in correct answers by one decreased the difference to the equilibrium by
17% on average.25 However, in the Market Force treatment, we found no significant
influence of the “Raven’s test” on the accuracy of the capacity choices.
Prices choices
For price choices we also differentiated between positive (+∆p) and negative (−∆p)
25For positive deviations (+∆q) the mean was 3.7.
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Baseline treatment Market Force treatment
−∆q +∆q −∆q +∆q
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Loss aversion 0.443∗ −0.032 −0.195 −0.026
(0.251) (0.075) (0.178) (0.077)
Raven’s test 0.695∗∗∗ −0.167∗∗ 0.314 0.051
(0.138) (0.075) (0.212) (0.082)
Risk aversion −0.120 −0.067 0.543 0.214
(0.387) (0.151) (0.375) (0.132)
Liebrand angle −0.046 0.012 −0.006 −0.015
(0.043) (0.013) (0.026) (0.010)
Liebrand efficiency −0.132 0.096 0.036 0.086
(0.189) (0.125) (0.279) (0.076)
Round 0.471∗∗∗ 0.039 0.590∗∗∗ 0.095∗
(0.156) (0.058) (0.168) (0.057)
Aggregated entries −0.133 −0.045 0.064 −0.113
(0.331) (0.129) (0.206) (0.101)
Market size 12.402∗∗ 2.766 10.215∗∗∗ −0.600
(5.350) (2.090) (3.554) (1.612)
Market size2 −1.642∗ −0.139 −1.067∗ 0.236
(0.890) (0.332) (0.588) (0.251)
Constant −25.849∗∗∗ −8.707∗∗∗ −25.634∗∗∗ −0.717
(7.540) (3.241) (5.239) (2.567)
Observations 79 151 113 161
R2 0.559 0.343 0.460 0.124
Adjusted R2 0.502 0.301 0.413 0.072
Notes: Standard deviation are in parentheses. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 3.8: Regression - Deviation of actual capacities from ex-ante equilibrium capac-
ities
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deviations from the ex-post equilibrium prices.26 Column (1) and (3) of Table 3.9 shows
that with increasing market size (“Market size”) as well as experience (“Round”) mean
posted prices converged towards the ex-post equilibrium prices.27
As for capacity choices, cognitive skill had a significant positive effect on price choices.
In the Baseline treatment as well as for negative price deviations in the Market Force
treatment, mean prices were closer to the ex-post optimal prices when cognitive skills
were higher. The effect was stronger in the Baseline treatment than in the Market
Force treatment.28
Apart from the cognitive skills, the other characteristics taken from the post-tests
had no meaningful impact on pricing. Risk aversion and loss aversion appeared to affect
price choices slightly negatively: The difference between mean posted prices and ex-post
predicted prices increased with a subject’s level of risk or loss aversion. Risk aversion
increased the difference between actual and predicted prices significantly for −∆p in
the Baseline treatment and +∆p in the Market Force treatment. Loss aversion had a
significant negative effect on the price difference for +∆p in the Baseline treatment, in
the sense that higher levels of loss aversion increased the price difference. However, it
had a marginally positive effect for −∆p in the Market Force treatment.29
A possible explanation for why loss and risk aversion seemed to affect price choices
negatively, at least to some extend, could be that subjects who were very focused on
not having any overcapacity tend to set prices that were too low compared to the
predictions. On the other hand, subjects that had a more per unit focus may have
26We used the average price over all three periods for each participant.
27The effect of market size on the price difference was non-linear (“Market size2” was significant for
−∆p in column (1) and (3)).
28The average deviation for −∆p was -2.9 in the Baseline treatment and -2.6 in the Market Force
treatment. For +∆p it was 1.1 in both treatments.
29However, the effects are not very clear as they seemed to counteract each other. While higher
levels of risk aversion increased the deviation from the ex-post predictions for −∆p in the Baseline
treatment significantly, it reduced the price difference for +∆p, though not significantly. Loss aversion
had just the opposite effect in the Baseline treatment. For +∆p, increasing loss aversion increased
the price difference significantly while it had a positive, though insignificant, effect on price accuracy
for −∆p. In the Market Force treatment, the effect of both, loss and risk aversion, was increasing
for +∆p while for −∆p higher loss aversion closed the gap between actual and predicted prices while
higher levels of risk aversion increased the difference.
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aimed for covering their unit costs with their per unit revenues which lead to higher
prices.
Baseline treatment Market Force treatment
−∆p +∆p −∆p +∆p
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Loss aversion 0.117 0.186∗∗ −0.215∗ 0.049
(0.118) (0.070) (0.115) (0.081)
Raven’s test 0.569∗∗∗ −0.189∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗ 0.159∗
(0.084) (0.060) (0.133) (0.086)
Risk aversion −0.358∗ −0.133 0.220 0.272∗
(0.214) (0.127) (0.215) (0.143)
Liebrand angle −0.021 0.027∗∗ 0.007 −0.013
(0.020) (0.011) (0.015) (0.014)
Liebrand efficiency −0.173 0.191∗ −0.133 −0.114
(0.126) (0.106) (0.119) (0.119)
Round 0.350∗∗∗ −0.134∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗ −0.106
(0.079) (0.053) (0.095) (0.068)
Aggregated entries −0.278 0.229∗ 0.129 −0.043
(0.169) (0.134) (0.131) (0.114)
Market size 9.336∗∗∗ −2.814 16.532∗∗∗ 0.944
(2.801) (2.285) (2.700) (1.282)
Market size2 −1.170∗∗ 0.508 −2.172∗∗∗ −0.117
(0.464) (0.350) (0.435) (0.206)
Constant −18.731∗∗∗ 3.579 −32.637∗∗∗ 0.284
(4.090) (3.680) (4.117) (2.027)
Observations 166 64 193 81
R2 0.490 0.465 0.466 0.211
Adjusted R2 0.460 0.376 0.440 0.111
Notes: Standard deviation are in parentheses. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 3.9: Regression - Deviation of mean posted prices from ex-post predicted prices
Profits
Regressing profits of each round on the data collected in the post-tests shows that
market size has a non-linear effect on profits which is intuitive as profits decrease with
market size in our setting. Experience captured by the round variable has a highly
significant increasing effect indicating that profits were increasing over time. As before
for the capacity and price choices we observe a highly significant positive effect of
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cognitive skills on profits. According to the regression results higher levels of loss
aversion and a more pro-social attitude decreased profits in the Baseline treatment. In
the Market Force treatment the effect of these two variables is not significant.
Profits
Baseline Market Force
(1) (2)
Loss aversion −13.064∗∗∗ −7.430
(4.820) (4.643)
Raven’s test 19.988∗∗∗ 13.184∗∗
(3.591) (5.285)
Risk aversion −13.336 7.504
(8.736) (8.725)
Liebrand angle −2.121∗∗∗ 0.405
(0.805) (0.667)
Liebrand efficiency −5.963 −6.750
(5.660) (5.342)
Round 25.069∗∗∗ 18.258∗∗∗
(3.335) (3.880)
Aggregated entry −19.122∗∗ 5.154
(7.525) (5.696)
Market size −1, 694.355∗∗∗ −1, 846.499∗∗∗
(119.823) (95.537)
Market size2 212.424∗∗∗ 233.849∗∗∗
(19.361) (15.309)
Constant 3, 461.471∗∗∗ 3, 607.203∗∗∗
(180.264) (146.681)
Observations 230 274
R2 0.819 0.807
Adjusted R2 0.811 0.800
Notes: Standard deviation are in parentheses. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 3.10: Regression - Profits on the main market
3.5 Conclusion
In the economics literature laboratory experiments are often used to examine firms
decisions. A major advantage of such experiments is that they allow researchers to
analyze specific market settings and behavior in an isolated environment where they can
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control for and vary the influencing factors. However, as subjects in such experiments
are often students, critics question the experiments external validity. One common
line of reasoning is that in “real” markets only firms that conform to the model of
the sophisticated rational firm succeed since competition and market forces eliminate
those that do not. One major concern that has been voiced is that students who are
confronted with a new and possibly complex market situation behave rather naively
and use simple heuristics when making decisions.
To investigate the relevance of this claim to the validity of laboratory experiments
we confronted our subjects with a deliberately complex multi-layered strategic market
setting, in which they first chose capacity levels and then competed by setting prices in
three consecutive periods in the main market. We set up two different treatments: the
Baseline treatment and the Market Force treatment. In the Baseline treatment subjects
were allocated at random to markets of two, three or four players. Poor performance
in this treatment did not lead to exclusion from the market. For the Market Force
treatment, endogenous market entry was introduced. Subjects in this treatment could
actively choose to enter the market provided they had sufficient liquidity. If their
balance fell below the required minimum they were forced out of the market.
Although we observed strong self-selection into markets in the Market Force treat-
ment, in the sense that participants “specialized in the later rounds and either operated
in the main market or stayed in the side market, we observed no substantial difference
between the Baseline and Market Force treatments in terms of performance. In both
treatments, outcomes were closest to equilibrium predictions in tripolies. In duopolies
firms oftentimes did not fully exploit their market power and capacities as well as prices
were too low, while in quadropolies capacities and prices tend to be too high affect-
ing profits negatively. Regardless of market size, we observed price adjustments in the
three consecutive periods of a round which affected profits positively. Overall, although
the setting was deliberately complex, participants decisions converged on average to
the equilibrium solution.
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In both treatments we find that the market entry decision did not vary significantly
with any of the characteristics (loss aversion, risk aversion, cognitive skills and social
value and efficiency orientation) from the post-tests. Risk and loss aversion had a
slightly negative effect on prices, increasing the gap between posted prices and the
optimal prices given total market outputs (ex-post predicted prices). Experience and
cognitive skills affected capacity and pricing decisions was well as profits significantly
in the sense that with increasing experience and cognitive skills capacity and price
choices were closer to the equilibrium predictions and profits increased.
In total, we did not find any substantial differences between the outcomes of the two
treatments in our setting. It seems that although particpants in the Baseline treatment
did not actively choose to enter the main market, they were able to adjust to the market
situation and the decisions they were confronted with.
4 Procrastination and Deadlines in
Long-term Team Projects
4.1 Introduction
When the term “procrastination” comes up in conversation, we almost immediately
think of our own behavior and the last time we put something off until the last minute.
Although we all know that we should “never put off until tomorrow what we can do
today”, we still struggle to live up to this adage. However procrastination is not only
an individual issue but can also be a major roadblock to teamwork.
Even in our everyday lives we encounter situations where we are confronted with
inefficient delay in teams. Group projects at school or voluntary contributions to local
community projects are examples we are all familiar with. Here a conflict between
collective and individual interests can arise since costs are private while benefits are
public. The collective interest is in achieving a common goal that would be beneficial
for everyone involved in the sense that it would maximize joint payoffs. In such sit-
uations selfish team members who pursue their own interests will minimize their own
investment while relying on the efforts and investments of the other team members.
Such detrimental holding back on investments might have fatal consequences, since
it can lead to increased delay costs or even the failure of a project. The situation is
worsened when contribution decisions are made independently and there is uncertainty
about the actions of the other people involved.
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In the economic literature, the conflict of collective and individual interests is mod-
eled predominantly by public good games. One special case of public good games
includes a threshold that has to be met to guarantee the provision of these goods.
In general, the underlying games for most common public good settings are one-shot
decision games. However, there are many situations where a one-shot game even if
it is repeatedly played is not realistic: Many group projects as well as cooperation
among firms normally last for more than one period. Investments have to be provided
continuously over a certain time period in order to complete a project or achieve a
goal. So what happens if contributions have to be accumulated over time? Will teams
be able to coordinate on the most efficient outcome when there is no deadline, or will
they delay their work or even fail to complete a project at all? How can the efficiency
of teamwork be improved?
Deadlines are a common way of counteracting procrastination. But how effective are
deadlines in a team setting? The effect of a deadline will depend on different factors
such as how binding it is and how it was set. For example, a deadline can be externally
imposed (exogenous) or set by the individuals or firms themselves. In the case of a
school project an exogenous deadline might be one set by the teacher. On the other
hand, sometimes students are allowed to set their own deadlines. Some self-imposed
deadlines are binding, e.g. when a group has to commit to the hand-in day for a project.
Other self-imposed deadlines, such as intermediate deadlines, are non-binding and are
often used to prevent everything from being postponed until the last minute. But do
deadlines increase efficiency? And what exactly is the difference between exogenous
deadlines and self-imposed ones?
The issue of procrastination in a team setting has been analyzed theoretically by
Bonatti and Ho¨rner (2011). They investigate collaboration over an infinite time horizon
where efforts are private information and only the outcome can be observed by the
agents. If agents wanted to maximize joint profits, it was best for them to exert
maximal effort. However, the authors found that when agents could do things later,
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they did. Agents exerted too little effort too late, relying on the efforts of others.
Bonatti and Ho¨rner refer to this specific type of inefficient delay as procrastination.
Building on the work of Bonatti and Ho¨rner, Ku¨lpmann (2015) defines an important
effect seen after contributions have been made over an extended period as the encour-
agement effect: An individual’s actions today will affect the efficiency of every players
future efforts and therefore their choice of effort. In continuous contribution models
such as Bonatti and Ho¨rner’s, the encouragement effect is usually negative: Putting
in more effort today will “encourage” the other team members to exert less effort to-
morrow, whereas exerting less effort today will force the others to increase their efforts
tomorrow in order to complete the project.
In the experimental literature some well-known work has been done on the issue of
coordination failure by Van Huyck et al. (1990, 1991). Following Van Huyck et al.,
other authors have also studied the prevalence of coordination failures and tested the
robustness of the findings.1
In addition, voluntary contribution to threshold public goods has been analyzed ex-
perimentally in various settings: While continuous contribution (Cadsby and Maynes,
1999), a money-back guarantee (Cadsby and Maynes, 1999) and sequential move (Rau
and Normann, 2011) increase total contribution, completion rate and payoffs, they
do not stop attempts to free-ride. In a continuous contribution setting, the average
first-round investment also has an effect on total contributions: The lower the average
first-round investment, the lower the total contribution (Dannenberg et al., 2011).
So far experimental research on procrastination has mainly focused on the aspects of
time-inconsistency and present bias (Bisin and Hyndman, 2014) as well as self-control
problems in an individual setting. Some studies have analyzed the effect of certain
methods such as costly self-imposed deadlines and intermediate deadlines to enforce
self-discipline. According to Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002) subjects in the exogenous
1Anderson (2001) and Goeree and Holt (2005) show that lower effort costs lead to higher frequency
of coordination on the payoff-dominant equilibrium even with random matching. Blume (2005) intro-
duces communication and finds that cheap talk facilitates quick convergence towards coordination.
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deadlines treatment performed best, while subjects in the no-deadline treatment per-
formed the worst. In addition, self-imposed deadlines were often not set optimally and
hence did not improve performance as much as expected. Possible reasons for what
Ariely and Wertenbroch call imperfect sophistication (or “partial naivete´”) might be
biased self-perception and cognitive limitations in calibrating deadlines or even a de-
liberate mixed strategy of balancing flexibility and self-control. The results of Bisin
and Hyndman (2014) are in line with that: There setting a self-imposed binding dead-
line did not increase completion rates either, even though sophisticated people show a
high demand for commitment in the form of self-imposed deadlines. Bisin and Hynd-
man argue that there are various factors besides present-bias causing procrastination
such as over-confidence and lack of preference. Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002) also
find that under intermediate deadlines performance is higher and there is less delay.
However, Burger et al. (2011) observed the exact opposite. In their experiments, ex-
ogenous intermediate deadlines did not improve the completion rate. On the contrary,
they lowered it. The major difference between their experimental design and Ariely
and Wertenbroch’s was that not meeting intermediate deadlines resulted in failure of
completion while Ariely and Wertenbroch’s subjects were penalized for missing a dead-
line but could still participate in the experiment. Burger et al. conclude that some
deadlines may in fact reduce flexibility enough to overcome any benefits they provide
in terms of improving performance.
To the best of my knowledge, procrastination and the effect of deadlines have not
been analyzed experimentally in a teamwork setting where contributions accumulate
over time. The lack of research in this area leaves interesting possibilities that need
to be investigated. My study addresses these issues by empirically investigating in-
dividual investment behavior in long-term team projects. I use a threshold public
good setting with a continuous contribution that requires multilateral contributions
over an extended period for completion. This setting is then varied in two dimensions:
type of deadline and team size. I seek to analyze whether deadlines improve efficiency
and whether there is a difference between self-imposed deadlines and exogenous ones.
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According to the literature, deadlines might help reduce procrastination or at least
encourage teams to make a final sprint. However, they might also have a negative
effect on subsequent levels of effort if the first-period investment is very low. I also
want to see how team size affects the results. Conventional research indicates that the
larger the team, the easier it is for an individual to free-ride. Therefore increasing team
size should lower individual effort provision. Hence, the larger the team, the longer it
should take to finish a project.
I find clear evidence of inefficient procrastination by teams in the absence of dead-
lines. The tendency to free-ride and delay the project increases with team size. In
fact, large teams in this study needed almost twice as long as small ones to complete
projects. Project completion was also negatively affected by team size. While intro-
ducing a deadline helped to mitigate the problem of procrastination, it had a negative
effect on project completion, particularly when the deadline was exogenous rather than
self-imposed. The strong negative effect of team size remained even when deadlines
were set.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 explains the study’s general
design. Section 4.3 provides a short theoretical prediction, and Section 4.4 gives a
detailed description of the experiments that were conducted. I present the results of
the experiments and my conclusions in Sections 4.5 and 4.6 respectively.
4.2 Experimental Design
4.2.1 General Setting
Consider a team of n players working together on a project. To complete the project,
the aggregated investment must be at least H > 0 with H ∈ R+ (“effort threshold”).
It takes at least k > 1 periods to finish the project. Each player has an initial wealth
of Wi ∈ R+. In each period, every player decides how much to invest in the project.
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Individual investments in period t are denoted by xi,t ∈ [0, b], where b ∈ R+.2 Whatever
players decide to invest in the project will be subtracted from their current wealth
immediately and is non-refundable. Each player can invest at most Wi in total. Once
the team’s total investment is greater than or equal to the threshold, the project is
completed. As a reward for completing the project, each member receives R ∈ R+.
However, the net reward decreases over time. When the team needs more than k
periods (the minimum number of periods) to complete the project, an amount of d > 0
is subtracted for each additional period (“delay cost”). Define the aggregated total
team investment until period t as Y t =
∑n
i=1
∑t
k=1 xi,k. Then, payoffs are calculated
as
EU(xi,t, x−i,t) =

W −∑Tt=1 xi,t +R− d(T − k) for Y T ≥ H
W −∑∞t=1 xi,t else
where time is denoted by t and T is the period in which the project is completed.
Now consider a setting where a deadline Tˆ is introduced. If the project is not
completed before the deadline the team will not receive the reward R. All investments
are non refundable. Then payoffs are
EU(xi,t, x−i,t) =

W −∑Tt=1 xi,t +R− d(T − k) for Y T ≥ H and T ≤ Tˆ
W −∑Tˆt=1 xi,t else
where time is denoted by t and T ≤ Tˆ is the period in which the project is completed
which is either Tˆ or less then Tˆ if the project is completed earlier.
4.2.2 Experimental Setting
The setting in this study is varied in two different dimension: team size and deadlines.
To analyze the effect of team size, I distinguished between n = 1, n = 3 and n = 7.
2The introduction of an upper limit on investment b can be justified by the fact that efforts are
naturally limited in real life. For example, a day only has 24 hours, and when it comes to monetary
contributions, people are usually budget constrained.
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The behavior in an individual setting (n = 1) is used as a benchmark. I chose n = 3
as a team size for small teams, firstly because it is frequently chosen in the literature
as a good proxy for a small group, and secondly, because n = 2 is a special case in
which a player can always directly infer his or her teammate’s individual investment.
To create a noticeable difference between small and large teams, I wanted to at least
double the team size for large teams. As an odd number is required for determining
the maximum number of periods in one of the treatments with a deadline as will be
explained in detail below, I chose n = 7 for large teams.
To analyze the effect of deadlines, three different treatments are introduced.
(i) No deadline (ND): Since this is a lab experiment it was not possible to implement
a treatment with an infinite deadline. But in order to simulate a situation in which
subjects felt like they were working on a long-term project without the pressure of a
deadline the maximum number of periods had to be sufficiently long. Therefore, the
maximum number of periods was set at 30 periods in this treatment.
(ii) Self-imposed deadline (SID): Team members made suggestions for the maximum
number of periods and a deadline was defined through a mechanism based on the sug-
gestions made.
(iii) Exogenous deadline (ED): Relatively short deadlines of between five and ten pe-
riods were set exogenously and communicated to the teams . The way decisions were
made did not change between treatments. The only thing that changed was that teams
had to finish the project before the given deadline 5 ≤ Tˆ ≤ 30. Otherwise they do not
receive any reward.
The individual investment per period was xi,t ∈ [0, 10]. Every subject was given
the same initial endowment of 75 ECUs (Experimental Currency Units). Each team
member was allowed to invest at most 75 ECUs over the course of a single project.
The completion threshold for small teams was defined as H = 150 and H = 350 for
large teams. Given these thresholds, teams of both sizes needed at least five periods
to complete a project. Once a project was completed, each team member received
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a reward of 90 ECUs. However, a delay cost of 2 ECUs was subtracted from the
reward for every period over five.3 If subjects maximized their joint profits as a team,
investing 10 ECUs in each period and finishing the project in five periods, they achieved
the optimal and most efficient outcome.
The payoff function for each individual is then given by
EU(xi,t, x−i,t) =

175−∑Tt=1 xi,t − 2T for Y T ≥ H and T ≤ 30
75−∑30t=1 xi,t else
Periods are denoted by t, and T is the last period of a round which is either 30 or
less then 30 if the project was completed earlier.
No Deadline Deadline
Self-imposed Exogenous
n = 3 30 5 - 30 5 - 10
n = 7 30 5 - 30 5 - 10
Table 4.1: Maximum number of periods
4.3 Theoretical Prediction
The joint payoff-maximizing outcome, with everyone investing 10 ECUs in each period
and completing the project within five periods is not sustainable as an equilibrium, as
each team member has an incentive to stop their investment if the other team members
continue to contribute.
Focusing only on symmetric equilibria, xi,t = 0 ∀ i and t is one possible equilibrium,
as the best response to everyone else not investing is also not to invest. The project
will not be completed and everyone will have a payoff of 75 ECUs.
3The delay costs were set such that teams would not give up on completing the project too early.
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One other symmetric equilibrium involves all participants playing a trigger strategy
in which the total investment in period t is equal to Xˆ t. If someone deviates and the
total investment in a periods is X t < Xˆ t everyone will stop their investment and the
project is not completed. In order for the trigger strategy to be credible the payoff
from continuing the investment and completing the project by oneself has to be smaller
than by sticking to the trigger strategy while taking into account the time constraint
(T ≤ 30) and the budget restriction (Wi = 75).
As before Y t =
∑n
i=1
∑t
k=1 xi,k is the aggregated total team investment until period
t. For n = 3 and n = 7 every team member invests xi,t > 0 in each period such that
Yˆ t ≤

25(2n− 3) n
(n−1) for t ≤ 27.5n−30(n−1) and T ≤ 30
50n+ 10t− 300 for t ≥ 27.5n−30
(n−1) and T ≤ 30
(4.1)
holds.
Assuming that individuals will chose to invest whenever they are indifferent between
investing and not investing, the individual per-period investment in this symmetric
equilibrium can be defined as
xi,t =

25(2n− 3) 1
(n−1) for Y
t−1 ≥ Yˆ t−1 and t ≤ 27.5n−30
(n−1)
1
n
[50n+ 10t− 300] for Y t−1 ≥ Yˆ t−1 and 27.5n−30
(n−1) < t ≤ 30
0 else
(4.2)
In this equilibrium the project is completed in period 30, which is the last period in
our treatments without a stricter deadline. It is not possible to complete the project
earlier as once the aggregated total team investment is too high, players have an in-
centive to deviate from the equilibrium strategy and start to free-ride since the threat
to immediately stop investing once someone defects is not credible anymore.
After completing the project in 30 periods, every team member receives a payoff of
EU(xi,t, x−i,t) = 125 −
∑30
t=1 xi,t = 125 − 50 = 75. The payoff is equal to the initial
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endowment and hence also equal to the payoff when xi,t = 0 ∀ i and t. This is because
the variable values in this setting were constructed such that the net reward is equal to
the delay costs whenever the maximum of 30 periods is needed to complete the project.
As condition 4.1 has to be fulfilled, there is no other symmetric equilibrium in which
the project is completed before the very last period of a round.4
4.4 Experimental Procedures
4.4.1 General procedures
The experiment consists of two parts. In part one each participant works alone for one
round to complete one project. The maximum number of periods for this round is 30.
In part two participants are assigned to teams. This part of the experiment consists of
either twelve rounds (self-imposed deadline) or nine rounds (exogenous deadline), with
each round constituting an entire game either with the maximum number of periods
being 30 or the type of deadline specified in brackets. Table 4.2 shows, each subject
took part in three different treatments during a session: single-player, teams without
deadline and teams with either self-imposed deadline or an exogenous deadline.
Endogenous deadline treatment
Part 1 Single-player
1 round without a deadline
Part 2 Teams
3 rounds wihout a deadline
9 rounds with self-imposed deadline
Exogenous deadline treatment
Part 1 Single-player
1 round without a deadline
Part 2 Teams
3 rounds wihout a deadline
6 rounds with exogenous deadline
Table 4.2: Session sequence depending on deadline variation
I conducted the experimental sessions in the Experimental Economics Laboratory
at the University of Mannheim (mLab).5 Across fourteen sessions, a total of 276
4For details see Appendix C.1.
5The experiment was programmed and conducted using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007)
and subjects were recruited through ORSEE (Greiner, 2004).
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undergraduate and postgraduate students participated. All students were recruited
from the general student population of the University of Mannheim.
Participants were compensated based on their ECU earnings in one randomly se-
lected round.6 The exchange rate was 6 ECUs = 1 Euro. The average payoff per
subject was around 18 Euros.
4.4.2 Treatments
Single-player (without deadline)
At the beginning of each session, the instructions were read aloud and explained to
all participants. Participants were not allowed to talk or communicate during the
sessions and were unable to influence each other than through their actions. Then,
all participants played one round of the game on their own with a threshold of 50
ECUs. This not only enabled participants to familiarize themselves with the game and
the interface but was also a chance to analyze participants behavior when they are
working on their own and to observe whether inefficient procrastination occurred even
when there is no scope for free-riding.
After the single-player round, participants were randomly placed into groups of three
or seven. Random matching was employed at the beginning of each new round to
allocate participants to groups. Participants took part in either a small team (n =
3) or a large team (n = 7) treatment, not both. The small-team sessions involved 18
participants who were separated into two matching groups to guarantee the existence of
independent observations from two completely unrelated samples. For the experiments
with large teams, each session consisted of one matching group with 14 participants.
6At the end of the session, one of the participants was asked to draw a ball with a number on it.
The number picked represented the round that would be payoff relevant.
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Teams without deadline
For rounds one to three of part two, the maximum number of periods was 30 per round.
In each period, all team members made their investment decisions independently. At
the end of each period, participants were informed of their teams total investment, the
total amount that they had invested thus far and how much their team still needed
to invest to reach the threshold. Once a teams total investment (summed up over
all previous periods and the current period) reached or exceeded the threshold, the
current round ended as soon as the team completed its project. If the project was not
completed within 30 periods, the round ended and no rewards were given.
Teams with self-imposed deadline
In rounds four to 12 of the self-imposed deadline treatment teams could decide on the
maximum number of periods. At the beginning of each round, each team member
was asked to suggest a maximum number of periods (at least five and up to 30). As
soon as all team members had submitted a suggestion, the suggestions were ranked
from lowest to highest. The median value was then imposed as the relevant maximum
number of periods for that round. For transparency, all participants received feedback
on the suggestions of their fellow team members and the resulting deadline for that
round. The deadlines in this treatment can therefore be seen as the self-imposed result
of a voting process that all team members were able to influence to a certain degree.
Teams with exogenous deadline
In rounds four to nine of the exogenous deadline treatment, teams were informed of
the maximum number of periods at the beginning of each round. The deadlines were
chosen based on the previously obtained results of the self-imposed deadline treatment.
In the self-imposed deadline treatment, a very clear and fast convergence towards the
jointly efficient deadline of five was observed. With much lower frequency and mostly
in earlier rounds, deadlines of six, eight and ten periods were also played. The sequence
4.5 Results 114
of exogenous deadlines chosen for this teamwork section was thus 5, 6, 10, 5, 8, 5.
Throughout the experiment, participants were provided with a calculator on their
screen. There they could enter their average investment per period starting from the
period they were in and their belief about all others average investment per person per
period. Then they were told what the last period and their expected payoff would be.
They were allowed to use the calculator as often as they wanted. At the beginning
of each period participants received feedback on the total team investment of the
last period, the total team investment up to the current period and how much was
still missing to reach the threshold. They were also informed about how much they
invested in the last period and how much their aggregated investment was until the
current period. Participants were able to see their current account balance throughout
the entire round. At the end of each round, they were informed whether the project
had been completed and about their payoffs for the round.7
4.5 Results
4.5.1 One-shot single-player
Result 1:
The completion rate in the single-player treatment was 100%, and very little procrasti-
nation was observed.
Figure 4.1 shows the cumulative share of individuals (n = 1) and teams (n = 3
and 7) who completed their projects within the deadline. As one can see, all sub-
jects completed their projects when working alone. On average, they needed six pe-
riods to do this. 70% of participants finished their projects in five periods, which is
7Appendix C.2 provides screenshots of the games.
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payoff-maximizing regardless of risk preferences. 30% of subjects needed more than
five periods. One possible explanation could be confusion. Some subjects might not
have realized in this very first round that finishing the project as fast as possible was
payoff-maximizing. Another reason may have been a preference to experiment. Some
participants may have used the first round as an opportunity to get acquainted with
the game, accepting a small decrease in payoff in the bargain. Although some delay
was observed, it was not too severe. 97% of participants finished within the first ten
periods.
The average payoff in the single-player part was 113 ECUs, which is very close to
the maximum possible payoff of 115 ECUs.8 Using the ratio between an individual’s
actual profit and the maximum possible payoff, we can see how efficient individuals
were on average. I define this ratio as the degree of efficiency DoE = actual payoffs
max payoffs
. In
case of teams the DoE was defined as the ratio between a team’s actual joint profit and
the maximum possible joint profit, DoE =
∑n
i=1 actual payoffs
max
∑n
i=1 payoffs
. Achieving the maximum
possible profit leads to a DoE of 1. For the single-player treatment the DoE was 0.98,
which is extremely high, indicating that subjects were very efficient in the single-player
round.
4.5.2 Teams without a deadline
Result 2:
(i) There is clear evidence for procrastination by teams when there is no deadline.
Completion rates were affected negatively by working in teams compared with working
alone.
(ii) Team size had a strong negative effect on completion rates, completion time and
efficiency.
8The maximum possible payoff can be achieved if every team member invests 10 ECUs in each
period and the project is then completed in period five.
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Figure 4.1: Cumulative distribution of completion time for the “single-player” and the
“teams without deadline” treatments
Let us consider completion rates first. In contrast to the single-player treatment, not
every team managed to complete projects within 30 periods. Aggregated over all three
rounds 98 out of 108 three-person teams completed their projects, for a completion
rate of approximately 92%. For seven-person teams the completion rate was only
71% (51 out of 72 teams). Disaggregating the data and comparing the completion
rates for each round separately, Figure 4.1 and Table 4.3 show that for small teams
the completion rate was constant over all three rounds. By contrast, there was a big
difference between the data in the first round and the latter two rounds for seven-person
teams (see Figure 4.1 and Table 4.3). Comparing the completion rate in round one
to the average combined completion rate for rounds two and three, the difference was
statistically very significant ( p = 0.004, Wilcoxon signed-rank test). The difference
between round two and round three was not statistically significant (p = 0.299).
Pooling the data for rounds two and three, we can see that the mean completion
rates for small teams was significantly higher than for large teams as the p-value of a
Mann- Whitney U test was 0.008. Hence, team size had a strongly negative effect on
completion rates.
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Given the substantial difference in the behavior of seven-person teams between round
one and the latter two rounds, I will pool the data for rounds two and three and consider
the data from round one separately in my analysis from now on. Further, between-
subject comparisons were tested using the Mann-Whitney U test and within-subject
comparisons with the Wilcoxon signed-rank test if not stated otherwise.
Single-player 3-person teams 7-person teams
(N = 276) (N = 12) (N = 12)
Round 1 1 2 3 1 2 3
Completion rate in % 100 91.7 88.9 91.7 91.7 66.7 54.2
∅ Completion time 5.9 11.7 13.6 12.2 16.1 23.7 23.8
Degree of efficiency (DoE) 0.98 0.87 0.84 0.87 0.78 0.59 0.59
DoE (only completed) 0.98 0.91 0.88 0.90 0.83 0.73 0.76
Notes: (i) N = number of independent observations. (ii) As the DoE includes teams that
did not complete their projects, I calculated a DoE (only completed) for teams that did.
Table 4.3: Summary of completion rate, completion time and efficiency
Now to examine completion time. The average number of periods small teams needed
for project completion over three rounds was 10.7, or more than twice as many as
the five-period minimum. This shows that even in small teams there were signs of
coordination failure and procrastination. For large teams the average was 17.6 periods.
For rounds two and three the average completion time for seven-person teams was 19.7
periods. Comparing this to the average second- and third-round completion time of
the three-person teams, the difference is highly significant (p < 0.001).
The distribution of completion times by team size is depicted in more detail in figure
4.2. The distributions for three-person teams peak at five periods, indicating that most
teams finished their projects in five periods. The median is nine periods in the first
round and ten periods in the second and third rounds. Figure 4.2a and 4.2c show
that the distribution remained almost the same across all three rounds. The share of
three-person teams who completed projects in five periods increased slightly, and some
teams needed more than 25 periods, which did not occur in round one. But these shifts
in the distribution are not significant (p = 0.248). For large teams (n = 7), completion
time was more evenly distributed over the 30 periods, with small peaks at periods
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14 and 19 in the first round and periods 14 and 24 in rounds two and three. Not a
single large team managed to finish a project within the first five periods. Looking at
Figure 4.2b and 4.2d, we see that delays were much more pronounced in rounds two
and three. In the first round 25% of all teams completed their projects within the first
ten periods while only one team managed to do so in rounds two and three. In the later
two rounds 31% of teams needed more than 25 periods, which is about twice as many
as in the first round (16%). This shift towards longer completion times is marginally
significant, with a p-value of 0.056. Hence, we can conclude that a larger team size
fostered procrastination here, with delays increasing over time.
(a) n = 3, round 1 (b) n = 7, round 1
(c) n = 3, rounds 2 and 3 (d) n = 7, rounds 2 and 3
Figure 4.2: Distribution of completion time depending on team size
That small teams were more efficient overall than large ones is also indicated by
the degree of efficiency (DoE) in Table 4.3. Although the three-person groups were
not as efficient as individuals working on their own, the average DoE was still very
high. On average, teams achieved 86% of the maximum joint payoff. The first round
DoE for the seven-person teams was also rather high. In rounds two and three the
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DoE dropped by about 20 percentage points and was significantly lower than for small
teams (p = 0.005), which corresponds to the significantly lower completion rate and
the longer completion time. As the DoE reports the average efficiency of all teams,
it also includes those that failed to complete projects. If we take only those teams
into account that completed their projects, the difference in efficiency between small
teams and large teams is not as large but still significant (p = 0.018). Similarly, the
difference in efficiency between the first round and the second and third rounds also
decreases for large teams if one focuses solely on cases of project completion. This in-
dicates that project non-completion was a major driver of the observed loss in efficiency.
Result 3:
Teamwork in large teams is characterized by strong free-riding behavior, which increases
over time leading to more and longer delays and lower completion rates.
Marked free-riding behavior was a major reason for the low completion rates for
large teams in this study, especially in the latter two rounds. Table 4.4 shows that
the average investment level per team member was much lower in the seven-person
teams than in the teams with three members. Looking just at teams that completed
their projects, a member of a seven-person team invested only about half as much as
someone in a three-person team in rounds two and three.
n=3 n=7
Round 1 2, 3 1 2, 3
completed 6.1 5.9 4.0 2.9
uncompleted 0.8 0.7 1.3 1.1
∅ in total 5.7 5.4 3.7 2.2
Table 4.4: Average per period investment per team member
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Looking at individual investment in seven-person teams, a large portion of partici-
pants chose to free-ride, investing only 0 or 1 ECU per period.9 Figure 4.3 shows the
share of participants who chose to invest 1 ECU or less in each period of each round.
In the first period of the first round 15% of subjects chose to free-ride. This share
increased dramatically during the round to 59% in period ten. At the start of rounds
two and three around 35% of subjects are already free-riders, a significantly higher
share than in the first round (p = 0.002).
Figure 4.3: n = 7, per period share of subjects who free-ride
As can be seen from Figure 4.3 the share of free-riders increased considerably not
only from round to round but also from period to period within the same round. To test
whether the observed increase in the share of free-riders over the first ten periods of each
round was statistically significant, I first calculated the regression coefficient of a simple
linear regression with the share of free riders as the dependent variable and periods as
the independent variable for each of the 12 independent observations. This regression
coefficient tells us how much the share of free-riders increased or decreased on average
9Investing 1 ECU or less per period is considered severe free-riding here for reasons: Firstly, if every
team member invested only 1 ECU per period, the team would be unable to complete its project.
Secondly, investing only 1 ECU is similar to giving to charity to ease ones mind. Only a very small
fraction of participants chose to invest just 1 ECU. Therefore, the summary statistics are not much
different than if only per-period investments of 0 ECU counted as severe free-riding.
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from period to period. If there is no systematical difference in the number of free-riders,
the regression coefficients should not be significantly different from zero. Hence, the
null hypothesis is that changes are equal to zero. Then I tested the coefficients against
the null hypothesis using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test. Applying this method to round
one and the pooled data for rounds two and three shows that the increase in the share
of free-riding subjects is highly significant (p = 0.003 for round one and p = 0.005 for
rounds two and three).
Figure 4.4: n = 7, share of free-riders throughout periods 1−5, 6−10 and 1−10
Figure 4.3 shows the share of subjects who systematically chose to free-ride through-
out the entire first ten periods of a round. It also breaks down the share of systematic
free-riders for periods one to five and periods six to ten. As with the findings in figure
4.4 for the total share of free-riders, the share of subjects who systematically chose to
free-ride increased substantially from round to round and within each round. While
only 5% of subjects chose to free-ride over the first ten periods of round one, this share
increased to 21% in round three. Between periods one to five and periods six to ten,
the number of systematic free-riders increased by 10 to 16 percentage points.
One possible explanation is that those who were willing to invest more became
discouraged by the rather low average investment during the initial periods of round
one and hence started reducing their own investments, leading to even more severe
delays. Frustrated by their experience in the first round, participants invested much
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less right from the start in the second and third rounds. This led to even more severe
delays and lower completion rates in the two latter rounds. On average, only 11% of
participants did not free-ride at all within the first ten periods of a round. This share
was fairly constant over all three rounds of this treatment.
Result 4:
The investment level in the first period had no significant effect on the completion rate.
However, when extending the focus to the first five periods the effect becomes significant.
The average individual first-period investment for the three-person teams that com-
pleted their projects was 7.8 ECUs while for teams that did not complete their projects
in time it was only 4.1 ECUs. The corresponding values for seven-person teams were
6.6 ECUs and 5 ECUs respectively. For small teams the difference between first-period
investments of those teams that succeeded in completing a project and those that did
not was statistically not significant (p = 0.106). However, when the focus is extended
to the first five periods the difference in total investment on teams that did and those
that did not complete their projects does become marginally significant (p = 0.059).
In the case of large teams this difference in average first-period investment was not
statistically significant (p = 0.343). Once again when the focus is extended to the first
five periods the difference becomes significant (p = 0.024).
Taking a closer look at how first-period investment affects investment behavior in
subsequent periods, we see two different effects. In some teams observing full invest-
ment by all teammates in the first period seems to have had a signaling effect and
induced cooperative behavior. This was mainly observed for three-person teams. For
some other teams, in particular seven-person teams, however, a very high first-period
investment level was followed by a rapid decrease in total investments over the next
few periods. In those teams, some members seem to have taken a very high first-period
team investment as an opportunity to free-ride and rely on the investments of their
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teammates. Considering the first five periods instead of only the very first period
accounts for these free-riders.
(a) n = 3, period 1 (b) n = 7, period 1
(c) n = 3, period 1 to 5 (d) n = 7, period 1 to 5
Figure 4.5: Effect of first-period and first-five-period investment on completion times
Figure 4.5a and 4.5b depict the correlation between teams’ first-period investment
and the time they needed for project completion.10 As the trendline in those graphs
indicates, the higher the first-period team investment, the less time teams need to
complete a project. Figure 4.5c and 4.5d show the correlation between investments in
the first five periods and project completion time. Compared to Figure 4.5a and 4.5b
the data points are less scattered and we can clearly see the correlation between the
investment levels of the first five periods and completion time.
10For this analysis I excluded all teams that did not complete their projects in time. I also only
looked at data from rounds two and three for better comparability as round one is somewhat special
for seven-person teams.
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(a) Type 1 - short completion time (b) Type 2 - median completion time
(c) Type 3 - median completion time (d) Type 4 - long completion time
Figure 4.6: Four typical investment paths for aggregated team investments
The data also show that most teams’ investments decreased over time regardless of
the first-period investment level. In general, for a completion time above five periods
four types of team investment paths were observed, as illustrated in Figure 4.6:
(a) Type 1 was observed for some small teams that completed their projects in six to
nine periods. These teams usually did not start out with full investments (everyone
investing 10 ECUs) in the first period, but then either increased their investments a
bit or maintained fairly constant investment levels throughout the remaining rounds.
(b) Type 2 is typical of teams who have a completion time around the median value.
As the figure shows, investments were fairly constant over the first few periods, then
gradually decreased. This was the most frequently observed investment path for both
small and large teams.
(c) Type 3 is a rather special case that did not occur very often. Here there seemed
to be a revival phase or final sprint. After total investment had dropped to 0 ECU or
a value close to it, one or two team members suddenly spurred investments again by
making a rather high contribution.
(d) Type 4 is typical of teams that needed more than 20 periods to complete a project.
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Their total investments gradually decreased over time, and in the last few rounds
different team members alternately invested very low amounts.
4.5.3 Self-imposed deadline treatment
Result 5:
Regardless of team size, suggestions for the maximum number of periods very quickly
converged to five, as did the deadlines actually implemented, indicating that partici-
pants were aware that completing a project in five periods was the efficient outcome.
In this treatment, where participants were able to influence the maximum number
of periods they played, the suggestions for a deadline converged quickly to five. For
three-person teams 61% of team members suggested a deadline of five periods in the
first round. This share increased over subsequent rounds to 92% in round nine. For
seven-person teams, 59% of participants suggested five as the maximum number of
periods in the first round. Just as for small teams, this share then increased rapidly,
to over 80%. In total, five was suggested as the maximum number of periods 80% of
the time when n = 3 and 76% of the time when n = 7.
Similarly, the deadlines implemented by teams of both sizes converged to five. Al-
most all three-member teams played a five-period deadline from round two onwards.
For n = 7, the deadline was five periods for over 80% of teams starting with round
three. Aggregated over all nine rounds, 90% of small teams and 85% of large teams
played a deadline of five periods (see Figure 4.7).
Result 6:
For small teams the completion rate was similar to that in the treatment without a
deadline and introducing a self-imposed deadline increased efficiency as the average
completion time was much shorter. However, large teams systematically failed to com-
4.5 Results 126
(a) n = 3. (b) n = 7.
Figure 4.7: Self-imposed deadlines and completion across all nine rounds
plete their projects within the self-imposed deadlines.
Although teams of both sizes almost immediately chose deadlines of five periods,
team size still had a significantly negative effect on completion rates: While for n =
3 the average completion rate over all rounds was 87%, it was only 37% for n = 7.
This difference was significant (p = 0.030). As we can see in Figure 4.7 the average
completion rates did not differ much between projects with a deadline of five periods
and those with a longer deadline. For small teams the average completion rate was
87% under a five-period deadline and 93.3% under longer deadlines. For large teams
the average completion rate was 37% no matter what deadline was selected.
Looking more closely at how completion rates changed over time, we see no significant
improvement from one round to the next (see Figure 4.8). As shown in Figure 4.8a
the completion rates for small teams were rather stable throughout all nine rounds.
Focusing solely on the completion rates when the deadline was five periods, we see no
significant improvement. To test whether the completion rate for a deadline of five
periods changed over the nine rounds, I again used the slope of a linear regression line
for each independent observation to get the average per-period change, as explained
above in Section 5.2. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test gives a p-value of 1, indicating that
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completion rates did not change over time. For large teams the completion rates were
much more volatile, ranging from 0% to 67%. Although the average completion rate
in rounds five to nine (42%) was higher than in rounds one to four (30%), this increase
was not significant (p = 0.198).
(a) n = 3.
(b) n = 7.
Figure 4.8: Self-imposed deadline and completion rate over all nine rounds
Comparing this treatment with a self-imposed deadline to the treatment without a
deadline, the average completion rates were quite similar for small teams (87% versus
91%). However, the average completion time was much lower when subjects had the
opportunity to choose a deadline. In the treatment with a self-imposed deadline small
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teams completed their projects in 5.1 periods on average, twice as fast as in the treat-
ment without a deadline (10.8 periods). Hence, introducing a self-imposed deadline
increased efficiency for small teams. For teams that completed the project the DoE
was almost 1, as most of them were able to coordinate on completing the project in
five periods. This was an improvement compared to the treatment without a deadline,
where the average DoE for completed projects was 0.9 (p = 0.059).11
For seven-person teams the average completion rate dropped by more than 20 per-
centage points once a self-imposed deadline was introduced compared with rounds two
and three of the treatment without a deadline. This drop was not significant, however,
as the p-value was 0.4. The overall DoE for seven-person teams was 0.71, which was
higher than the DoE for rounds two and three in the treatment without a deadline
(0.59). But this difference was not significant either (p = 0.402). By contrast, the
DoE of teams that completed their projects was significantly higher (0.99) than in the
treatment without a deadline (p = 0.059), as these teams completed their project in a
much shorter time period. In the self-imposed treatment the average completion time
was 5.5 periods, while in the last two rounds of the treatment without a deadline it
was 19.7 periods.
Result 7:
There were four main reasons why participants withheld investments when the deadline
was 5: (i) They did not want to play 5 as a deadline. (ii) They were expecting other
team members not to invest. (iii) They were deliberately sabotaging the game. (iv)
They were simply confused and made a mistake.
But why was the completion rate of large teams so low when five was implemented
as a self-imposed deadline? One might expect completion rates to improve when teams
select their own deadline. One possible explanation might be that when participants
11The DoE of all teams, including teams that did not complete their projects, was also higher than
in the no deadline treatment (0.93 vs 0.86), though the difference was not statistically significant (p =
0.178).
4.5 Results 129
suggested a deadline larger than five periods but were outvoted − as the median of all
suggestions was imposed as the relevant deadline of the round they felt dissatisfied
about being overruled or simply did not feel committed to the deadline. A closer look at
the individual data reveals that 41% (34 out of 84) of the participants were overruled
in the sense that they suggested a deadline larger than five but then had to play a
deadline of five in at least in one of the nine rounds. Of these 34 participants 19 (56%)
did not invest 10 ECUs when the deadline was five. This behavior also affected the
investment decisions of the other team members negatively. In 76% of the uncompleted
projects team members who suggested a deadline of five refrained from investing once
they observed some other team members suggesting a deadline above five periods.
Although some participants who were outvoted did cooperate once a deadline of five
was selected, observing a suggestion larger than five was still taken as a negative signal
and induced some very risk-averse players to withhold their investments.
What is rather puzzling is that not all teams that unanimously elected five as a
deadline managed to complete their projects. In fact, only 65% of the projects were
completed under these circumstances. Taking a closer look at the data on an individual
level, we observe that twelve participants always suggested five as a deadline but then
invested less than 10 ECUs in at least one round in which a deadline of five periods was
implemented. Seven of these participants did this in more than one round. One might
assume that these participants were among those who did not complete their projects
within five periods when working alone in the single-player treatment. However, this
was the case for only four of the twelve participants. The remaining eight participants
all finished the single-player treatment in five periods.
These twelve players can be categorized into three groups. (i) Deliberate saboteurs:
Four players seemed to deliberately sabotage the game as they always suggested a
five-period deadline but then invested 0 ECU. It is not clear, why they behaved like
this. (ii) Extremely risk-averse players: Five players fully invested in early rounds with
a five-period deadline but the projects were not completed as someone else did not
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cooperate. In response these players stopped their investments in subsequent rounds.
(iii) Confused players: The remaining three players were probably confused as they
only deviated once and in all other rounds where five was the deadline they cooperated
and invested fully.
For three-person teams, we also observed that not every project where every team
member suggested five as a deadline was completed. There the completion rate was
83%, which was much higher than for seven-person teams. In total, there were five
subjects who did not invest 10 ECUs when they and their teammates unanimously
suggested a five-period deadline. Two of them did not complete the single-player
treatment in five periods. But unlike the seven-person treatments there was only one
subject who could be categorized as a “deliberate saboteur”, and that only for the first
four rounds. From round five onwards s/he invested 10 ECUs. One subject falls into
the extremely risk-averse category, while the remaining three players were “confused”.12
Result 8:
Team dynamics strongly affected project success. Subjects learned from experience and
adapted their investments accordingly. However, they did not adjust their choice of
deadlines.
It is evident from the data how important team dynamics were for the success of a
project. In one session with seven-person teams two players deliberately sabotaged the
game and two players who wanted a deadline longer than five periods reacted to being
overruled by investing 0 ECU. This led to a downward spiral in investments. Once
participants experienced defection in their teams they were frustrated and stopped
cooperating in the next round because they expected some of their teammates not to
cooperate. It turns out that four of the five extremely risk-averse players mentioned
12Two of the “confused” players only invested less than 10 ECUs in one round. Only one player
seemed to have difficulties in choosing his/her investments. His/her investments ranged between 1
ECU and 9 ECUs for a deadline of five.
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above were in this session too. Hence, not a single project was completed in this
session.13
However, the opposite was also observed. Once subjects experienced cooperation in
the sense that everyone consistently invested 10 ECUs per period in a round with a
five-period deadline, they continued to cooperate in all subsequent rounds with a five-
period deadline. Thus, although teams were reshuﬄed after each round, participants
still seem to have based their decisions on what they experienced in previous rounds
and adjusted their investments accordingly. This behavior was observed in 50% of the
large-team treatments and in 80% of the small-team treatments.
One very surprising observation is that subjects kept suggesting five as the maximum
number of periods, even after their teams were repeatedly unsuccessful in completing
projects within the minimum number of periods. One would assume that people would
learn from their experience and make suggestions greater than five after they had ex-
perienced failure a few times in a row. In total, 70% of the participants in large teams
encountered failure in two consecutive rounds with a deadline of five and 90% of these
participants nevertheless kept suggesting five as a deadline.
4.5.4 Exogenous deadline treatment
Result 9:
Completion rates were lower in the treatment with exogenous deadlines than in the
treatment with self-imposed deadlines. As before, the effect of team size on completion
rates was negative.
In the exogenous treatment, teams were given a binding deadline.14 As before,
the completion rate was much higher in small groups regardless of the deadline, as
13Excluding the data from this one session leads to an overall completion rate of 44%.
14For the six rounds played in this treatment the deadlines were 5, 6, 10, 5, 8 and 5.
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Figure 4.9 and Table 4.5 show. Over all six rounds, the average completion rate for
n = 3 was 69%; for n = 7 it was only 33%. However, irrespective of the externally
imposed deadline, the difference between these two team sizes was not as large as in
the treatment with self-imposed deadlines and only marginally significant (p = 0.077).
Looking at the different deadlines separately in Figure 4.9, it seems the more time
teams had to complete a project, the higher the completion rate. For small teams the
average completion rate was 61% when the deadline was five (see Table 4.5).15 The
completion rate peaked at 88% when the deadline was ten. This difference between
the completion rate when the deadline was ten and when it was five was significant
(p = 0.034). In contrast to small teams, having more time did not significantly improve
the completion rates of large teams. There the average completion rate was 28% over
the three rounds where the deadline was five. Although the completion rate with a
deadline of ten was 50%, the difference was not statistically significant (p = 0.269).
Focusing on the three rounds where five was imposed as the relevant deadline, we
saw no improvement in completion rates over time either for large or for small teams.
As the deadline of five was always played in three rounds (rounds one, four and six), I
used the same regression coefficient method as before to test for possible improvements
in the completion rate. By calculating the regression coefficient with the number of
completed projects as the dependent variable and testing it against the null hypothesis
that the difference between the rounds is zero, I obtain a p-value of 0.890 for small
teams and 0.586 for large teams. This suggests that the average completion rate did
not systematically increase between the three rounds with five as a deadline.
Compared with the setting where teams selected their own deadline, the completion
rates were noticeably but statistically not very significantly lower for small teams (p =
0.064).16 For large teams the completion rates of both treatments − self-imposed
deadline (37%) and exogenous deadline (33%)− are not significantly different (p =
0.686). Table 4.5 shows that for a deadline of five the completion rates were much
1561% is the average over all three rounds where five was imposed as a deadline.
16In the SID treatment the average completion rate for small teams was 87%.
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(a) n = 3. (b) n = 7.
Figure 4.9: Completion rates under exogenous deadlines
ED SID
Deadline completion rate # projects completion rate # projects
5 61% 54 87% 141
n = 3 [6, 10] 78% 54 100% 10
> 10 − − 80% 5
5 28% 36 37% 92
n = 7 [6, 10] 39% 36 40% 15
>10 − − 0% 1
Notes: # projects = total number of projects.
Table 4.5: Comparison of completion rates under self-imposed and exogenous deadlines
lower in the exogenous deadline treatment for both team sizes. However this difference
was only marginally significant for small teams (p = 0.065) and not significant at all for
large teams (p = 0.678). Due to the low number of observations for certain deadlines,
it is somewhat difficult to compare completion rates separately for the two treatments
for each deadline length. Nevertheless, if we look at all the deadlines between six and
ten periods, we see that for three-person teams the completion rate was significantly
higher in the self-imposed deadline treatment (p = 0.016) whereas for seven-person
teams the difference between the two treatments is not significant (39% versus 40%).
As for efficiency, the average DoE for small teams was 0.83 and for large teams it
was 0.78. These values are quite similar to those in the team treatment with a self-
imposed deadline. If only teams that completed their projects are taken into account,
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the DoE increases to 0.97 for small teams and 0.98 for large ones. As these participants
were restricted by deadlines there was no room for procrastination. Hence, the teams
that managed to complete their projects did not encounter large delay costs. This also
applied to teams that were unable to complete their projects. Because rounds ended
as soon as the deadline was reached, projects could not be dragged on. This prevented
players from “wasting assets” by continuing to invest in uncompletable projects.
Overall it seems that for shorter deadlines, completion rates were higher when teams
coordinated on the deadline themselves. This might be because subjects who have a
say in setting a deadline will feel more committed to it. In addition, they might be more
aware of the optimal number of periods and how much to contribute. Furthermore,
when participants in a team see the other team members arguing for a particular
deadline, they can be more certain that their teammates will cooperate and fully invest
in completing the project. This sense of assurance, though no guarantee for success, is
absent when the deadline is externally imposed.
4.6 Conclusion
In this experimental study I analyze whether inefficient procrastination occurs in long-
term team projects when no strict deadlines are given. To investigate the effects of team
size on investment behavior and completion rates I distinguish between single-players
(n = 1), small teams (n = 3) and large teams (n = 7). In addition, the efficiency
of deadlines was examined while differentiating between self-imposed and exogenous
deadlines.
The setting involves participants making effort decisions over several periods in or-
der to complete a project with a contribution threshold. I find that in the absence
of deadlines, participants are rather efficient when working alone. In the single-player
treatments all subjects managed to complete their projects and very little procrasti-
nation was observed. Once participants were assigned to teams however, inefficient
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procrastination did occur, and completion rates were negatively affected. Delays were
much longer and completion rates significantly lower in large teams than in the other
two treatments. While single players completed projects in 6 periods on average, small
teams needed almost twice as long and large teams needed twice as long as small
teams. A strong tendency to free-ride was observable in large teams − a tendency
that increased from round to round and over time within individual rounds. This af-
fected completion rates negatively, especially in the later rounds of the team treatment
without a deadline.
In the self-imposed deadline treatment, teams were allowed to select a deadline using
a mechanism where each team member made a suggestion for the maximum number
of periods played and the median was then taken as the deadline. In this treatment,
suggestions quickly converged to five, the minimum number of periods teams needed to
complete a project. In fact, five was chosen as a deadline for over 80% of the projects.
Almost none of the self-imposed deadlines was above ten periods, showing that the
majority of participants realized what option would be efficient to play. This strong
convergence towards five periods as a deadline was independent of team size. However,
while introducing a deadline can mitigate procrastination, it can have a negative effect
on completion rates, especially when the deadline is very tight. For small teams the
completion rate did not change when a deadline was introduced, but for large teams
the average completion rate was lower than in the treatment without a deadline. Large
teams are particularly prone to failure when deadlines are short as the non-cooperative
behavior of a single team member can lead to non-completion of a project. It was rather
surprising to see that even after they experienced failure in previous rounds subjects
kept suggesting five periods as a deadline instead of adjusting their suggestions.
Comparing the two different deadline types, completion rates were higher when dead-
lines were self-imposed than when they were exogenous. This difference, however, was
only marginally significant for three-person teams and not statistically significant for
seven-person teams.
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To sum up, inefficient procrastination was observed in the team treatments. Intro-
ducing deadlines can help with procrastination, but it can negatively affect project
completion when deadlines are too tight. Aiming for the most efficient outcome, e.g.
by setting the deadline to dive periods in this experiment, only improved the outcome
when all team members were willing to contribute fully. For teams that were able
to complete their projects within the given deadline, efficiency increased considerably
as they encountered much lower delay costs. Overall, team size had a strong nega-
tive effect on completion time and completion rates regardless whether a deadline was
introduced or not. One modification of the self-imposed deadline treatment worth in-
vestigating further would be to assign subjects to teams according to their suggestions
for a specific deadline. Participants who suggested the same maximum number of pe-
riods could be matched together, which might help to increase completion rates and
improve efficiency. For example, if only subjects who suggested a 5-period deadline
were assigned to a group, there would be no dissatisfaction among participants over
being “outvoted”, increasing the probability of success.
Introducing a deadline is only one of many ways to prevent procrastination. Penaliz-
ing delay more severely by increasing the delay costs, introducing more transparency in
effort choices or even allowing for communication are, among others, also possible ways
to improve the efficiency in long-term team projects. For future research it would be
interesting to investigate these methods and how they affect the investment dynamics
of teams.
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A.1 Examples of Possible Outcomes
500
Value−50
550
Value
586
Price
572
Bid
Seller’s payoff: 0, Buyer’s payoff: 0
(a) Price>Bid: No transaction. Payoffs=0.
500
Value−50
550
Value
516
Price
528
Bid
Buyer’s payoff: +34
Seller’s payoff: +28
(b) Transaction scenario 1.
500
Value−50
550
Value
586
Bid
572
Price
Buyer’s payoff: -22
Seller’s payoff: +86
(c) Transaction scenario 2.
500
Value−50
550
Value
486
Bid
472
Price
Buyer’s payoff: +78
Seller’s payoff: -14
(d) Transaction scenario 3.
Figure A.1: Transaction scenarios.
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A.2 Simulation of Publication Bias
The benchmark values of the difference between the kth-highest evidence and the
true value v in the first line of panel (a) in table 2.4 do not take into account that
v ∈ [200, 1000]. In order to analyze the effect of such boundaries on the inference,
we simulate the distribution of the true value given the realization of a certain kth
highest evidence with the help of a set of 10000 draws of 10 evidences for each true
value between 200 and 1000.
For each realization of kth highest evidence between 200 and 500, we calculate the
difference between the true means in this simulation and the benchmark value. If the
deviation is different from 0 the boundaries for the true values are still at play, causing
a skewed distribution of the true means underlying the observed kth evidence. The
results of these simulations are depicted in figure A.2.
Figure A.2: Deviation from benchmark value for realized levels of the kth evidence
close to the lower bound of v, 200.
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A.3 Screenshots
Figure A.3: Sellers’ screen in C10
Figure A.4: Buyers’ screen in C10
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Figure A.5: Sellers’ feedback screen in C10
Figure A.6: Screen of the understanding test
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Figure A.7: Tool to generate 10 draws from a normal distribution N(v, 100), v ∈
[0, 1000]. Here: v = 500
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A.4 Instructions for C10 - M10
You are about to participate in an experiment in a market setting. You may earn a
considerable amount of money. The amount you earn will depend on your decisions
and the decisions of others, so please follow the instructions carefully. All that you
earn is yours to keep, and will be paid to you in private, in cash, at the end of today’s
session.
During the experiment your payoffs are denominated in points. Your point earnings
will be converted to cash at the end of today’s session at an exchange rate of 60 points
= 1 Euro. No matter what your payoffs are in the experiment, you will be paid at least
2 Euro.
It is important to us that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s screens.
If you have any questions or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand, and an
experimenter will come to you. If you talk, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be kindly
asked to leave.
The experiment consists of two parts (Part I, Part II) which are independent of
each other. Each of these parts, in turn, consists of up to 12 rounds.
Part I
In this part of the experiment, four Sellers and four Buyers form a market. The
Seller knows the Value (in points) of his/her good but cannot report it to the Buyers.
The Seller has requested 10 external test institutes to officially evaluate the Value of
the good and can indeed report these 10 official “Evidences” about the Value to the
Buyers. The external Evidences are informative about the good’s Value but noisy.
In particular, they follow a normal (Gauss+ian) distribution around the Value with a
constant standard deviation of 100. The standard deviation measures the dispersion of
the Evidences, how far away they are from the Value. Figure A.8 shows that Evidences
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are more likely to be close to the Value than far away. You will be able to get familiar
with this distribution later.
Figure A.8: Normal probability distribution with a Value of 550 and a standard devi-
ation of 100, indicating the probability of Evidences.
At the beginning of a round, each Seller is informed about the true Value of her/his
good. The true Value lies between 200 and 1000 points, each Value level in this interval
is equally likely. As we said, the Seller cannot report the true Value to the Buyers, but
she/he can choose for each of the 10 Evidences whether to report it to the Buyers or
not. The Seller cannot change or manipulate the Evidences in any way.
After the Sellers’ choice, the Buyers will see the reports of all 4 Sellers. Sellers as
well will be informed about the reports of the other Sellers. Before the Buyers place
their bid, they have to chose from which Seller to buy. For the chosen Seller’s good,
the Buyer places a Bid. The Bid has to be an integer value between 0 and 1200.
When does the transaction take place? The computer generates randomly a Price
of the Seller’s good. Neither Seller nor Buyer will be informed about the Price when
they take their decisions. The Price takes integer values between the Value minus 200
and the Value plus 200, with each Price level being equally likely (figure A.9). The
transaction takes place whenever the Buyer’s Bid is greater than or equal to the Price.
So, in our example, a Bid of
1. 349 will never lead to a transaction, since the Price is certainly above.
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Price
350 750550
Pr(Price)
Value
Figure A.9: Price distribution around the Value of 550.
2. 750 will always lead to a transaction since the Price is certainly below or the
same.
3. 550 corresponding to the Value will lead to a transaction with 50% chance.
How are the Seller’s and the Buyer’s payoff determined? First, if no transaction
takes place, both Seller and Buyer get a payoff of 0 points. If a transaction takes place,
as we said depending on the Buyer’s Bid and the random Price, the Seller produces
the good at the cost of the Value minus 50. The Seller sells one item of their good to
each Buyer whose Bid exceeds the Price. A Seller might sell to none, one, two, three,
or four Buyers. The Seller’s payoff per transaction at the end of the round will be the
Bid placed by the Buyer minus the cost:
PayoffSeller = BidBuyer − (Value − 50).
The Buyer’s payoff is the true Value of the good minus the Price:
PayoffBuyer = Value − Price.
Notice that a Bid equal to the Value will ensure the Buyer to never make losses. If the
Price was higher than the Bid=Value, the transaction would not take place. Recall
from 3. that under a Bid=Value, the transaction does not take place half the times.
Further, note that in terms of expected payoff, the Buyer benefits most from bidding
what he believes the Value of the item is. The bids are limited to be between 0 and
1200. Figures A.10a to A.10d present various scenarios.
Part I of this experiment consists of 2 practice rounds and 2 blocks of 5 experiment
rounds. At the beginning of each round, you will be informed about the randomly
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(a) Price>Bid: No transaction. Payoffs=0.
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Buyer’s payoff: +34
Seller’s payoff: +28
(b) Transaction scenario 1.
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(c) Transaction scenario 2.
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Buyer’s payoff: +78
Seller’s payoff: -14
(d) Transaction scenario 3.
Figure A.10: Transaction scenarios.
chosen role (Seller or Buyer) that you take. You keep this role in the first block of 5
rounds, and take on the other role in the second block. You will keep the same role
within a block, but you will face randomly chosen market counterparts. Throughout,
four Sellers and four Buyers will form a market.
In order to participate in the experiment, you will go through a brief understanding
test. Here and throughout the experiment, you can access a calculator via a button
in the right bottom corner of your screen. Once everybody accomplishes this test, you
can get more familiar with the normal distribution with standard deviation of 100. For
that purpose, you will have three minutes to simulate as often as you want the process
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of generating 10 Evidences for different Values. The experiment will start with the 2
practice rounds that are not paid. Finally, you proceed to the paid rounds.
Are there any questions? If not, please turn to your screens and follow carefully the
instructions there.
Part II
You are about to start Part II of the experiment, which consists of no practice rounds
and 2 blocks of 5 experiment rounds. Like before, in each block of 5 rounds you will
take the same role, and you will face randomly chosen market counterparts.
In this part, one market will consist of one Seller and one Buyer. Just like before, the
Seller first chooses the Evidences s/he wants to report. The Buyer will observe only
the Evidences that the Seller chose to report. S/He then places a bid for the good.
The Buyer’s and the Seller’s payoffs are determined in the same fashion as before.
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A.5 Instructions for M15 - C15
You are about to participate in an experiment in the economics of decision making in
a market setting. You may earn a considerable amount of money. The amount you
earn will depend on your decisions and the decisions of others, so please follow the
instructions carefully. All that you earn is yours to keep, and will be paid to you in
private, in cash, at the end of today’s session.
During the experiment your payoffs are denominated in points. Your point earnings
will be converted to cash at the end of today’s session at an exchange rate of 60 points
= 1 Euro. No matter what your payoffs are in the experiment, you will be paid at least
2 Euro.
It is important to us that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s screens.
If you have any questions or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand, and an
experimenter will come to you. If you talk, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be kindly
asked to leave.
The experiment consists of two parts (Part I, Part II) which are independent of
each other. Each of these parts, in turn, consists of up to 12 rounds.
Part I
In this part of the experiment, one Seller and one Buyer form a market. The Seller
knows the Value (in points) of his/her good but cannot report it to the Buyer. The
Seller has requested 10 external test institutes to officially evaluate the Value of the
good and can indeed report these 10 official “Evidences” about the Value to the buyer.
Additionally, the Seller has the possibility to ask 5 more test institutes to evaluate the
Value of his/her good at a package price of 15 points. These 5 additional Evidences
can also be reported to the Buyer. The external Evidences are informative about the
good’s Value but noisy. In particular, they follow a normal (Gaussian) distribution
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around the Value with a constant standard deviation of 100. The standard deviation
measures the dispersion of the Evidences, how far away they are from the Value. Figure
A.11 shows that Evidences are more likely to be close to the Value than far away. You
will be able to get familiar with this distribution later.
Figure A.11: Normal probability distribution with a Value of 550 and a standard
deviation of 100, indicating the probability of Evidences.
At the beginning of a round, the Seller is informed about the true Value of her/his
good. The true Value lies between 200 and 1000 points, each Value level in this interval
is equally likely. After observing the initial 10 Evidences, the Seller has the opportunity
to get 5 additional Evidences for a price of 15 points. As we said, the Seller cannot
report the true Value to the Buyer, but s/he can choose for each of the 10 (or 15)
Evidences whether to report it to the Buyer or not. The Seller cannot change or
manipulate the Evidences in any way.
After the Seller’s choice, the Buyer observes only the Evidences that the Seller chose
to report. S/He then places a Bid for the good. The Bid has to be an integer value
between 0 and 1200.
When does the transaction take place? The computer generates randomly a Price
of the Seller’s good. Neither Seller nor Buyer will be informed about the Price when
they take their decisions. The Price takes integer values between the Value minus 200
and the Value plus 200, with each Price level being equally likely (figure A.12). The
transaction takes place whenever the Buyer’s Bid is greater than or equal to the Price.
So, in our example, a Bid of
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Price
350 750550
Pr(Price)
Value
Figure A.12: Price distribution around the Value of 550.
1. 349 will never lead to a transaction, since the Price is certainly above.
2. 750 will always lead to a transaction since the Price is certainly below or the
same.
3. 550 corresponding to the Value will lead to a transaction with 50% chance.
How are the Seller’s and the Buyer’s payoff determined? First, if no transaction
takes place, the Buyer gets a payoff of 0 points. In case the Seller didn’t purchase
additional Evidences her/his payoff is 0 points as well. Otherwise her/his payoff is -15
points. If the transaction takes place, as we said depending on the Buyer’s Bid and
the random Price, the Seller produces the good at the cost of the Value minus 50. The
Seller’s payoff at the end of the round will be the Bid placed by the Buyer minus the
cost (production cost and possibly cost from purchasing 5 additional Evidences):
PayoffSeller =

BidBuyer − (Value − 50) without purchase of additional Evidences
BidBuyer − (Value − 50) − 15 with purchase of additional Evidences
The Buyer’s payoff is the true Value of the good minus the Price:
PayoffBuyer = Value − Price.
Notice that a Bid equal to the Value will ensure the Buyer to never make losses. If the
Price was higher than the Bid=Value, the transaction would not take place. Recall
from 3. that under a Bid=Value, the transaction does not take place half the times.
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Further, note that in terms of expected payoff, the Buyer benefits most from bidding
what he believes the Value of the item is. The bids are limited to be between 0 and 1200.
Figures A.13a to A.13d present various scenarios. In these scenarios the purchasing of
additional Evidences is not considered.
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572
Bid
Seller’s payoff: 0, Buyer’s payoff: 0
(a) Price>Bid: No transaction. Payoffs=0.
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Buyer’s payoff: +34
Seller’s payoff: +28
(b) Transaction scenario 1.
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(c) Transaction scenario 2.
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(d) Transaction scenario 3.
Figure A.13: Transaction scenarios.
Part I of this experiment consists of 2 practice rounds and 2 blocks of 5 experiment
rounds. At the beginning of each round, you will be informed about the randomly
chosen role (Seller or Buyer) that you take. You keep this role in the first block of 5
rounds, and take on the other role in the second block. You will keep the same role
within a block, but you will face randomly chosen market counterparts. Throughout,
one seller and one buyer will form a market.
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In order to participate in the experiment, you will go through a brief understanding
test. Here and throughout the experiment, you can access a calculator via a button
in the right bottom corner of your screen. Once everybody accomplishes this test, you
can get more familiar with the normal distribution with standard deviation of 100. For
that purpose, you will have three minutes to simulate as often as you want the process
of generating 10 Evidences for different Values. The experiment will start with the 2
practice rounds that are not paid. Finally, you proceed to the paid rounds.
Are there any questions? If not, please turn to your screens and follow carefully the
instructions there.
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Part II
You are about to start Part II of the experiment, which consists of no practice rounds
and 2 blocks of 5 experiment rounds. Like before, in each block of 5 rounds you will
take the same role, and you will face randomly chosen market counterparts.
In this part, one market will consist of 4 Sellers and 4 Buyers. Just like before, the
Sellers first decide whether they want to purchase 5 additional Evidences. Then they
choose the Evidences they want to report. The Buyers will see the reports of all 4
Sellers. Sellers as well will be informed about the reports of the other Sellers. Before
the Buyers place their bid, they have to chose from which Seller to buy. For the chosen
Seller’s good, the Buyer places a bid and the Buyer’s payoff is determined in the same
fashion as before. The payoff of the Sellers is as well determined in the same fashion
as before. The Seller sells one item of their good to each Buyer whose Bid exceeds the
Price. A Seller might sell to none, one, two, three, or four Buyers.
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B Appendix Chapter 3
B.1 Screenshots
Figure B.1: Screen in entry stage in Market Force treatment
Figure B.2: Screen in capacity choice stage – main market
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Figure B.3: Screen in the third period of the pricing stage – main market
Figure B.4: Screen at the end of a round in the Market Force treatment
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B.2 Instructions for Market Force treatment
Welcome and thank you for participating. In this experiment you will have the oppor-
tunity to earn a certain number of ECUs (experimental currency units). At the end of
todays session we will convert these ECUs to an amount of money, using an exchange
rate of 175 ECUs = 1 Euro. We will pay you in cash and in private. How much money
you earn will depend on your decisions so please follow these instructions carefully.
Please note the following before we begin: It is very important to us that all participants
are focussed exclusively on their own decision making. Please do not talk to the other
people and also do not communicate with them by any other means. If you have a
question during the experiment, just raise your hand and we will come to you.
At the beginning of the experiment the computer will randomly allocate the partici-
pants in this session to groups of 5. The experiment consists of 10 rounds, and in
these rounds you will interact with the other four people in your group but not with
the members of other groups. You will not learn who has been allocated to your group.
What is this about?
In todays experiment you assume the role of a firm. Your task will be to decide how
much to produce and at what price you want to offer your product. Furthermore, in
each round you will choose whether you want to operate on the main market or on
the side market. The other members of your group must take the same decisions for
themselves. Your starting capital at the beginning is ECU 1,000. Depending on the
decisions that you and others make you may earn additional ECUs. Losses are possible
too, however.
The organization of a round
At the beginning of round 1 you first decide whether you wish to go on the main market
or on the side market for this round. So that you are able to evaluate the consequences
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of your decision we will provide you with a calculator via the software that allows you
to run through possible scenarios and how they affect your ECU earnings in advance.
We will describe this calculator in more detail further below.
If you choose the main market you will compete with those in your group who have
also selected the main market for the current round. If you choose the side market you
will not compete with other firms in the current round (that is, there is a separate side
market for each firm). You and the other four members of your group make the main
market/side market decision simultaneously and individually. Therefore, you will only
learn how many other firms have chosen the main market after you have submitted
your own decision. Up to 5 firms in total (all members of a group) can simultaneously
operate on the main market.
The main market
As soon as everyone has made their decision you will be informed about the number of
firms on the main market. The round then consists of two phases. In phase 1 each firm
decides on its production capacity for the current round, and in phase 2 the firms on
the main market compete in 3 consecutive periods by choosing prices for their goods.
After the third period the round ends.
A firms production capacity determines how man units it can maximally produce in
each period of phase 2. At the beginning of phase 2 the production capacities of all
firms involved will be announced.
In each of the three periods of phase 2 each firm chooses a price (in ECUs) for its
product. At the end of each period the computer then calculates how many units
each firm sells. For this a particular formula is used, which is of course the same that
underlies the already mentioned calculator that allows you to try out how different
prices affect your earnings.
Basically, there are the following three principles:
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Principle 1: The higher your price the fewer units you will sell: For each ECU you
charge more you sell two units less. The number of units you sell can even fall to zero.
Principle 2: The higher the prices of your competitors the more units you will sell: For
each ECU that the other firms average price increases you sell one additional unit.
Principle 3: Per period you cannot sell more units than you have production capacity.
Please note that at this stage you cannot change the production capacity you have
chosen in phase 1. Each capacity unit costs ECU 50. You bear these costs only once,
in phase 1. In phase 2 (in the 3 periods) there are no costs.
Here are two examples. The numbers are completely arbitrary and are just for illus-
tration. Example 1: A firm chooses a production capacity of 5 units. This means
that it can sell up to 5 units in each of the 3 periods. Its costs in phase 1 are 5 ECU
50 = ECU 250. In period 1 it chooses a price of ECU 10 and sells 5 units (although it
would have been able to sell more units at this price if it had chosen a higher capacity
level in phase 1). In period 2 it chooses a price of ECU 20 and again sells exactly 5
units due to its constrained capacity. In period 3 it chooses a price of ECU 30 and this
time it sells 4 units.
The firms account at the end of the round:
Example 2: A firm chooses a production capacity of 30 units. This means that it can
sell up to 30 units in each of the three periods. Its costs in phase 1 are 30 ECU 50 =
ECU 1,500. In period 1 it chooses a price of ECU 25 and sells 25 units. In period 2 it
chooses a price of ECU 40 and sells 0 units. In period 3 it chooses a price of ECU 15
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and sells 20 units.
The firms account at the end of the round:
Investing in capacity is necessary in order for you to be able to obtain a profit.
Note also that you have the possibility to invest an amount that exceeds your current
account balance.
At the end of the round the firms that are present on the main market individually
decide for themselves whether they wish to remain on the main market for the subse-
quent round or wish to exit the main market. Firms that decide to exit will operate
on the side market during the subsequent round. There is one special rule: All firms
whose account balance falls below ECU 300 at the end of the round must leave the
main market.
At the same time the firms that are not present on the main market individually decide
for themselves whether they want to enter the main market. Entering the main market
requires an account balance of at least ECU 300, however. Furthermore, entry is also
restricted in an-other respect: The main market is allowed to grow by only one firm
from round to round. An example: In the round that has just been completed there
were 2 firms present on the main market. One of these firms now decides to leave
the main market, and the other one chooses to stay on the main market. Meanwhile,
all firms that were not previously on the main market now want to enter the main
market. However, because the main market is allowed to grow by only one firm overall
(to then 3 firms), only two of the firms interested in the main market are admitted.
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The selection of these two firms is done at random. The place of the one firm that had
previously operated on the main market is secure.
The side market
As already explained above the side market and the main market differ in that there is
no interaction between firms on the side market. Thus, each firm operates in its own
individual side market. Another difference between the main and the side market is
that the demand level on the side market fluctuates randomly from round to round
while the demand situation on the main market remains in principle the same (although
the demand for your product is affected by the number of firms on the main market
and by their actions).
In all other respects the side market and the main market are practically identical.
Here, too, you determine first (in phase 1) your production capacity and then (in phase
2) choose prices in three consecutive periods. At the end of the round the computer
shows you a statement with your expenditures for ca-pacity and your revenue from the
three periods. Moreover, you get a summary of what has happened on the main market
in the current round (number of firms, chosen capacity levels, average prices). Finally,
you will be asked whether you want to enter the main market or stay on the side market.
The calculator
As already mentioned above, our software provides you with a calculator which you
can use to run through possible scenarios. The calculator for the main market has four
sliders that allow you to set (a) the number of firms on the main market, (b) your
production capacity, (c) your price and (d) the average price of the other firms on the
main market. The calculator shows you your expected costs and revenues (the costs
and revenues that would emerge in the scenario you selected by choosing values for a,
b, c and d).
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Figure B.5: The four sliders (initial settings)
During the round the calculator becomes somewhat simpler: As soon as the actual
number of firms on the main market is known, the first slider disappears and the
calculator uses only the actual number of firms, and as soon as you have chosen your
production capacity the second slider also disappears and the calculator uses only your
actual capacity.
Figure B.6: The sliders again (during phase 2) and the output for particular prices
Notes: The example here displays a case where the firm is currently choosing its price for period 2. As shown the actual number of firms
on the main market is 3 and the firm has chosen a capacity of 15 units for this round. The calculator is set to show what would happen
if the firms own price is ECU 18 and the others average price turns out to be ECU 19.5. The result: The firm would sell 15 units and
obtain a revenue of ECU 270 (= 15 ECU 18). On the right hand side you see the currently expected total revenue from periods 1 and 2
(if the ECU 270 really materialize in period 2), the projected total revenue from all 3 periods (if the ECU 270 materialize in both period
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2 and then once again in period 3), the capacity cost of ECU 750 (15 units ECU 50) and finally the expected profit (expected revenue
from all 3 periods minus the ECU 750).
We provide you with a very similar calculator on the side market when you operate on the
side market. However, at the very beginning of the session and in between the rounds (i.e.
whenever you have to decide whether you wish to enter the main market) the computer will,
for simplicity, display only the calculator for the main market. To give you some orientation:
On the side market you can expect a profit of between approximately ECU 160 and approx-
imately ECU 330 per round, if you choose your capacity and your prices optimally. Your
potential profit on the main market depends on the individual decisions of all firms that are
involved.
Final remarks
On the main market prices up to ECU 50 and individual production capacity levels of up to
50 units are allowed. Only whole numbers are permissible. On the side market prices can
also be up to ECU 50 but the maximum possible capacity is only 20 units because demand
levels are generally lower than on the main market.
You have to submit your decisions within certain time limits. In the first 5 rounds these time
limits are more generous than in the last 5 rounds. At the beginning of the very first round,
you have a one-off opportunity to spend 5 minutes on trying out the calculator intensively
and to take a first decision between main market and side market. For rounds 2 to 5 you
have 2 minutes for selecting main or side market. You must choose your production capacity
in a round within 2 minutes and your price in a period within 90 seconds.
After round 5 you will be reminded that you are now entering the second half of the exper-
iment. The second half also consists of 5 rounds and is identical to the first half in every
respect. The only difference is that from now on you only have 90 seconds to choose between
main market and side market and that you only have 60 seconds to choose your price. The
time limit for your capacity choice remains at 2 minutes.
When the time is up and you have not submitted a decision, the computer will in each case
automatically choose an option for you, and to do this it will submit the value that you, at
that precise moment, had selected for the relevant variable in your calculator (production
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capacity or price). If you fail to submit the main market/side market decision in time, the
computer will choose the side market for you. The applicable countdown is always shown in
the top right corner of your screen.
If you have any questions, now or during the experiment, please raise your arm and we will
come to you.
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C Appendix Chapter 4
C.1 Theoretical considerations
Consider a team of n players working together on a project. The individual investment in
period t is denoted by xi,t ∀ i = 1, 2, ..., n and the total individual investment until period t,
including investments in period t, is denoted by
∑t
k=1 xi,k = y
t
i . Hence, the total aggregated
team investment at the end of period t is given by
∑n
i=1 y
t
i = Y
t.
In order to complete a project the teams’ total investment has to meet the threshold of
H = 50n. In each period, team members have to decide how much to invest. The amount
that is still missing to reach the threshold is denoted by Zt = H − Y t−1 in period t.1
Assume that the trigger strategy is such that the total investment in period t is equal to
Xˆt. If someone deviates and the total investment in a periods is Xt < Xˆt everyone will stop
their investment and the project is not completed.
Assume further that until period t˜ − 1 everyone has invested such that Xt ≥ Xˆt but in
period t˜ there is a deviation and X t˜ < Xˆt. Hence, the total investment at the end of period
t˜ is Y t˜ = (t − 1)Xt + X t˜. According to the trigger strategy all players should stop their
investments in the following periods t ≥ t˜ + 1. Hence, xi,t = 0 for i and ∀ t > t˜ and the
project is not completed.
This trigger strategy is only credible if none of the players have an incentive to continue
investing and completing the project on his/her own. In period t˜+ 1 the team is still missing
Zt˜+1 = H − Y t˜ to reach the threshold of H. Consider a player i that did not deviate in
the previous periods. In order for this player to have an incentive to continue to invest to
complete the project given that all other players stick to the trigger strategy and stop their
investments, three conditions have to be fulfilled:
(i) T ≤ 30 (Time restriction)
(ii) Zt˜+1 ≤ 75− yt˜i (Budget restriction)
1Note: When players make their investment decisions in period t the aggregated team investment
is Y t−1.
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(iii) Payoff of competing the project has to be larger or equal to sticking to the trigger strat-
egy 75 + 90− 2(T − 5)− yTi ≤ 75− yt˜i
For (i): As the maximum investment per period is 10 ECUs, i would need at least
T − t˜ = H − Y
t˜
10
=
50n− Y t˜
10
additional periods to complete the project. Taking into account that the maximum number
of periods is only 30:
50n− Y t˜
10
+ t˜ ≤ 30
Y t˜ ≥ 50n+ 10t˜− 300
For (ii): Considering the case of symmetric investment, the budget restriction Zt˜+1 ≤
75− yt˜i can be written as
75− Y
t˜
n
≥ 50n− Y t˜
Y t˜ ≥ 25(2n− 3) n
(n− 1)
For (iii):
75 + 90− 2(T − 5)− Y T ≥ 75− Y
t˜
n
Substituting T = H−Y
t˜
10 + t˜ and solving for Y
t˜ gives the following condition:
Y t˜ ≥ 5
3
t− 250
3
+ 50n
When does which condition apply?
(i) > (ii) for
50n+ 10t− 300 ≥ 25(2n− 3) n
(n− 1)
t ≥ 27.5n− 30
(n− 1)
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(iii) > (ii) for
5
3
t− 250
3
+ 50n ≥ 25(2n− 3) n
(n− 1)
t ≥ 35n− 50
(n− 1)
(i) > (iii) for
50n+ 10t− 300 ≥ 5
3
t− 250
3
+ 50n
t ≥ 26
For n = 3 and n = 7 condition (ii) is stricter than condition (iii) for t < 28 and for t ≥ 26
(i) is stricter than (iii). Hence for T ≤ 30 the trigger strategy to be credible the total team
investment in period t has to fulfill 4.1
Y t ≤

25(2n− 3) n(n−1) for t ≤ 27.5n−30(n−1) for T ≤ 30
50n+ 10t− 300 for t ≥ 27.5n−30(n−1) for T ≤ 30
(C.1)
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C.2 Screenshots
Figure C.1: Screen in treatment without deadline (three-person teams)
Figure C.2: Feedback at the end of each round
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Figure C.3: Screen to enter suggestion for a deadline
Figure C.4: Feedback on suggestions made by all team members and deadline
C Appendix Chapter 4 169
C.3 Instructions – Endogenous deadline, three-person teams
Instructions General rules
Welcome! You are about to take part in an experiment in the economics of decision making.
You will be paid in private and in cash right after the end of the experiment. The amount
you earn will depend on your decisions, so please follow the instructions carefully. During
the experiment your payoffs are denominated in ECUs (Experimental Currency Units). Your
ECU earnings will be converted to cash at the end of todays session at an exchange rate of
30 ECUs = 1 Euro. Thus, the more ECUs you earn the more cash you will take home today.
The experiment will consist of two parts. In the first part you will be working alone while
in the second part you will be assigned to teams. Each part will consist of a certain number
of rounds, as will be explained in detail in a few moments. At the end of the session one
of these rounds will be selected at random. Your cash earnings from the experiment will be
calculated based on your ECU earnings in this randomly selected round.
Note: It is important that you do not talk to any of the other participants until
the experiment is over. If you have a question at any time, raise your hand and
someone will come to your desk to answer it.
Instructions for Part 1
This part will consist of just a single round. This round, in turn, will consist of several periods
(up to a maximum of 30, as explained below).
At the beginning of the round you receive an initial endowment of 300 ECUs. In each period
of the round you will decide how many ECUs to invest into a project. You can invest any
integer number between 0 and 10 ECUs in each period. Whatever you decide to invest into
the project will be subtracted from your initial endowment and is non-refundable. Your total
investment will be summed up over the periods. As soon as your total investment is 50 ECUs
or greater the project is completed and the round ends. As a reward for the completion of
the project you will receive an additional 300 ECUs.
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Since you can invest no more than 10 ECUs in a single period and since the threshold for
the completion of the project is 50 ECUs, you will need at least 5 periods to complete the
project. If you do not complete the project within 5 periods an amount of 15 ECUs will be
subtracted from the 300 ECU reward for each additional period you need to complete the
project. If you do not complete the project within 30 periods the round ends and you will
not receive the reward.
Thus, your earnings in this round will be calculated as:
Initial endowment Your total investment + Reward if you complete the project
The reward for completing the project is calculated as:
300 ECUs 15 ECUs for each period after period 5
You are provided with a calculator in the bottom left box of your screen. There you can
enter your average investment per period starting from the current period your in and the
computer will tell you what your last period and your expected payoff will be. You can use
the calculator as often as you want.
Instruction for Part 2
This part consists of twelve rounds in total. At the beginning of each round you will be
matched with two other participants, randomly selected from the people in this room. The
three of you form a team. As before, your task is to decide how much you want to invest into
a project but this time all members of your team invest into the same project. The way you
take decisions will be the same in all rounds but the identity of the people you are teamed
up with will change from round to round.
Each round consists of several periods. In the first three rounds the maximum number of
periods is 30. In the remaining nine rounds you will have the opportunity to decide on the
maximum number of periods as a team. This will be explained in detail below.
Just like in part 1 you receive an initial endowment of 300 ECUs and you can invest any
integer number between 0 and 10 ECUs in each period. All team members make their
investment decisions independently but at the end of each period you will be informed about
your teams total investment, the total amount that you have invested thus far and how much
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your team still needs to invest to reach the threshold of 150 ECUs. As soon as your teams
total investment (summed up over the periods) does reach or exceed the threshold the project
is complete and the round ends. As a reward for the completion of the project each team
member will receive an additional 300 ECUs.
Since you can invest no more than 10 ECUs per person in a single period and since the
threshold for the completion of the project is 150 ECUs, you will need at least 5 periods
to complete the project. If your team does not complete the project within 5 periods an
amount of 15 ECUs will be subtracted from the 300 ECU reward for each additional period
your team needs to complete the project. If your team does not complete the project within
the maximum number of periods the round ends and you will not receive the reward.
Thus, your individual earnings in this round will be calculated as:
Initial endowment Your individual total investment + Reward if your team completes the
project
The reward for completing the project is calculated as:
300 ECUs 15 ECUs for each period after period 5
In rounds 4-12 teams will use the following procedure to determine the maximum number of
periods for completing the project. At the beginning of the round each team member will be
asked to suggest a maximum number of periods (up to 30). As soon as all the team members
have submitted a suggestion the computer will rank these suggestions from lowest to highest
and will impose the middle one as the relevant maximum number of periods for that round.
As before, you are provided with a calculator in the bottom left box of your screen. There
you can enter
- your average investment per period starting from the current period
- what you believe all others’ average investment per person per period is going to be
Then the computer will tell you what the last period and your expected payoff will be in this
case. You can use the calculator as often as you want.
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C.4 Instructions – Exogenous deadline, seven-person teams
Instructions General rules
Welcome! You are about to take part in an experiment in the economics of decision making.
You will be paid in private and in cash right after the end of the experiment. The amount
you earn will depend on your decisions, so please follow the instructions carefully. During
the experiment your payoffs are denominated in ECUs (Experimental Currency Units). Your
ECU earnings will be converted to cash at the end of todays session at an exchange rate of
30 ECUs = 1 Euro. Thus, the more ECUs you earn the more cash you will take home today.
The experiment will consist of two parts. In the first part you will be working alone while
in the second part you will be assigned to teams. Each part will consist of a certain number
of rounds, as will be explained in detail in a few moments. At the end of the session one
of these rounds will be selected at random. Your cash earnings from the experiment will be
calculated based on your ECU earnings in this randomly selected round.
Note: It is important that you do not talk to any of the other participants until
the experiment is over. If you have a question at any time, raise your hand and
someone will come to your desk to answer it.
Instructions for Part 1
This part will consist of just a single round. This round, in turn, will consist of several periods
(up to a maximum of 30, as explained below).
At the beginning of the round you receive an initial endowment of 75 ECUs. In each period
of the round you will decide how many ECUs to invest into a project. You can invest any
integer number between 0 and 10 ECUs in each period. Whatever you decide to invest into
the project will be subtracted from your initial endowment and is non-refundable. Your total
investment will be summed up over the periods. As soon as your total investment is 50 ECUs
or greater the project is completed and the round ends. As a reward for the completion of
the project you will receive an additional 90 ECUs.
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Since you can invest no more than 10 ECUs in a single period and since the threshold for the
completion of the project is 50 ECUs, you will need at least 5 periods to complete the project.
If you do not complete the project within 5 periods an amount of 2 ECUs will be subtracted
from the 90 ECU reward for each additional period you need to complete the project. If you
do not complete the project within 30 periods the round ends and you will not receive the
reward.
Thus, your earnings in this round will be calculated as:
Initial endowment Your total investment + Reward if you complete the project
The reward for completing the project is calculated as:
90 ECUs 2 ECUs for each period after period 5
You are provided with a calculator in the bottom left box of your screen. There you can
enter your average investment per period starting from the current period youre in and the
computer will tell you what your last period and your expected payoff will be. You can use
the calculator as often as you want.
Instruction for Part 2
This part consists of nine rounds in total. At the beginning of each round you will be matched
with six other participants, randomly selected from the people in this room. The seven of
you form a team. As before, your task is to decide how much you want to invest into a
project but this time all members of your team invest into the same project. The way you
take decisions will be the same in all rounds but the identity of the people you are teamed
up with will change from round to round.
Each round consists of several periods. In the first three rounds the maximum number of
periods is 30. In the remaining six rounds the maximum number of rounds will change from
round to round. You will be informed about the current maximum number of periods at the
beginning of each round.
Just like in Part 1 you receive an initial endowment of 75 ECUs and you can invest any
integer number between 0 and 10 ECUs in each period. All team members make their
investment decisions independently but at the end of each period you will be informed about
C Appendix Chapter 4 174
your teams total investment, the total amount that you have invested thus far and how much
your team still needs to invest to reach the threshold of 350 ECUs. As soon as your teams
total investment (summed up over the periods) does reach or exceed the threshold the project
is complete and the round ends. As a reward for the completion of the project each team
member will receive an additional 90 ECUs.
Since you can invest no more than 10 ECUs per person in a single period and since the
threshold for the completion of the project is 350 ECUs, you will need at least 5 periods
to complete the project. If your team does not complete the project within 5 periods an
amount of 2 ECUs will be subtracted from the 90 ECU reward for each additional period
your team needs to complete the project. If your team does not complete the project within
the maximum number of periods the round ends and you will not receive the reward.
Thus, your individual earnings in this round will be calculated as:
Initial endowment Your individual total investment + Reward if your team completes the
project
The reward for completing the project is calculated as:
90 ECUs 2 ECUs for each period after period 5
As before, you are provided with a calculator in the bottom left box of your screen. There
you can enter
- your average investment per period starting from the current period
- what you believe all others’ average investment per person per period is going to be
Then the computer will tell you what the last period and your expected payoff will be in this
case. You can use the calculator as often as you want.
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